IRAQ-IRAN DIPLOMACY A SIGN OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE OR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000289 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER PINR ECON EAIR IR IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ-IRAN DIPLOMACY A SIGN OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE OR IRAQI RESOLVE? REF: A. BAGHDAD 197 ¶B. BAGHDAD 133 ¶C. BAGHDAD 91 ¶D. BAGHDAD 129 ¶E. BAGHDAD 152 ¶F. BAGHDAD 196 Classified By: Acting DCM Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b-d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Recent Iraqi-Iranian visits (most notably PM Maliki and National Security Advisor al-Rubaie's visits to Tehran) indicate that Iraq is being increasingly assertive toward its ambitious neighbor, and that Iran is showing Iraq overdue respect, although the relationship might be characterized as "scratchy" at best. (GoI has failed to get any Iranian movement on water or border issues.) Al-Rubaie claimed that he pressed Iran on border issues including smuggling, and PM Maliki's team says he was warmly received there (despite Iran's apparent stalling on Maliki's planned December visit). While it is hard to gauge the truth of these claims, it is notable that -- for now, at least -- PM Maliki has displayed backbone in the face of Iranian pressure on the US-Iraq Security Agreement and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK). However, the Iraqis are getting no satisfaction on their concerns about water flows from Iran and the Shatt al-Arab. Diplomatic accreditation is also an irritant. The lingering threat of violence by Iranian-backed insurgents and Iran's full-court press by trade delegations heading across the country from Basra to Erbil indicate that Iraq will continue to face a spectrum of challenges in the relationship. End summary. -------------- Frequent political visits -------------- ¶2. (S) National Security Advisor Mowafaq al-Rubaie carried the message of a more confident Iraq to Tehran in meetings with senior Iranian officials January 19-22, according to readouts of the visit Rubaie gave to the Embassy (ref A). Rubaie said his Iranian interlocutors did not react harshly to the USG-GoI Security Agreement or the GOI's approach to the MEK at Camp Ashraf, while Rubaie said he demanded an end to smuggling from Iran to Iraq (and sent a paper to the Ambassador listing stopping Iranian arms smuggling as one of his main objectives). In contrast to Rubaie's tough-talking descriptions of the Tehran meetings, press accounts portrayed the visit as a warm affirmation of Iraqi-Iranian relations. 
But regardless of what Rubaie actually told the Iranians about Iraqi policy toward Camp Ashraf, the GoI continues to take a measured approach to the issue (ref B). ¶3. (S) Iranian officials received Maliki much more warmly on his visit January 3-5 than they did during his last trip in June 2008, a visit that was soured by belligerent Iranian opposition to the Security Agreement negotiations, according to MFA Director for Neighboring Countries Ambassador Taha al-Abassi, who accompanied Maliki to Tehran in January (ref B). This assessment does not reflect all the likely tension involved in arranging the visit and the topics discussed, including the unexplained rescheduling of the planned December 25 visit by the Iranian side. Saad al-Muttalibi, a confidant of Rubaie and international affairs director of the Ministry of Dialogue and Reconciliation, told Iran watchers that despite media reports of Maliki's cozy statements toward Iran, he approached his meetings with confidence and determination. Al-Muttalibi pointed to a small but telling detail as evidence: for his June 2008 meeting with Khamanei, Maliki removed his necktie out of deference to Khamanei's association of ties with Western Qdeference to Khamanei's association of ties with Western influence, but for the January 2009 visit, Maliki left his tie on. ¶4. (S) The GoI may be adopting a more confident posture toward the Iranians, but negotiating success remains elusive. Economic ministers accompanied Maliki to discuss issues including Shatt al-Arab navigation, riparian rights and an Iranian offer for $1 billion in loans and economic assistance. In an apparent reference to the visits on Jan. 5, Deputy Prime minister al-Essawi told the Deputy Secretary that recent missions to Iran had failed to convince the Iranians to release water from new dams into drought-stricken agricultural areas in Diwaniyah (ref D). The GoI has also failed recently to convince the Iranian government to reconsider the 1975 Algiers accord demarcating the Iran-Iraq border, under which Iraqis believe that Saddam Hussein compromised national interests for a politically expedient agreement. ¶5. (C) Meanwhile, an Iranian media delegation headed by MFA spokesman Hassan Qashqavi received glowing coverage in Iran of its January 16 meeting in Baghdad with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, who has long-standing ties to Iran. Iranian media quoted Talabani describing the Iraqi-Iranian relationship as "flourishing," calling for more economic and cultural cooperation. The media delegation appeared to be a prelude to higher-level Iranian visitors in coming weeks. Among Iraqi visits to Iran was a trip to Tehran on December 28 by Mohammed Heidari, the Chairman of the Iraqi Council of Representative's Human Rights Committee, who discussed parliamentary cooperation with Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani. -------------- Nest of spies? -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Amid the high-level diplomacy, the GoI continues to restrict the activities of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) officers operating under diplomatic cover in Iraq. For several months, the Iraqi MFA has passed to the USG the names of proposed Iranian diplomats to Iraq, refusing to accredit those who we find have ties to the IRGC or Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (MOIS). In addition, on January 19, the MFA passed Iran watchers copies of the passport pages of 35 Iranian diplomats currently posted to Iraq to seek USG assistance in vetting them for IRGC and MOIS ties. (Note: The namechecks are still pending, but we believe a significant percentage are intelligence officers. End note.) ¶7. (S/NF) In November, Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad Hasan Kazemi Qomi called on MFA Undersecretary Labeed Abbawi to complain about GoI visa refusals and processing delays for proposed Iranian diplomats, according to Abbawi's assistant Sama Salim. Qomi threatened to withhold visas for Iraqis posted to Iran until all the Iranian visas were approved. Abbawi responded that if Iran intends to apply reciprocity to Iraq, Iran should take into account the fact that there are 65 accredited Iranian diplomats in Iraq but only 34 accredited Iraqi diplomats in Iran, Salim said. She added that the Iranian MFA has since approved all pending Iraqi applications. Meanwhile, the Iranians tried to avoid MFA scrutiny by obtaining a one-month visa for an administrative employee and applying for a one-year diplomatic visa once the employee arrived. Salim said on January 26 that the Iraqi MFA refused the extension and established a policy preventing all such extensions in the future. However, FM Zebari told Ambassador Satterfield on January 17 that he was very concerned about the Iranian diplomatic issues as he didn't believe he could resist intense Iranian personal pressure unless the Prime Minister stepped in and stood up to the Iranians on this issue also. -------------- 'Aggressive' Iranian investors -------------- ¶8. (S) For economic and political reasons, the Iranian government is aggressively pursuing expanded economic ties with Iraq. On January 11, a delegation of Iranian investors came to Muthanna province to continue negotiations for an $81 million iron plant. PRT Muthanna believes the Iranian delegation was largely comprised of former, and possibly current, representatives from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is not yet clear if the GoI will issue a license for the plant. Minister of Industry and Minerals (MIM) Fawzi Hariri said in a meeting January 14 that Iranian firms are QHariri said in a meeting January 14 that Iranian firms are very interested in investing in the state-owned Iraqi petrochemical sector, particularly the State Company for Petrochemical Industries in Basra (ref E). Describing the Iranian bidders as "very aggressive," Hariri said he was "literally having to fend them off." ¶9. (C) Other notable economic initiatives include, on January 13, the first commercial Iran-Iraq flight to land in Najaf in three decades. Iranian officials projected that up to three million Iranian pilgrims will fly this route in 2009. In the North, senior Iranian diplomats visited Erbil on January 24 and met with Iraqi Kurdistan leader Massoud Barzani in an effort to expand the market for Iranian goods, according to Tehran's Fars News Agency (ref F). Despite Iran's full-court economic press in Iraq and the Iraqi need for trade and investment, polling and anecdotal reports continue to indicate that Iraqis from Basra to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) harbor deep distrust of Iran. KRG Minister of State for the Interior Karim Sinjari claimed to us two days before the Iranian trade visit, "We don't want them or their money." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (S) While GoI officials' claims that they talk tough to the Iranians are hard to take at face value, and the relationship can best be described as "scratchy," their recent demonstrations of resolve do indicate that they are gradually developing the capacity to defend their interests against Iran. As the Iranians continue their ambitious outreach to Iraq, Iraq's capacity to promote its own interests on issues like water rights and the Shatt al- Arab will continue to be sorely tested. CROCKER