TURKOMANS: THE THIRD WHEEL ON ELECTION LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002864 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019 TAGS: KDEM PGOV IZ SUBJECT: TURKOMANS: THE THIRD WHEEL ON ELECTION LAW Classified By: Political Counselor Yuri Kim for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkoman intransigence on Kirkuk's treatment in the national elections has become a key sticking point in achieving consensus on a national election law. In discussions over how to divvy Kirkuk's allocation of seats in Parliament, the minority Turkoman insist on representation equal to that of the Kurds and Arabs, who far outnumber them in Kirkuk. The Kurds are opposed to this arrangement, as are the Arabs. At the same time, Kirkuki Arabs are reticent to negotiate any deal that leaves Turkoman concerns unaddressed. The complex three-way negotiations have so far resulted in deadlock. END SUMMARY. -------------- Turkoman Politics -------------- ¶2. (C) There are currently 9 Turkoman MPs in the Council of Representatives (COR) representing the community's estimated 1.7 million people who reside predominantly in the provinces of Kirkuk and Ninewa. The 9 Turkoman MPs are politically fractured, with four Shia MPs, including Fryad Omar Abdullah and Muhammad al-Bayati, caucusing with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI); two MPs caucusing with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP); and three independent Turkomans such as Walid Muhammad al-Sherika of the Sunni Turkoman Brotherhood and Sa'addin Ergec of the Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF). Despite their shared ethnicity, the various Turkoman parties have shown no desire to negotiate as a cohesive bloc and in fact in some cases openly feud with one another. Moving into the national elections, the various Turkoman parties have agreed to join different coalitions. On October 4, there were press reports announcing the formation of a national Turkoman coalition, but to date this list has not materialized. -------------- Positions on Election Law -------------- ¶3. (C) The one issue on which the various Turkoman MPs agree is the inaccuracy of the Kirkuk voter registration lists, but how to deal with those lists has them divided. On October 22, Turkey-backed Iraqi Turkoman Front leader Sa'addin Ergec told Pol M/C that he wants open-list elections to take place on time (January 2010),but with voters added to the 2004 voter registration list to account for reasonable demographic growth and for those who had turned 18 years old and were now eligible to vote since 2003. Realizing that a complete revision of the list could probably not be concluded prior to the election, Ergec proposed a quota system for Kirkuk that would give four representatives (seats) each to the Arab, Kurd and Turkoman communities and one seat to the Christians. ITF Director Aydin Aksu was less optimistic, telling Poloff on October 19 that he expects a delay of up to 1-3 months in passing the law. According to Aksu, the Turkomans favor at least a one-month delay in order to provide time to review the Kirkuk voter lists. (Note: Most of the major party blocs in the Parliament appear amenable to reviewing the voter lists as long as the effort is not focused solely on Kirkuk, but also on other areas that have seen large demographic growth since 2003. However, Ergec rejected any comparison of Kirkuk to other provinces like Ninewa, insisting that the population of Mosul had increased by 15% whereas the population of Kirkuk had risen 100% since 2003. End note.) ¶4. (C) On October 18, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Shia Turkoman Mohammad al-Bayati offered Poloffs two proposals. Al-Bayati stated that the "Arab-Turkoman" proposal calls for creating a committee, comprised of Council of Representatives (COR) members and representatives from Qof Representatives (COR) members and representatives from IHEC and the Ministries of Interior and Planning. This committee would review the voting records of Iraqis who moved to Kirkuk since 2003 using the 1957 census as a baseline. The objective of the committee would be to determine who is eligible to vote in Kirkuk. Bayati said this new committee would take decisions based on majority rule, not consensus. If this committee is unable to come to a decision, then al-Bayati proposed that elections be held using the 2004 voter registry by somehow dividing Kirkuk province into four electoral districts for this election so that the end result is that Arabs, Kurds and Turkomans each receive an equal number of MPs. ¶5. (C) Bayati's second proposal was to use the 2003 public distribution system (food ration cards) as a baseline, with each province allowed to accept more voters based on a 2.6% population increase per year for the 2010 election. (Note: Bayati said this 2.6% figure represents the international standard for population growth. End note.) He told Poloff that the Kurds are asking for a 5-10% per year population BAGHDAD 00002864 002 OF 002 increase in Kirkuk to account for all the newly arrived Kurdish residents, but said this is unacceptable. Asked whether ISCI would support the Turkoman position on the elections law, Bayati acknowledged that ISCI has a strategic relationship with the Kurds, but hoped that the party would not side with the Kurds at the expense of Turkomans as it had in the past. He claimed that during Ammar al-Hakim's speech at last weekend's ISCI party conference, Hakim had changed his policy on Kirkuk. Instead of calling for Kirkuk to be resolved "through the constitution," he had said it should be resolved "the appropriate way" implying, according to Bayati, that ISCI no longer sees Article 140 as the only mechanism by which to resolve Kirkuk's status. ¶6. (C) Another ISCI-affiliated Shia Turkoman, MP Fryad Omar Abdullah, told Poloff that he would prefer that Kirkuk not be included in the national elections than that the city vote with inaccurate voter lists. He said he did not care how long it would take to get an accurate voter registration list and that he would not accept compensatory seats for Kirkuk. ¶7. (C) Kurdish-aligned Turkoman Brotherhood Party COR MP Walid Muhammad al-Sherika told Poloffs on October 16, that he publicly supports an open list, but privately prefers closed list, single district on-time election. He explained that a closed list system would give minorities a better chance and that he would rather delay passage of the law to allow more time for consensus. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: The Turkomans' intransigence on the Kirkuk issue has been a key factor in the COR's failure to pass a national elections law. The impasse has forced Iraq's political leaders to use the Political Council for National Security (PCNS) to build a consensus on a draft law. The Turkomans are not likely to be included in the final PCNS deliberations given their small numbers and fractured positions, which would enable a compromise without formal Turkoman input. How the Turkoman react to any PCNS decision remains to be seen. END COMMENT. FORD