INITIAL AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN SECURITY INITIATIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002824 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2034 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR IZ SUBJECT: INITIAL AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN SECURITY INITIATIVE Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary & Comment: GOI, KRG and U.S. senior officials agreed on the text of a Northern Security Initiative that would create a joint security architecture for the disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas in the northern provinces of Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala. The plan would bring select Iraqi, Kurdish and U.S. forces under the rubric of a shared command-and-control structure and establish joint checkpoints and patrols, an integrated intelligence apparatus and Combined Coordination Centers (CCCs) to direct the combined forces' activities in defined Combined Security Areas (CSAs) within the DIBs areas. Consistent with the Security Agreement, the U.S. role is supervisory and advisory. Once the parties have generated a timeline to establish the CCCs and lists of personnel to staff them, the agreement will be forwarded to PM Maliki and KRG President Barzani for approval. The establishment of CCCs, joint checkpoints/patrols and integrated intelligence is expected to move ahead quickly. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary & Comment (continued): Agreement on the Northern Security Initiative at the ministerial level represents an important step towards constituting a potentially significant mechanism for mitigating tensions in northern Iraq. The joint security architecture would help close seams between Kurdish and IA-held territories in the north that AQI and others have exploited to perpetrate attacks against minorities in recent months, with the apparent goal of fomenting ethno-sectarian discord. Perhaps as importantly, it could help tamp down tension in areas like Kirkuk and Ninewa, where Arab-Kurd political rivalries have threatened to flare into violence. End summary & comment. THIRD MINISTERIAL ON NORTHERN SECURITY INITIATIVE ¶3. (S/NF) The third Northern Security Initiative Ministerial Summit was held on October 17 at the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in Baghdad (list of participants at para 9). (Note: The previous two ministerials were held on August 16 at al-Faw Palace in Baghdad and on September 5 at the KRG's Ministry of Interior (KMOI) in Erbil. End note.) The goal was to review a proposed joint security architecture for the DIBs areas in Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala provinces. (Note: The GOI's MOD prefers the phrase "Areas of Joint Interest" to DIBs. End note.) The joint security architecture would comprise the following elements: 1) checkpoints jointly manned by Iraqi Army (IA),Peshmerga and U.S. forces (USF); 2) joint IA/Peshmerga/USF patrols; 3) the establishment of three CCCs to support and direct the combined forces' activities, and; 4) steps to facilitate intelligence sharing between constituent elements. ¶4. (S/NF) The three sides negotiated on the basis of a statement of six principles agreed on at the September meeting. They are: 1) security of the people is paramount; 2) unity of effort in the proposed joint security forces is critical; 3) force levels must be adequate to secure each province; 4) forces in each province should reflect the demographic composition of that area; 5) intelligence organizations must work for the federal and provincial governments (not political parties),and; 6) all security forces must operate within the rule of law. PARTIES APPROVE THE PROPOSED JOINT SECURITY PLAN ¶5. (S/NF) The parties agreed on the proposal for the joint Q5. (S/NF) The parties agreed on the proposal for the joint security architecture, to include joint checkpoints/patrols and integrated command and intelligence structures, and achieved more specificity on the (temporary) U.S. supervisory role than had previously obtained. The next steps are for the IA, IP and Peshmerga to draw up lists of personnel to staff the operations centers in each of the three provinces and to establish a timeline for initiation of the CCCs. The entire package - including the outline of the structure, proposed personnel lists and timeline for CCCs - will then be submitted to PM Maliki and KRG President Barzani for final approval. In Ninewa and Diyala, a CCC will be established within the existing Ninewa and Diyala Operations commands (NOC and DOC, respectively). In Kirkuk, there was spirited discussion about where the CCC should be sited. The GOI Minister of Defense argued that it should be co-located with the IA 12th division; the KMOI believed it should be located at U.S. Forward Operating Base Warrior. A temporary site will be used through the upcoming elections; construction of a new Kirkuk Operations Center would commence in the interim. QUICK EXECUTIVE APPROVAL EXPECTED, BUT NOT ASSURED BAGHDAD 00002824 002 OF 002 ¶6. (S/NF) It is expected that the joint security plan will quickly be approved by Maliki and Barzani so operations in designated CSAs in the run-up to the election can take place under the rubric of the Northern Security Initiative. (Comment: However, Iraq is in the throes of a national election season and final approval may be subject to political pressures. End comment.) Consistent with the Security Agreement, the U.S. role is supervisory and advisory. The initial phase of the plan would last through the elections and seating of a new government, and would consist of establishing the three CCCs, integrating intelligence functions and establishing joint checkpoints and patrols. There was agreement that any movement of forces within the DIBs areas would have to be authorized at the Ministry level in the respective capitals. (Note: Discrete combined operations in the CSAs - vice movements of troop concentrations - would only need to be approved by the CCCs. End note.) POSITIVE ATMOSPHERICS AUGUR WELL ¶7. (S/NF) There was a great deal of uncertainty as to how GOI Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir would approach the joint security proposal, but he came well-briefed and prepared to move the matter forward. Abdul Qadir stressed the importance of elevating current levels of coordination between the respective GOI and KRG ministries, increasing the number of liaison officers within the military and police forces at the governate level and at the ministry buildings in the respective capitals. The parties not only reached agreement on the proposal, but negotiated in good faith around several issues that easily could have disrupted the proceedings. Following the ministerial, KMOI Sinjari told the Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq the agreement represented an important achievement, expressed optimism that it would be quickly implemented and thought it would positively transform "the security atmosphere" across the DIBs. He was careful to caution against overly high expectations, though. BUT OUTREACH EFFORTS WILL BE IMPORTANT ¶8. (S/NF) Despite apparent goodwill at the national level, there are fears within Arab and Turkoman communities in the north that implementation of the plan could legitimize the presence of Peshmerga in contested areas. The initiative experienced turbulence in August/September, when PM Maliki seemed to hesitate to take ownership of it in the face of protests by Kirkuki Arabs and Turkomans. Those voices are likely to be heard again when the approved plan is announced; it remains to be seen whether the PM will be more resolute in endorsing it this time around. Similarly, while the Kurds strongly support the initiative, they are motivated more by a desire to cooperate closely with U.S. forces than by prospect of integrating their forces with IA or Iraqi Police elements. We will need to engage concerned parties to assure them that the purpose of the plan is to protect the Iraqi people and prevent extremist elements from using violence to disrupt the upcoming national elections. The plan represents the first stage of a process to build confidence between forces as they move toward developing a more permanent security solution in the DIBs areas. The process of engaging communities in the north to ensure their buy-in for the security plan will be important. ¶9. (C) Principal participants in the October 17 summit were: Q9. (C) Principal participants in the October 17 summit were: U.S.: MNF-I Commanding General (CG) Ray Odierno; Lieutenant General Mike Barbero, MNSTC-I CG; Major General JD Johnson, MNC-I Commander; Major General Bob Caslen, MND-N Commander; Brigadier General Joe Anderson, MNF-I Chief of Staff, and; the Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq, Alan Misenheimer. Iraq: GOI Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir Mohammed Jassim, GOI Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani; GOI JFGQ DCOS Ops LTG Hashim; GOI Federal Police General al-Awadi; GOI IGFC sGeneral Ali Ghedan; GOI MOD Spokesman Major General Al Askri; KRG: KRG Minister of Peshmerga Affairs Jafar Mustafa Ali (Sheikh Jafar); KRG Minister of Interior, Abdul Karim Sinjari; KRG Deputy Minister of Peshmerga Affairs, LTG Sherwan Ali Abdulrahman, and; KRG Minister of Interior Advisor, MG Hama Sa,ed. ¶10. (U) This message was cleared by MNF-I. FORD