ISCI BLOC LEADER GUNNING FOR IHEC, OPTIMISTIC ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002799

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI BLOC LEADER GUNNING FOR IHEC, OPTIMISTIC ON
OPEN LIST ELECTION LAW

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo for reasons
1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) COR
bloc leader Jalal al-Din al-Saghir predicted to POL M/C that
the Council of Representatives (COR) would pass an open list
election law by October 19. Despite advising him against
dismissing members of the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC),Saghir said he will pursue the removal of
at least four IHEC commissioners because of alleged electoral
fraud during the January 2009 provincial elections and IHEC's
unsatisfactory performance. Saghir warned that if the
national election is not transparent, political entities
might resort to violence to protest the legitimacy of the
vote. END SUMMARY.

Predicts Passage of Open List Election Law
--------------


2. (C) In an October 17 meeting with POL M/C, ISCI bloc
leader and cleric Jalal al-Saghir predicted passage of a
national election law by Monday, October 19, claiming that
Sunni Arabs and Turkomen would reach a compromise on
electoral representation for Kirkuk, the last obstacle
blocking the legislation. Saghir said Arabs and Turkomen in
Kirkuk understand that preventing Kirkuk from participating
in the January 2009 provincial elections was a mistake
because it allowed the Kurds to reinforce their hold on the
city. Saghir claimed that ISCI and a majority in the COR
want an open list election system similar to the balloting
used in the provincial elections. Once the Kurds are
satisfied with the compromise on Kirkuk, they too will vote
for open lists, asserted Saghir. Saghir added that ISCI
would protest any effort to have the COR vote on the election
law by secret ballot as this would provide cover for parties
that seek to defy strong public support for the open list
option.

Still Gunning for IHEC
--------------


3. (C) Saghir blasted IHEC for being a biased and politicized
institution. He said that if the current IHEC membership
remains unchanged, continued mismanagement of the body would
result in illegitimate elections. Saghir claimed that there
was "massive fraud" during the provincial elections and that
the IHEC chairman's explanations to the COR during
questioning on October 5 was unsatisfactory. ISCI
accordingly wants to change at least four IHEC commissioners
with members of Iraq's previous electoral commission; the COR
could select an entirely new IHEC following the January 2010
national election. Saghir recommended that the COR remove
IHEC chairman, Faraj al-Haidari, a Kurd, along with three
other members--two Shia and one Sunni.


4. (C) Saghir stated that along with ISCI and Fadhila, the
Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and the Kurdish bloc are
willing to accept this course of action. Saghir asked that
the EMBASSY and the United Nations Assistance Mission Iraq
(UNAMI) seek to convince PM Maliki--the lone holdout, he
claimed--to accept a change at IHEC. POL M/C warned that
removing IHEC members now would appear overly politicized and
weaken Iraq's electoral institution too close to the January
2010 voting, a position that UNAMI shares with the Embassy.
Saghir replied these risks could be mitigated by swapping
IHEC members with experienced members of the former electoral
commission. (Note: On September 23, ISCI chairman Ammar
al-Hakim told the Ambassador that ISCI did not favor removing
any IHEC commissioners. This is a notable policy difference
between the newly appointed, young Hakim and the older, bloc
leader Saghir. End note.) Saghir also criticized the head of
Qleader Saghir. End note.) Saghir also criticized the head of
the UNAMI Electoral Assistance Team, Sandra Mitchell, for
failing to prevent IHEC's problems and then covering up its
mistakes. (Comment: Saghir's ire toward UNAMI is probably
due in part to Mitchell's role in forcing ISCI-affiliated
IHEC commissioner Qasim Aboudi in mid-September to give up
his IHEC leadership role as Chief Electoral Officer and
replacing him with Da'wa-affiliated Hamdia al-Husseini.
Aboudi remains an IHEC commissioner, but with less authority.
End Comment.)

Concerns about Electoral Violence
--------------


5. (C) Saghir said the stakes are high for IHEC's ability to
prevent fraud because political entities might resort to
violence if they feel voting in the national election is not
transparent. (Note: Saghir implied, but did not directly
state, that unless IHEC was revamped, some Iraqis/parties
dissatisfied with the election results might violently
protest the entire process. End note.) Saghir highlighted
the August 19 bombings in Baghdad and perceived poor

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coordination between the Interior and Defense ministries as
examples of the current government's failures. He rebuked PM
Maliki for unilaterally blaming Syria for the August 19
attacks without consulting other political parties, the
Presidency Council or the COR.

Electoral Alliances Consolidating
--------------


6. (C) Saghir predicted that there will be five or six major
electoral alliances competing in the January election--the
Shia-dominated Iraqi National Alliance (INA),the Maliki-led
State of Law Alliance (SLA),a Kurdish bloc, the Sunni
Tawafuq coalition, and a list headed by former PM Iyad Allawi
and Sunni COR member Salah al-Mutlaq. The primary
competition to form the next government, however, will be
between the INA and SLA. Saghir was optimistic about the
INA's chances and asserted that the INA has good relations
with the Kurds, Allawi, Tawafuq and Sunni tribal leader Ahmed
Abu Risha--all of whom are displeased with Maliki. Saghir
said that if Allawi were to join the INA, he would receive an
"important role."


7. (C) Comment: Saghir recently used his pulpit at the
influential Buratha Mosque in Baghdad to criticize IHEC, but
he has also called participation in the upcoming national
election a "religious duty." His indignation against IHEC is
troubling and reflects ISCI's belief that PM Maliki unfairly
used government institutions to sway the provincial elections
in his favor. Obtaining the needed absolute majority (138)
of votes in the COR to dismiss commissioners, however, will
be a high bar. Short of removing IHEC commissioners, Saghir
might be satisfied with more legislative oversight and
monitoring of IHEC, but he could also be laying the
groundwork for a more dangerous ploy: setting up IHEC as the
scapegoat should ISCI/INA again lose out against Maliki at
the polls. End Comment.
FORD