SPEAKER SAMMARRAIE ADDRESSES CONCERNS OVER IHEC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002750

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV IZ
SUBJECT: SPEAKER SAMMARRAIE ADDRESSES CONCERNS OVER IHEC
AND ELECTION LAW

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.



1. (C) Summary: Iraqi Council of Representatives Speaker
Ayad Sammarraie told the Ambassador October 11 that as a
result of the harsh interrogation of the Independent High
Electoral Commission (IHEC) chairman October 5, it was
possible that the COR would dismiss two IHEC commissioners.
The Ambassador took vigorous issue with Sammarraie's calm
assertions that such action seemed inevitable and would not
risk delaying the January 2010 elections. The Ambassador
termed such action misguided and urged the Speaker to consult
urgently with UNAMI, which, he noted, is almost ready to warn
publicly that if even one commissioner is removed, the
elections may be delayed. Sammarraie described the political
charge against IHEC as being led by the Shia party Fadhila,
but with the support of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI). Regarding the election law, Sammarraie expressed
confidence that, despite the IHEC political drama, it would
be approved by the end of next week of COR business (October
19). The Speaker said he had private assurances from Arab
and Turkomen COR members to accept modest work-arounds for
the Kirkuk issue, although such action would be last minute,
following a week of their angry rhetoric and extreme
proposals aimed at persuading Kurds to be more flexible.
Sammarraie doubted that there was serious opposition to the
package of amendments for the Investment Law -- and expressed
hope it could be re-introduced soon for COR consideration.
The Ambassador also put in a plug for passage of the Trade
and Investment Agreement (TIFA) and the OPIC Investor
Incentive Agreement (IIA). End Summary.

A WARNING ABOUT RISKS OF ATTACKING IHEC
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador raised concerns that the political
attacks on the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)
-- and calls for the removal of some IHEC commissioners --
had reached a critical point. Sammarraie acknowledged that
there was extensive political support in the COR for the
harsh interrogation of IHEC Chairman Faraj al-Haydari. With
a somewhat disconcerting calm, Sammarraie said that it might
be necessary to remove two of the IHEC commissioners,
implying strongly that Haydari and fellow commissioner Qasim
al-Aboudi would be the two slated for dismissal. In his
view, the normally nine-member Board of Commissioners of IHEC
could smoothly continue its work with just seven members, if
the dismissals occurred quickly. (COMMENT: Some contacts
insist that if the two are dismissed, they will be replaced
with party-affiliated hacks much less independent -- and
capable -- than their predecessors. END COMMENT.)

DISCOUNTING FEARS THAT DISMISSALS COULD DELAY ELECTIONS
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Sammarraie discounted the Ambassador's concern that
once the dismissals began, the COR might not stop at one or
two dismissals. Reciting conversations that he had had with
a few of the party activists who had organized the COR
interrogation, Sammarraie seemed confident that the majority
of the COR would be satisfied with a couple of dismissals.
He also noted that most COR members did not support the
notion that taking such strong action against IHEC would
necessarily stop IHEC from doing its work. Pushing back
hard, the Ambassador noted that UNAMI was very concerned --
and almost ready to warn publicly -- that if even one
commissioner is removed, the elections might have to be
delayed. (NOTE: UNAMI did issue a statement to this effect
Qdelayed. (NOTE: UNAMI did issue a statement to this effect
on October 11. END NOTE.) Pushing harder, the Ambassador
told the Speaker that while he did not want to exaggerate, it
would not be inappropriate to descDQ6Lsh4HQQ_Q'+k!Qemployees at IHEC allegedly
had taken
advantage of their positions to gain monetary benefits or
privileges; and reported IHEC countenancing fraudulent
election results in particular places. Given those charges,
some parties no longer trust IHEC as currently constituted to
organize the elections, explained Sammarraie (COMMENT: As
we have noted elsewhere, the parties leading the charge
against IHEC, such as Fadhila, ISCI, and the Sunni Iraqi
Islamic Party did poorly in the January 2009 provincial
elections and harbor an animating grudge against the
electoral commission, blaming it for their poor performance
and hoping to establish a convenient scapegoat in case
electoral history repeats itself. END COMMENT.)


6. (C) Taking issue, the Ambassador insisted that political
parties are exaggerating IHEC's sins, as well as its ability
to manipulate elections results. The key factor is UNAMI's
close oversight of IHEC; UNAMI's Electoral Assistance Unit is
fully integrated with IHEC and has established controls that
would inhibit significant electoral fraud. The Ambassador
also expressed concern that the COR's efforts to "fix"
problems at IHEC would "mess it up completely" and questioned
whether some political parties had other agendas, including
possibly trying to delay the January elections. The Speaker
responded that it was "not easy to answer that question" and
refused to elaborate further.


7. (C) The Ambassador returned to the role of ISCI in
supporting the attack on IHEC, musing aloud whether with the
turnover in leadership with the death of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim,
the son Ammar was providing the necessary leadership.
Sammarraie did not respond directly, merely providing
background on political elements that were supportive of the
attack on IHEC.

MORE OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR ELECTION LAW
--------------


8. (C) Regarding the election law, Sammarraie expressed
confidence that it would be approved by the end of the full
week in the COR (October 19). He told the Ambassador to
expect some heated discussions and extreme proposals from the
Arabs and Turkomen on the issue of Kirkuk's participation in
the elections, but described them as tactics that were being
used to pressure the Kurds to be flexible. Sammarraie said
that he had held private discussions with Arab and Turkomen
representatives and believed he had their commitment that in
the end they would settle for something much more modest than
what they were demanding in public.


9. (C) In general, Sammarraie expressed optimism that
despite the challenges, the COR would rise to the occasion
and pass the election law. He noted that the Iraqis -- while
they might engage in messy disagreements and perhaps accept
less than optimal solutions -- would overcome these political
problems and ensure that the elections are held on time.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE INVESTMENT LAW?
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador also raised with the Speaker the
investment law, expressing disappointment that the COR had
Qinvestment law, expressing disappointment that the COR had
not passed the necessary amendments. Sammarraie said it was
not clear if there was some real opposition and members had
manipulated quorum requirements October 6 to stop
consideration of the amendments. His best assessment was
that the economic and investment committee had done a poor
job of presenting the amendments and confused COR members
into thinking there was an entire new investment law up for
consideration. He said he had conferred with committee
chairman Haidar Ebadi and expressed hope the amendments could
be re-introduced for consideration this coming week.

TIFA AND OPIC LAWS
--------------


11. (C) On a related matter, the Ambassador and Sammarraie
agreed that it was also important for the COR to pass key
bilateral agreements, including the Trade and Investment
Agreement (TIFA) and the OPIC Investor Incentive Agreement
(IIA). (NOTE: These two, with the Bilateral Assistance

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THE POLITICS BEHIND THE ATTACK ON IHEC
--------------


5. (C) Sammarraie described the political charge against
IHEC as being led by the Shia party Fadhila, but with the
support of ISCI. (Note: Sunni elements in the COR are also
highly critical of IHEC and have supported the interrogation
and calls for dismissals.) The Kurds are standing with the
IHEC chairman (a fellow Kurd and KDP activist),according to
the Speaker. There were two basic charges: administrative
corruption, in which employees at IHEC allegedly had taken
advantage of their positions to gain monetary benefits or
privileges; and reported IHEC countenancing fraudulent
election results in particular places. Given those charges,
some parties no longer trust IHEC as currently constituted to
organize the elections, explained Sammarraie (COMMENT: As
we have noted elsewhere, the parties leading the charge
against IHEC, such as Fadhila, ISCI, and the Sunni Iraqi
Islamic Party did poorly in the January 2009 provincial
elections and harbor an animating grudge against the
electoral commission, blaming it for their poor performance
and hoping to establish a convenient scapegoat in case
electoral history repeats itself. END COMMENT.)


6. (C) Taking issue, the Ambassador insisted that political
parties are exaggerating IHEC's sins, as well as its ability
to manipulate elections results. The key factor is UNAMI's
close oversight of IHEC; UNAMI's Electoral Assistance Unit is
fully integrated with IHEC and has established controls that
would inhibit significant electoral fraud. The Ambassador
also expressed concern that the COR's efforts to "fix"
problems at IHEC would "mess it up completely" and questioned
whether some political parties had other agendas, including
possibly trying to delay the January elections. The Speaker
responded that it was "not easy to answer that question" and
refused to elaborate further.


7. (C) The Ambassador returned to the role of ISCI in
supporting the attack on IHEC, musing aloud whether with the
turnover in leadership with the death of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim,
the son Ammar was providing the necessary leadership.
Sammarraie did not respond directly, merely providing
background on political elements that were supportive of the
attack on IHEC.

MORE OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR ELECTION LAW
--------------


8. (C) Regarding the election law, Sammarraie expressed
confidence that it would be approved by the end of the full
week in the COR (October 19). He told the Ambassador to
expect some heated discussions and extreme proposals from the
Arabs and Turkomen on the issue of Kirkuk's participation in
the elections, but described them as tactics that were being
used to pressure the Kurds to be flexible. Sammarraie said
that he had held private discussions with Arab and Turkomen
representatives and believed he had their commitment that in
the end they would settle for something much more modest than
what they were demanding in public.


9. (C) In general, Sammarraie expressed optimism that
despite the challenges, the COR would rise to the occasion
and pass the election law. He noted that the Iraqis -- while
they might engage in messy disagreements and perhaps accept
less than optimal solutions -- would overcome these political
problems and ensure that the elections are held on time.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE INVESTMENT LAW?
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador also raised with the Speaker the
investment law, expressing disappointment that the COR had
Qinvestment law, expressing disappointment that the COR had
not passed the necessary amendments. Sammarraie said it was
not clear if there was some real opposition and members had
manipulated quorum requirements October 6 to stop
consideration of the amendments. His best assessment was
that the economic and investment committee had done a poor
job of presenting the amendments and confused COR members
into thinking there was an entire new investment law up for
consideration. He said he had conferred with committee
chairman Haidar Ebadi and expressed hope the amendments could
be re-introduced for consideration this coming week.

TIFA AND OPIC LAWS
--------------


11. (C) On a related matter, the Ambassador and Sammarraie
agreed that it was also important for the COR to pass key
bilateral agreements, including the Trade and Investment
Agreement (TIFA) and the OPIC Investor Incentive Agreement
(IIA). (NOTE: These two, with the Bilateral Assistance

BAGHDAD 00002750 003 OF 003


Agreement (BAA),and an MOU for Cooperation on Supporting
Reform and Capacity Building in the Agriculture Sector form a
package that the COR will consider together. END NOTE.).
Sammarraie said that the Maliki government had not made
passage of these agreements a priority, which had slowed
consideration in the COR. The Ambassador highlighted the
importance of both agreements, noting how they would
complement a new investment law and improve the climate for
American investors in Iraq. He further noted that at the
upcoming investor conference in Washington, some 300 business
executives had signed up to attend, representing key fields
such as oil, computers, and telecommunications. Passage of
these agreements would convince investors that there were
clear rules of the road ahead for investment in Iraq.

BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH HIS VISIT
--------------


12. (C) The Speaker raised the issue of his visit to
Washington again and noted that "his people" in Washington
had gotten back to him in the past week, suggesting a new
date in the first week of November. The Ambassador pointed
to the extremely important business the Speaker was tending
to here in Baghdad, such as the election and investment laws,
and underscored that the Embassy and the Department would do
everything necessary to facilitate a successful visit once
the crucial parliamentary business was accomplished.

HILL