POST PROPOSES SHOULDER-FIRED MISSILE ABATEMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002736 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA, NEA/I, PM, PM/I, PM/WRA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2029 TAGS: AF IR IZ PARM PGOV PINR PK PREL PTER XD XF YM, ZR SUBJECT: POST PROPOSES SHOULDER-FIRED MISSILE ABATEMENT PROGRAM FOR IRAQ (MANPADS REDUCTION) BAGHDAD 00002736 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor Cameron Munter for reasons 1. 4 b-d ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 9. ¶2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Embassy seeks to develop with the Government of Iraq (GOI) a Man-Portable Air Defense Systems Reduction Program (MANPADS Program). The program would follow a "host-country model", used in Yemen and Pakistan, through which Post would partner with GOI and use Department funds to pay rewards for the surrender of MANPADS outside of GOI control, after verifying the authenticity and disposal of the weapons. Post wishes to support the safe conduct of civilian and military flights in Iraq by enhancing air space security, and mitigating the MANPADS threat is a critical step. The Iraq MANPADS Program implemented through the GOI would seek to reduce the number of MANPADS in Iraq that are held by non-state actors. This cable proposes a course of action that would advance that Mission objective and requests support from the Department on the proposed approach. END SUMMARY. NEED FOR THE PROGRAM -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Regional Security Office (RSO) at Post conducted a Threat Assessment Study of Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) in September 2009. While the assessment suggests surface-to-air missiles, particularly MANPADS, remain a prevailing threat to aircraft flying into and out of BIAP, it rated the overall threat level for MANPADS against civil aviation as low. This is due, in part, to the fact that several hundred aircraft have flown into and out of BIAP over the past five years with no reported MANPADS incidents. ¶4. (S/NF) Although the rate of MANPADS attacks has declined, there could be a large number of MANPADS systems held in storage throughout Iraq. MNF-I reported that it made 17 MANPADS-related recoveries (mostly batteries and other parts) since 2008 as part of ongoing operations to recover weapons caches. There have been 200 incidents of MANPADS being used in Iraq since 2003, but there were only 8 MANPADS attacks against military targets in 2008. The Iraq MANPADS Program would simultaneously help diminish the threat and improve our information if it enables more MANPADS to be recovered for exploitation by IC experts. PROPOSED MODEL -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Department's Weapons Removal and Abatement Office (PM/WRA) has developed substantial experience running black market acquisition programs through host nations' internal security forces. PM/WRA currently manages black market acquisition programs in three countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. Of those, the governments of Pakistan and Yemen implement the programs through their internal security infrastructure. In these cases, PM/WRA provides funding and oversight, and the U.S. Embassies manage the host-nation relationship, disperse payments to the host governments, and verify destruction of acquired systems. In the Iraqi context, it might make sense to work with the MOD, but MOI and other departments would either have to be Qbut MOI and other departments would either have to be involved or made aware to prevent internal disputes. In consultation with PM/WRA, a model for the preferred option is below. PROGRAM OUTLINE -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) The Embassy's Political-Military Affairs Section (Pol-Mil) would engage GOI interlocutors in order to develop a USG plan whereby Iraqi officials collect black market MANPADS, and U.S. military or intelligence officials then confirm the possession and destruction of the weapons. This BAGHDAD 00002736 002.3 OF 003 paragraph outlines the roles that each section and office would play in the proposed program. -- Pol-Mil would manage our relationships with the GOI partners. -- PM/WRA would fund and oversee the program, and Pol-Mil would manage its implementation at Post. -- Pol-Mil would also facilitate delivering funds to the GOI partnering agency that administers the program and pays individuals who surrender MANPADS. -- Officials in the Office of Regional Affairs have indicated willingness to lend experts to the process of verifying that the surrendered items are actual MANPADS weapons or weapons parts, and in verifying that they have been rendered inert. PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION AND TIME FRAME -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) With prior PM/WRA support for the initiative, Post would take the steps that this paragraph outlines as the proposed course of action. October - November, 2009: -- Pol-Mil engages GOI interlocutors in the Iraqi national security architecture (such as National Security Council or Prime Minister's National Operations Command) in order to identify an acceptable GOI body (presumably MOI, MOD or both) that would partner with the USG to collect MANPADS and administer the program. -- Pol-Mil works directly with PM/WRA in laying out the scope and operational details. PM/WRA would provide guidance on how MANPADS programs in other countries function within our embassies. December, 2009: -- Pol-Mil would engage the preferred GOI partner to establish an official channel to surrender MANPADS, laying out the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that would allow it to happen. Pol-Mil would request the GOI partners to ensure that it had achieved "buy-in" with other parts of the government to prevent conflict or turf battles. -- As the Iraqi Parliamentary elections approach in January, Pol-Mil will assess the sustainability of the program within the Iraqi government and ensure that the MOD, MOI, and the national security architecture have sufficient awareness and offer sufficient institutional support to permit the program to survive political vicissitudes. January, 2010: -- Launch the program with initial meetings and signings of relevant MOUs. February, 2010: -- Start the program with an awareness campaign, regular meetings, and finalize operational details. March, 2010: -- The host-country program becomes operational, and host-country takes over operations with Pol-Mil support. ADDRESSING CONCERNS: POTENTIAL RISKS, SHORTCOMINGS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Working through IC partners, PM/WRA's review of available analyses suggests that incentive-based efforts to remove MANPADS from the Iraqi black-market are unlikely to draw missiles into Iraq because: 1) Iraq likely already has a comparative glut of MANPADS. The IC assesses that more than 2,000 missiles and a smaller QThe IC assesses that more than 2,000 missiles and a smaller BAGHDAD 00002736 003.3 OF 003 number of gripstock launchers remain errant from the former Saddam Hussein-era stockpile, giving Iraq potentially the heaviest existing distribution of black-market MANPADS in any country today. 2) Iraq's neighbors have relatively tight control of their MANPADS stockpiles. Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are assessed to have adequate control of their own MANPADS stocks, making them unlikely sources of weapons flow into Iraq by arms traffickers. 3) Existing evidence of MANPADS exploited by the IC indicate Iraqi or Iranian origin. The Iraqi weapons are pre-existing and the Iranian systems are supplied for political reasons, not for profit, and therefore not drawn by black market considerations. Assessments from Post's analysts support this conclusion. REQUEST -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Post requests Department support for this plan through a program funded and overseen by PM/WRA. Post welcomes PM/WRA input on the program outline, course of action, and timeline detailed above. ¶10. (U) Point of contact for this program until May 1, 2010 will be Ben Reames at ReamesBN@state.gov and ReamesBN@state.sgov.gov or by phone at 1-240-553-0581 (x2683). HILL