PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION ON THE MEK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002717

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2024
TAGS: PTER PREF PREL PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION ON THE MEK

REF: BAGHDAD 2488

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) In this cable, the Embassy offers our
recommended course of action and associated talking
points for addressing the issue of the Mujahideen-e
Khalq (MEK). In the last six to eight weeks, the
Embassy has made significant strides in addressing
this issue, the most important of which has been
persuading UNAMI to play an active role in this
matter and to place a small team near Ashraf. Also,
the international community has shown greater
interest and some European missions have indicated
an interest in accepting UNHCR-recognized MEK
refugees. Our intention now is to capitalize on
their interest and to respond to the GOI's desire to
resettle non-criminal MEK members in third
countries. Staving off GOI security operations to
relocate the MEK is dependent on our and UNAMI's
ability to convince the GOI of a credible program on
our collective part to resettle MEK members.


2. (C) With this objective in mind and building on
the strategy outlined in reftel, Post proposes the
following course of action:

-- Post will continue to engage GOI leaders to press
for a delay in efforts to relocate the residents of
Camp Ashraf until all efforts at negotiation and
international mediation have been exhausted and
until a comprehensive plan has been put into place
regarding third countries willing to accept those
deemed by UNHCR to be refugees. The Ambassador will
make this point to the Prime Minister when they meet
October 10.

-- In order to make the resettlement alternative
viable, Post recommends that the Department review
information concerning some or all of the 22 Ashraf
defectors (some of whom UNHCR has classified as
refugees and are fairly young and took up residence
in Ashraf only recently),and work with other
agencies, including DHS, to determine whether some
number of them may be eligible for immigration
status in the United States.

-- Post also recommends that the Department engage
with members of Congress who have expressed interest
in the MEK issue to gauge interest in possible
legislative actions to address Ashraf defectors
determined by the UNHCR to be refugees and,
therefore, eligible for resettlement in third
countries including the United States. The ability
to guarantee resettlement even to a few of the MEK
refugees would give us more credibility to request a
delay in the GOI's relocation efforts and to press
for similar resettlement efforts from European and
other governments.

-- The Department should consider actively
approaching other governments to emphasize the need
for renewed efforts to resettle MEK refugees.
Resettlement of MEK refugees will undercut the MEK's
position that they are only safe at Ashraf.

-- Post will continue its support of UNAMI as the
lead third party in mediating and observing
interactions between the GOI and MEK, including
establishment of a visible UN presence at/near FOB
Grizzly. (Note: Post and MNF-I facilitated a UNAMI
visit to Grizzly on October 7 for the purposes of
giving UNAMI an opportunity to engage with the MEK
leadership and to conduct an assessment of the
facilities at FOB Grizzly. MNF-I will continue to
provide logistical support to UNAMI so that it can
establish a presence at Ashraf and facilitate
dialogue between the GOI and MEK. End note.)

-- Barring a change in GOI policy, Post will
emphasize that the GOI needs to develop a
comprehensive media strategy and be as transparent
as possible about its relocation plans, including
the issuance of a public justification for the
Qthe issuance of a public justification for the
relocation and continuous engagement with media.
Post will also emphasize that the GOI must be well
prepared for an effort to relocate the MEK forcibly
and that the security forces assigned to the mission
have the proper training in non-lethal civil
disturbance disruption tactics.

-- Finally, the Embassy recommends against any USG
involvement in GOI security operations related to

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the MEK, including training, planning, advising or
equipping.


3. (SBU) Post recommends that a statement not be
issued on the MEK, but that the following talking
points be used on an if-asked basis only when
engaging with local and international media:

-- The United States has neither the legal
obligation nor the authority to intervene in the
process of relocating residents of Ashraf. The MEK
are not considered protected persons as a matter of
law or policy. The United States' obligation to
treat the MEK as "protected persons" ceased as a
matter of law in connection with the end of the U.S.
occupation of Iraq. As a matter of policy, the
United States continued to treat the MEK as
protected persons throughout the end of 2008,
consistent with the UNSC mandate to take all
necessary measures to maintain the security and
stability of Iraq. That policy ended at the
beginning of this year in connection with the
expiration of the UN mandate. The GOI has full
responsibility for the security of the residents of
Ashraf, as it does for all of Iraq;

-- The United States has underscored to the GOI the
importance of adhering to its written assurances
that the residents of Ashraf will be treated
humanely and in accordance with Iraq's Constitution,
laws, and international obligations and that it will
not forcibly transfer camp residents to a third
country where they may have reason to fear
persecution for political opinions or religious
beliefs or where there are substantial grounds for
believing they would be tortured;

-- We continue to urge international organizations,
including the UN, to play a more active role in
finding a solution; and

-- Any domestic transfer of Ashraf residents should
be carried out in a peaceful manner.
HILL