PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION ON THE MEK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002717 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2024 TAGS: PTER PREF PREL PINR IR IZ SUBJECT: PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION ON THE MEK REF: BAGHDAD 2488 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) In this cable, the Embassy offers our recommended course of action and associated talking points for addressing the issue of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK). In the last six to eight weeks, the Embassy has made significant strides in addressing this issue, the most important of which has been persuading UNAMI to play an active role in this matter and to place a small team near Ashraf. Also, the international community has shown greater interest and some European missions have indicated an interest in accepting UNHCR-recognized MEK refugees. Our intention now is to capitalize on their interest and to respond to the GOI's desire to resettle non-criminal MEK members in third countries. Staving off GOI security operations to relocate the MEK is dependent on our and UNAMI's ability to convince the GOI of a credible program on our collective part to resettle MEK members. ¶2. (C) With this objective in mind and building on the strategy outlined in reftel, Post proposes the following course of action: -- Post will continue to engage GOI leaders to press for a delay in efforts to relocate the residents of Camp Ashraf until all efforts at negotiation and international mediation have been exhausted and until a comprehensive plan has been put into place regarding third countries willing to accept those deemed by UNHCR to be refugees. The Ambassador will make this point to the Prime Minister when they meet October 10. -- In order to make the resettlement alternative viable, Post recommends that the Department review information concerning some or all of the 22 Ashraf defectors (some of whom UNHCR has classified as refugees and are fairly young and took up residence in Ashraf only recently),and work with other agencies, including DHS, to determine whether some number of them may be eligible for immigration status in the United States. -- Post also recommends that the Department engage with members of Congress who have expressed interest in the MEK issue to gauge interest in possible legislative actions to address Ashraf defectors determined by the UNHCR to be refugees and, therefore, eligible for resettlement in third countries including the United States. The ability to guarantee resettlement even to a few of the MEK refugees would give us more credibility to request a delay in the GOI's relocation efforts and to press for similar resettlement efforts from European and other governments. -- The Department should consider actively approaching other governments to emphasize the need for renewed efforts to resettle MEK refugees. Resettlement of MEK refugees will undercut the MEK's position that they are only safe at Ashraf. -- Post will continue its support of UNAMI as the lead third party in mediating and observing interactions between the GOI and MEK, including establishment of a visible UN presence at/near FOB Grizzly. (Note: Post and MNF-I facilitated a UNAMI visit to Grizzly on October 7 for the purposes of giving UNAMI an opportunity to engage with the MEK leadership and to conduct an assessment of the facilities at FOB Grizzly. MNF-I will continue to provide logistical support to UNAMI so that it can establish a presence at Ashraf and facilitate dialogue between the GOI and MEK. End note.) -- Barring a change in GOI policy, Post will emphasize that the GOI needs to develop a comprehensive media strategy and be as transparent as possible about its relocation plans, including the issuance of a public justification for the Qthe issuance of a public justification for the relocation and continuous engagement with media. Post will also emphasize that the GOI must be well prepared for an effort to relocate the MEK forcibly and that the security forces assigned to the mission have the proper training in non-lethal civil disturbance disruption tactics. -- Finally, the Embassy recommends against any USG involvement in GOI security operations related to BAGHDAD 00002717 002 OF 002 the MEK, including training, planning, advising or equipping. ¶3. (SBU) Post recommends that a statement not be issued on the MEK, but that the following talking points be used on an if-asked basis only when engaging with local and international media: -- The United States has neither the legal obligation nor the authority to intervene in the process of relocating residents of Ashraf. The MEK are not considered protected persons as a matter of law or policy. The United States' obligation to treat the MEK as "protected persons" ceased as a matter of law in connection with the end of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. As a matter of policy, the United States continued to treat the MEK as protected persons throughout the end of 2008, consistent with the UNSC mandate to take all necessary measures to maintain the security and stability of Iraq. That policy ended at the beginning of this year in connection with the expiration of the UN mandate. The GOI has full responsibility for the security of the residents of Ashraf, as it does for all of Iraq; -- The United States has underscored to the GOI the importance of adhering to its written assurances that the residents of Ashraf will be treated humanely and in accordance with Iraq's Constitution, laws, and international obligations and that it will not forcibly transfer camp residents to a third country where they may have reason to fear persecution for political opinions or religious beliefs or where there are substantial grounds for believing they would be tortured; -- We continue to urge international organizations, including the UN, to play a more active role in finding a solution; and -- Any domestic transfer of Ashraf residents should be carried out in a peaceful manner. HILL