FRAUD SUMMARY - BAGHDAD

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002680 DEPT FOR CA/FPP, KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY, DHS FOR CIS/FDNS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC PREF KFRD IZ SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - BAGHDAD REF: A. STATE 057623 ¶B. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2009 COUNTRY CONDITIONS ¶1. Security remains a concern in Iraq; however, conditions are gradually improving. Traveling both domestically and around the region remains difficult for Iraqi nationals. High numbers of Iraqis continue to pursue plans to immigrate to the US for economic and security reasons. Post is preparing to expand nonimmigrant visa services to include accepting B1/B2 applications from members of the public. Currently, B1/B2 applications are accepted on referral or if an applicant meets specific criteria such as a medical emergency. Post also administers a large special immigrant visa program and continues processing traditional immigrant visas. Post continues to identify significant vulnerabilities in various Iraqi civil documents such as identity cards and certificates of nationality that make it possible for mala fide applicants to obtain genuine Iraqi passports under false identities. Access to the Consular Section in Baghdad's International Zone is a continuing logistical challenge. The current overall level of fraud at Post is low, though this may be a product of our overall qualified applicant pool and may change when post begins processing B1/B2 applications for the general public. NON IMMIGRANT VISA (NIV) FRAUD ¶2. Post adjudicated 1,710 NIV applications between March 1 and August 31. Of these, thirty-four percent were A and G visas, 28 percent were J visas and 25 percent were B1/B2 visas. The remainder was primarily F visa applicants. Post began adjudicating F and J visas in August 2008. NIV fraud was minimal during the reporting period. Consular staff referred two non-immigrant cases to the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU). In one, further investigation confirmed false identity. The applicant appeared for a second interview and admitted that her fianc had obtained a second passport for her in a false identity, due to a previous visa refusal. Facial recognition software made the match between the two cases. FPU staff investigated the second case, involving suspicious documents, and found no fraud. IMMIGRANT VISA (IV) FRAUD ¶3. Post began immigrant visa processing on July, 2008. ¶4. In addition to regular IV and DV cases, Post administers two Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) programs for Iraqi nationals who have been employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government. Embassy Baghdad's Office of Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Affairs (REF) accepts Section 1244 SIV applications for Chief of Mission approval. As designees of the Chief of Mission (COM),the refugee coordinators in REF determine whether the applicants statutorily qualify to apply for the SIV program. Fraud prevention measures in the COM process seek to detect imposters, detect fraudulent documents, and verify employment on behalf of the USG. ¶5. Independent employment verification at the Chief of Mission approval stage is an important fraud prevention measure. REF requires all employment letters to be on company letterhead and employment verification communication to be done via an official USG, military or corporate email account. REF is creating new SIV statistical reports to monitor trends that could highlight areas for potential fraud such as an unrealistic number of recommendations Qpotential fraud such as an unrealistic number of recommendations coming from ONE supervisor or company. Generally, applicants in both programs have undergone security screening by their employers as part of their hiring process and fraud has been limited to date. However, the FPU and REF discovered weaknesses in some contractors' overall employment vetting, verification and termination procedures that have allowed mala fide SIV applicants to reach the visa interview stage in cases where they had been fired for cause after the REF vetting process. The FPU coordinates review of suspected cases with the Regional Security Office and on occasion has sought additional clarification regarding the applicant's history from the employer as a second layer of security. REF and the FPU are working together to institute stronger joint internal measures to guard against SIV fraud. ¶6. Post issued 1,876 immigrant visas in this six month reporting period. Eighty percent were Iraqi SIV program cases. Consular staff referred 10 cases to the FPU. Closer examination found no fraud in eight, and two are pending investigation. DIVERSITY VISA FRAUD ¶7. Baghdad adjudicated twenty-five Diversity Visas and reported no fraud. AMERICAN CITIZENS SERVICES (ACS) AND US PASSPORT FRAUD ¶8. The ACS unit reported no significant fraud for the past six months. The unit referred ONE passport case to the Fraud Prevention Unit for investigation, which found no evidence of fraud. The majority of first time passport applicants in Iraq are US military personnel with government issued identification and original birth certificates. ADOPTION FRAUD ¶9. Foreign adoptions are not allowed in Iraq and Post does not process adoption cases. USE OF DNA TESTING ¶10. Post is in the process of negotiating with a new panel physician clinic that has the capability to administer DNA testing under the recently published Department guidelines. REFUGEE, ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD ¶11. REF continues to work to identity potential fraud in the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) and is increasing information sharing between the USRAP and the SIV program as the two programs draw from the same pool of Iraqi applicants. REF ensures that derogatory threat information that leads to the denial of an SIV is passed to DHS officers who will adjudicate the same applicant's refugee case. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL ¶12. Post maintains a productive working relationship with Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials. Iraq is a known source country for terrorists and the Consular Section has been working through the Visas Viper and other reporting mechanisms to ensure the proper watch listing of suspected terrorists or individuals of concern. Iraq is both a source and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and involuntary servitude (Ref B). The more prevalent means of becoming a victim is through sale or forced marriage. The ACS section assisted three American citizens who were victims of forced marriage in Iraq. Two were successfully repatriated and ONE case is pending resolution. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS ¶13. No new information to report this period. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CIVIL REGISTRY ¶14. The new A-series Iraqi passport book is scheduled to be issued in October 2009; the current G series Iraqi passport will continue to be distributed until book stock is depleted. There will be no wholesale replacement of previous books and all issued G-series passports will remain valid. ¶15. The A-series will contain a mandatory thumbprint in the book itself, positioned on the data page. The print will be captured electronically at the time of application and then verified when applicants retrieve their passports (heads of households can pick up passports for the entire family). The Directorate of Passports, Travel and Nationality plans to electronically transfer, via the Internet, A-series applications from provincial offices (one office in each Iraqi province plus 14 offices in Baghdad). The books will be printed in Baghdad and couriered to provincial offices. The passport office in Baghdad has servers that allow it to accept A-series passport applications and required finger scans from 20 Iraqi embassies overseas (see below) via the Internet. These 20 QIraqi embassies overseas (see below) via the Internet. These 20 embassies will also submit the application electronically to the main passport office for printing, although this system is not yet operational. ¶16. The A-series passport book interior is identical to those in the G-series passport. The cover is slightly different and the book has text printed in Arabic, Kurdish and English, instead of the G-series Arabic and English only. The passport office states it has the capability to run all applications against a "black list" of criminals and terrorists. It is unclear if all applications are run through this check. ¶17. Overseas passport application facilities (with finger scan collection capability): Washington, D.C., Amman, Damascus, Tehran, Dubai, Cairo, London, Berlin, Stockholm, Tunisia, Sanaa, Sydney, Kuala Lumpur, Ottawa, Brasilia, Vienna, Istanbul, Paris, Bucharest, Athens. ¶18. Post continues to be concerned with the credibility of Iraqi identity documents. Anecdotal evidence suggests that all types of fraudulent identity documents are available. The widely-acknowledged existence of forged G-series passports remains an issue, but it is a greater concern that authentic G-series passports may be issued by the MOI based on fraudulent identity documents. Inconsistency in official document production standards remains a fundamental issue, particularly with ID cards issued in the Kurdish region and in Diyala province. The Kurdish Regional Government is producing its own version of the Iraq ID card which does not conform to national formatting and security feature norms. ¶19. Notwithstanding these concerns and anecdotal evidence, Post has not observed a significant volume of fraudulent documentation being submitted to support U.S. visa applications. ¶20. Post has initiated several new programs to combat fraud. At the end of August, the Consular Section established a Fraud Prevention Unit composed of the FSO Fraud Prevention Manager, ONE Locally Engaged Staff (LES) member, and ONE Eligible Family Member (EFM). Each member of the FPU has consular responsibilities in addition to the fraud portfolio. The unit has created a computerized index of all exemplars currently in its files and is working to acquire more and better samples. The FPU is currently focusing on a retrospective analysis of fraud trends and issues in order to establish a baseline for future operational focus. The FPM is also refining Standard Operating Procedures for IV, NIV, and ACS officers to refer cases to FPU; and the FPM provides Iraqi document verification training to consular staff. ¶21. The Consular Section has expanded outreach efforts to the MOI in order to continue information sharing on document fraud trends and detection techniques in Iraq. We also continue enhancing liaison and coordination efforts with the Consular Sections of other foreign missions in Iraq focusing on common fraud prevention issues and sharing relevant information. The FPM met recently with his Danish counterpart to discuss fraud in refugee cases. The FPU and Consular Section also have an excellent working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Attache at Post and frequently consult regarding suspect documents. The DHS Attache's office also facilitates introduction to important a contacts within the MOI and security services for the Consular Section. ¶21. The FPM and REF staff also met with the Human Resources department at Global Linguist Services (GLS),the largest employer of SIV applicants, to discuss employment verification and vetting Qof SIV applicants, to discuss employment verification and vetting concerns in the SIV process. ¶22. In conjunction with the HEALTH Attache's office, the Regional Medical Officer, and REF, the Consular Section is undertaking an in depth review of panel physician qualifications and procedures. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES ¶23. The Consul General maintains productive relationships with officials at the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consular staff also enjoy open communication and useful working-level relationships with Ministry employees. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN ¶24. In addition to concerns over document fraud, Post anticipates increased fraud as non-immigrant visa processing expands. STAFFING AND TRAINING ¶25. The FPM provides individualized training for all consular staff working in IV, NIV, and ACS to ensure that personnel know how and when to refer cases to FPU. FPM continues to update Fraud Prevention Program files at Post to include more document exemplars, fraud reporting trends, and detailed explanations of prior fraud cases. The Consular Section's LES Fraud Assistant spent a week in training with Embassy Amman's FPU in August and is also scheduled to attend a Fraud Prevention Workshop for FSNs at the Foreign Service Institute in November. HILL