MALIKI'S REVAMPED ELECTORAL ALLIANCE FAILS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002639 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: MALIKI'S REVAMPED ELECTORAL ALLIANCE FAILS TO ATTRACT MAJOR SUNNIS PARTIES REF: A. BAGHDAD 2288 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2539 ¶C. BAGHDAD 0804 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor William V. Roebuck for reason s 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: During an October 1 press conference in Baghdad, Prime Minister al-Maliki unveiled his new State of Law Alliance (SLA) that will contest the January national election. While Maliki emphasized the diversity of his list as a reflection of Iraq and physically surrounded himself at the podium with clerics and secular Shia, women and ethnic minorities, and a Christian bishop, it appears that he was unable to attract significant Sunni or Kurdish parties to forge a so-called "national" electoral alliance. ¶2. (C) Summary and Comment continued. This announcement makes it less likely that the Shia will unify before the election, pitting Maliki up against the Iraqi National Alliance (INA),which absorbed the bulk of the Shia alliance that won the previous national election and formed the current government. However, Maliki noted that SLA is committed to dialogue with other political entities. Both SLA and INA probably will have to negotiate an expanded alliance before or, more likely, after the January vote in order to reach the needed majority in the parliament to form the next government. End Summary and Comment. Specifics of today's announcement -------------- ¶3. (U) Building on the alliance that won a plurality in the January 2009 provincial elections, the State of Law Alliance (SLA) on October 1 announced the following composition: -- SLA's three original parties--Da'wa, Da'wa Tanzim, and the Independent Group--that contain notables such as Oil Minister Hussein al-Sharistani, Education Minister Khudayr al-Khuzai, Deputy COR Speaker Khalad al-Attiyah, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh, and Maliki confidants and Da'wa members Sadiq al-Rikabi, Sami al-Askari, and Hasan al-Sunayd; -- Some former members of Ayad Allawi's Iraqiyya party, like Safiya Suhail and former parliament speaker Hachim al-Hassani; -- A handful of tribal figures from Anbar, Ninawa, Diyala and Salah ad-Din. Poloff witnessed a busload of shaykhs depart after the event; -- Figures from the Fayli (Shia) Kurd, Shabbak, Turkoman and Christian minority groups. Like INA, Only Token Sunnis -------------- ¶4. (C) Similar to the INA's attempt to present a non-sectarian alliance (ref A),the SLA unveiled today contained merely a scattering of Sunni and other non-Shia. Of the prominent Sunnis who Maliki had courted over the past months--Sahwa leader Ahmed al-Rishawi (aka Abu Risha),Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi, Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) leader Osama Tikriti, MP Salih al-Mutlaq, Shaykh Abdullah al-Yawar and Athiel al-Nujayfi from Hadba--none appeared on stage. Although SLA still might ally after the election with Sunni or Kurdish parties, it appears that Maliki's efforts to create a "national," ambitiously cross-sectarian electoral list have fallen short. ¶5. (C) INA member Tahsin al-Azzawi, undoubtedly prepping INA campaign rhetoric, joked to Poloffs on September 30 that many of the new "parties" that Maliki is claiming are in reality "parties of one." Azzawi noted that Maliki thought Anbar Sahwa leader Ahmed al-Rishawi would join SLA, but Rishawi backed out of his August public statement (made in Jordan but not repeated publicly in Iraq) that he was with Maliki. Haidar al-Abadi (Da'wa) told Poloffs on September 28 that Rishawi did not want to join SLA unless other significant Sunni members did also. Potential Sunni Partners QPotential Sunni Partners -------------- ¶6. (C) Shaykh Abdullah al-Yawer al-Shammari, a leader of the Sunni Hadba Party, told Poloffs on September 24 that his group would be willing to form a coalition with Maliki before the election and would accept Maliki as the next prime minister (septel). Yawer said his group would include Interior Minister Bolani (a Shia),Ahmed al-Rishawi, and DPM Issawi. As late as September 30, SLA member Abd al-Hadi al-Hassani (Da'wa Tanzim) told Poloffs that SLA was still unsure whether Bolani (and presumably this grouping) would BAGHDAD 00002639 002 OF 002 join. Campaign Rhetoric To Heighten -------------- ¶7. (C) Given SOL's and INA's lack of significant Sunni members, Baghdad and the Shia-dominated southern provinces will be the battleground between these two lists. In the January provincial elections, SLA gained three percentage points more than the parties that now constitute the INA, forecasting a close race for the national election. (Note: In the provincial elections, the INA parties competed separately: ISCI, two Sadrist Trend lists, Fadilah, and the Reform Trend. End note.) ¶8. (C) In a SLA versus INA election, Maliki will likely campaign on his success in providing Iraq security and overseeing the beginning of the withdrawal of U.S. forces. He will take a hard line on "Ba'thists" to inoculate himself against criticism that by dividing the Shia, he has jeopardized a Shia-led government and offered the former regime an opportunity. Maliki today said SLA will resist "foreign interference" probably to distance himself from claims that he is too close to the United States and to highlight the INA's history with Iran, although it is unclear how persuasive such a political about-face would be with voters. ¶9. (C) To oppose Maliki's SLA, INA will run an "anti-incumbency" campaign--railing against corruption and inefficient services, according to INA member Qasim Daud (ref B). The INA's desire to call parliamentary hearings to question the Electricity Minister and the chairman of the electoral commission is probably designed to embarrass Maliki's government before the election. Given the recent harsh anti-Ba'thist sermons from INA clerics like Jalal al-Din al-Saghir and Muhammad al-Haidari, the INA might also seek to portray Maliki as soft on the loathed former regime, like its parties did in March (ref C),especially if Maliki continues his efforts to woo Sunni parties. ¶10. (C) Neither INA or SLA are likely to win an outright majority in the next parliament, highlighting the need to campaign to maximize votes from the Shia south while not alienating the Sunni or Kurdish parties either will need to form the next government. INA Itself Not Settled -------------- ¶11. (C) According to our INA contacts, the alliance has yet to agree upon power-sharing or leadership positions--in essence how the INA will divide up the electoral spoils. These decisions will be difficult given the stakes involved, the historic distrust between ISCI and the Sadrist Trend, and the internal posturing among those who wish to become prime minister. ¶12. (C) Maliki could stoke these divisions by offering promises to rival parties--detainee releases for Sadrists or security posts for ISCI, for example. For now, however, INA appears unified given its confidence that it will win a plurality of COR seats, a shared desire to oust Maliki, and the Iranian government's consistent encouragement for a unified Shia list. Now that Maliki has announced his coalition, he too will have to focus on maintaining cohesion as SLA forms its electoral lists and articulates a common public message. HILL