VPOTUS MEETING WITH UNAMI ACTING SRSG GILMOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002623

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: VPOTUS MEETING WITH UNAMI ACTING SRSG GILMOUR

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (U) September 16, 2009; 2:30 p.m.; Baghdad, Iraq.


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
Vice President Joseph Biden
Ambassador Christopher R. Hill
GEN Raymond Odierno, Commanding General MNF-I
Tony Blinken, National Security Advisor, OVP
James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State
Colin Kahl, DASD
Herro Mustafa, Special Advisor to the Vice President
Molly Phee, National Security Council Director
Colonel Dominic Caraccilo, Executive Officer
Kate Wiehagen Leonard, EMBASSY Notetaker

UNAMI
Andrew Gilmour, Acting SRSG, UNAMI
Sandra Mitchell, Chief Technical Advisor, UNAMI Electoral
Assistance Team
Stephanie Khoury, Political Officer, UNAMI


3. (C) SUMMARY. UNAMI Acting SRSG Andrew Gilmour predicted
to the Vice President that elections will take place on time,
but that parliamentarians are likely to opt for an
unambitious amendment of the 2005 election law and that
Kirkuk's voter registry will remain central to the ongoing
election law debate. On overall Arab-Kurd issues, Gilmour
reported slow but steady progress in the High Level Task
Force, noting that the process was keeping key players
engaged in a process of low-risk concessions. The Vice
President expressed his desire that this process continue in
the run up to national elections. On hydrocarbons
legislation, Gilmour suggested that revenue-sharing be agreed
in a Constitutional amendment. Gilmour told the Vice
President that Iraqi-Syrian relations were best addressed by
others at the UN and not by UNAMI in Baghdad. END SUMMARY.

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Elections
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4. (C) Asked about prospects for Iraq's national elections,
UNAMI's Acting SRSG, Andrew Gilmour, predicted that Iraq's
elections would take place on time, but that Parliament was
unlikely to pass a wholly new election law this fall.
Instead, Gilmour said that Parliament was most likely to make
minimal amendments to the 2005 election law to allow the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to continue its
preparations. Gilmour noted that Sandra Mitchell, the head
of the UNAMI Electoral Assistance Team was embedded at IHEC
and guiding its work daily. Gilmour told the Vice President
that UNAMI remained concerned that some political actors were
seeking to delay the elections. He cited the debate over
voter eligibility in Kirkuk as an example of a delay tactic.
Gilmour also said the UN is monitoring with concern the
Parliamentary summons of the IHEC Chairman for questioning
and rumored interest in removing members of the IHEC Board,
possibly as an indirect effort to prevent timely elections.
In a subsequent sidebar, Mitchell underscored her concerns
that such pressure is unhelpfully interfering with IHEC's
needed focus on preparing for elections and asked for U.S.
support for IHEC with the Parliament.


5. (C) The Vice President raised the issue of voting for
refugees outside of Iraq. Mitchell explained that IHEC had
plans for refugee voting, which Iraq calls "Out of Country
Voting" (OCV),but warned that preparations needed to begin
immediately. The August 19 bombing of the Foreign Ministry
delayed efforts to establish bilateral agreements to govern
OCV. Asked about who was pushing for OCV, Gilmour said that
because it was in the 2005 election law, most Iraqis assume
it would take place again. Mitchell recommended a more
modest approach than the one taken in 2005, when 15 countries
participated in OCV. Given limited time and funding,
Qparticipated in OCV. Given limited time and funding,
Mitchell said it would be practical for OCV take place only
in bordering countries where most Iraqi refugees live, and
possibly in Sweden. Mitchell also predicted that internally
displaced persons would be allowed to vote. The Deputy
Secretary raised the possibility that those Iraqis resident
in Syria would not vote because participation in the election
could put their refugee status at risk.

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Kirkuk's Voter Registry

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6. (C) The Vice President pressed Gilmour on a solution for
voting in Kirkuk province, noting that there seemed to be a
question about who might vote in Kirkuk under either a new
election law or an amended version of the 2005 law. Gilmour
explained that the central solution was to assure Arabs and
Turkomen that the current voter registry would not be used as
a basis for future events, such as Kirkuk's delayed
provincial elections or a referendum on whether the province
should become part of the Kurdistan Region. According to
Gilmour, Arabs and Turkomen acknowledge that the influx of
Kurds into Kirkuk over the past five years will likely result
in the Kurds winning most of the seats from Kirkuk in the
national elections. To address the voter registry question,
UNAMI recommended development of an "innocuous clause"
stipulating that the voter registry used in Kirkuk for the
national elections would not be used again for any other
electoral event. He added that, in a worst case scenario,
UNAMI could accept the idea of quota seats for
representatives from Kirkuk, as some have suggested, but
UNAMI would prefer not to do it.

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Arab-Kurd Relations
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7. (C) Gilmour offered his view that behind the debate on
election rules in Kirkuk lay a larger assumption that few
contested: Arabs and Turkomen fear that ultimately the
United States will support the Kurdish efforts to annex
Kirkuk into the Kurdistan Region. The Ambassador observed
that the Arabs and the Kurds both seem to harbor that idea.
Gilmour predicted that concerns over Kirkuk would continue to
slow national progress -- as seen during efforts to hold
provincial elections, the nationwide census, and national
elections -- until this underlying fear could be assuaged.
With pre-election rhetoric and tension intensifying, the
United States should indicate that it will not support a
Kurd-controlled Kirkuk, Gilmour advised. The Vice President
acknowledged the importance of this problem, and agreed that
we will tell the Kurds we support a confirmatory referendum
over a decisional one, but agreed with GEN Odierno that it
would be better to wait until after the national elections to
tell the Kurds that they will have to compromise on the
status of Kirkuk. The Vice President expressed his desire to
keep efforts focused on maintaining momentum in UNAMI's High
Level Task Force (HLTF) and in ensuring that Arabs and Kurds
continue to make low-risk concessions before January. The
Ambassador emphasized that he was encouraging all sides to
stay engaged in the HLTF.

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Hydrocarbons Revenue-Sharing
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8. (C) Gilmour offered an idea on how to bypass the current
lack of support for the package of hydrocarbon laws. In
UNAMI's view, the Arabs did not support the hydrocarbons
package because they feared it could be circumvented by the
language in the future Kurdistan Regional Constitution.
Gilmour proposed solving this problem by creating an
amendment to the Iraqi constitution on revenue sharing. The
goal of such an approach would be to provide a mechanism for
revenue-sharing that all sides could trust. Gilmour also
noted that revenue-sharing is the only subject which the
Kurds believe should be handled nationally vice regionally.
The Ambassador noted that a mutually acceptable agreement on
revenue-sharing could "take oil out of the equation" for
Arabs and Kurds. U.S. participants agreed to consider the
feasibility of a constitutional amendment.
Qfeasibility of a constitutional amendment.

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Syria
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9. (C) The Ambassador asked Gilmour for his views on the
role the UN could play in addressing the current dispute
between Iraq and Syria, and in particular, regarding Iraq's
request that the UN Security Council launch an inquiry into
the August 19 bombings. Gilmour thought issues between Iraq
and Syria would best be handled from New York and expressed
concern that if UNAMI in Baghdad were to be directly involved
with these issues, it might make UNAMI vulnerable to attacks
from those who wanted to discredit UNAMI's work in Iraq.

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MEK
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10. (C) The Vice President also raised a possible UNAMI
role in helping the GOI resolve the outstanding issue of the

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Mujahideen-e-Kalq (MEK). Gilmour said that UNAMI would like
to help. All concurred on the difficulty of successfully
managing this issue.
HASLACH