REFORMING THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM -- EASIER

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002621 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAGR EAID ECON ETRD IZ KCOR PREF WFP SUBJECT: REFORMING THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM -- EASIER SAID THAN DONE REF: BAGHDAD 1378 ET AL. BAGHDAD 00002621 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Summary and Comment: The GOI won't soon take the tough political decisions needed to reform Iraq's Public Distribution System (PDS),despite the burden it places on national finances and the market distortions and corruption it engenders. The UN World Food Program (WFP) has proposed a PDS restructuring plan to key GOI officials, who acknowledge the PDS' endemic inefficiency. WFP Iraq Director Edward Kallon previewed the proposal in a September 8 meeting with DCM for Assistance Transition, Patricia Haslach, and formally presented it to Acting Trade Minister Dr. Safa al-Safie on September 9. According to UN staff, Prime Minister Maliki recently "has agreed in principle" to the proposal and the GOI has followed up with questions on the program,s budget details. We expect immediate action is unlikely, however, with national elections looming. This leaves the primary PDS ministries -- Trade, Finance, Agriculture -- struggling to pay for personal profiteering and the growing cost of supplying a shrinking basket of rations. WFP expects to begin soliciting approximately USD 17 million in funding for the proposal once/if negotiations with the GOI are complete. Post fully supports WFP's objectives and looks forward to the upcoming U.S.-Iraq Dialogue on Economic Cooperation (DEC) to reinforce the importance of reforming the PDS. End Summary and Comment. -------------- Origin of the WFP PDS Reform Proposal -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to WFP Iraq Director Edward Kallon, former Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, chairing a GOI PDS reform committee in May 2009, requested three specific WFP actions to help the GOI: 1) realign the PDS to better serve vulnerable Iraqis; 2) devise a system to integrate the PDS into a strengthened social safety net; and, 3) help Iraq rehabilitate its agricultural base (ref A). This reflects the GOI,s professed interest in better focusing the PDS program and reducing its budgetary impact. The Council of Representatives (COR) passed in its 2009 Budget Law a provision for a Ministry of Trade (MOT) study on how to target PDS benefits on the truly needy. MOT has not yet done the study, reportedly displeasing the COR. Baghdad's Treasury Attache, reported that the Council of Ministers, in reviewing the medium-term budget picture, also discussed reducing the PDS; we won,t know the results of these discussions until the introduction of the 2010 budget. The World Bank has been pushing for a policy pronouncement from the GOI on phasing out the PDS, moving to cash subsidies, providing social safety net protections, etc. With a potential USD 1 billion support loan in the offing, these calls may carry some weight. -------------- 20% of Iraqis Food Insecure, Without PDS? -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In late 2007, WFP partnered with the GOI, UNICEF, FAO, and WHO to conduct the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA),a standard WFP pre-crisis baseline study designed to measure the scope of food insecurity in Iraq. In late 2008, WFP reported that almost 1 million Iraqis were food insecure and six million more would be without the PDS, approximately 20 percent of the population. Iraqis who WFP considered "food insecure" Qpopulation. Iraqis who WFP considered "food insecure" include those who lack sufficient income to complement or replace the PDS commodities basket; non-skilled workers, agricultural workers and households where chief wage earners are unemployed, women-headed households, current or recently resettled IDP households, and households with chronically malnourished children. WFP has extended its emergency operations from April to December 2009, and is currently covering the food needs of 1.1 million Iraqis. -------------- Commodities Shrinking, Cost Growing -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Under the Saddam-era PDS, each Iraqi national is entitled to a monthly commodities basket that contains enough wheat, rice, milk, sugar, vegetable oil, pulses, and infant BAGHDAD 00002621 002.2 OF 003 formula to meet 100 percent of each household member's minimum daily caloric needs (2,200 calories). In recent years, however, supply shortfalls and disruptions have meant that the PDS supplies less than half of Iraqis' daily caloric needs. This supports anecdotal accounts from Iraqi contacts about widespread shortages. Despite almost universal acknowledgement of its failures -- its massive price tag, its distorting effects on domestic commodity markets, and its myriad opportunities for corruption -- there have been no significant reform efforts. In 2007, the COR passed legislation that would have rendered households of government officials at the rank of Director General or higher ineligible for PDS rations. The GOI has not implemented this reform, however, and even the wealthiest Iraqis remain eligible for rations. Grey-market trade of PDS rations remains common, as better-off households seek higher-quality products and very poor households consume less to raise cash by selling rations or ration cards. Despite the significant shortfalls and supply disruptions, the cost of the PDS has risen to between USD 6 and USD 7 billion annually, according to World Bank and WFP estimates. -------------- -------------- Proposal Details - Supply Chain Capacity Building: CY 2010 -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Kallon told DCM Haslach that within the strategic objectives outlined by the GOI the WFP proposed a pilot program in which the WFP administers the PDS in six of Iraq's eighteen governorates, deploying technical advisors to work side-by-side with GOI authorities on procurement, shipping, quality control, pipeline management and logistics, including land transport, warehousing and commodity tracking, and monitoring. Kallon said that, by WFP estimates, the total cost of a WFP-administered PDS would be USD 5.7 billion nationwide, assuming the population of Iraq is 31.5 million - the GOI's official estimate. For the six governorates, the first stage of the pilot, the cost would be around USD 1.7 billion. Under WFP's proposal, Iraq would pay all costs except costs derived from contracting the WFP technical advisors -- about USD 17 million, the WFP estimates. (Note: Though these costs are not significantly lower than what the GOI is currently paying, WFP is basing its cost estimates on delivery of 100 percent of the commodities in the basket. The GOI is currently delivering about half of the commodities. The WFP also estimated the costs for providing only five essential commodities (rather than the ten commodities currently in the PDS basket) at USD 4.6 billion nationwide and USD 1.4 billion in the six governorates. Some estimates place the cost of delivering USD 1 in PDS commodities at USD 6 under the current system. End note.) -------------- -------------- Proposal Details - Relief and Recovery Operations: CY 2010-11 -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Kallon told DCM Haslach that phase two of WFP proposal included programs designed to strengthen Iraq's social safety net as well as capacity-building projects divided into 3 categories: - In-kind conditional transfers which includes: school meals and community-based maternal child health and nutrition programs; Qprograms; - Conditional transfers which includes: resettlement and reintegration of returnees, income generation for female headed households, and small farm food production; - Government institution capacity building for administering social safety nets. -------------- Progress Likely to Slow Ahead of Elections -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The WFP,s senior policy advisor told us that Ministry of Trade officials, in a meeting with her in mid-September, claimed that the Prime Minister "agrees in principle" with the proposal, and the MOT asked her for a more detailed breakdown about the proposal,s $17 million BAGHDAD 00002621 003.2 OF 003 budget. The WFP may already be able to cover some of the $17 million program cost through insurance recovery funds it has recently received, she claimed. Despite this interest, all indications are that the GOI will continue for now to raid its budget to support the corrupt, bulky PDS program. Dr. Abdulhadi al-Hamiri, Senior Advisor to the Acting Trade Minister and co-chair of the SFA JCC Trade and Investment Working Group has told us repeatedly that the GOI would take few, if any, concrete steps on key economic issues -- especially PDS reform -- in advance of Iraq's national elections scheduled for January 2010 (ref). He says the Acting Trade Minister is acutely aware of the political impacts of any reductions to this very visible social benefit. As a "symbolic first step," al-Hamiri has said that there may be political space "for this business of" removing Iraq's highest income earners from the beneficiary rolls, but he has acknowledged such a move would have only negligible fiscal impact. According to al-Hamiri, the GOI has secured funding and contracts to continue PDS rations until the January elections but not beyond. Funding for the first quarter of 2010 is unclear and the MOT is exploring options -- like supplemental budgeting or guaranteed loans from the Ministry of Finance - to keep the PDS running. HASLACH