UNAMI ON THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS, KIRKUK AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002550

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2024
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM IZ IR
SUBJECT: UNAMI ON THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS, KIRKUK AND THE
MEK (RE-SEND)

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: UNAMI Deputy SRSG Andrew Gilmour discussed
with POL M/C the challenges of passing a timely national
elections law, suggesting that UNAMI, the Embassy, and others
would need to make a major push with Iraqi political players
in October to rally support for passage of the law and to
ensure that Kirkuk is included. Gilmour encouraged a more
muscular U.S. role on disputed internal boundaries (DIBs),
including Kirkuk, and underscored the importance of close
U.S.-UNAMI coordination. POL M/C raised with Gilmour options
for a UN role in resolving the Ashraf/MEK issue. END SUMMARY.

Election Law, Kirkuk
--------------


2. (C) In a September 14 meeting with POL M/C, Deputy SRSG
Gilmour expressed concern that the question of voter
eligibility in Kirkuk could capsize the debate on the
elections law (septel). According to Gilmour, Sunni Arab
politicians had expressed concern to UNAMI that if used in
the January national elections, the current voter registry
could later be used for Kirkuk provincial council elections
or as a basis for a referendum on Kirkuk's status. The root
of their concern was that the current registry included
300,000-400,000 new Kurdish voters since 2004. Gilmour said
that UNAMI and the USG need to find a way to counter the
Sunni Arabs' and Turkomen's fears. He had engaged Sunni Arab
and Turkomen politicians in Kirkuk but had failed to dissuade
them from stirring up controversy about Kirkuk when at most,
one was talking about 2-3 extra seats for the Kurds out of
approximately 310 seats planned for the Council of
Representatives (COR). Instead, the Arabs and Turkomen
offered the idea of using the 1957 census, which Gilmour
rejected as a non-starter.


3. (C) Gilmour was skeptical of Speaker Sammaraie's notion of
establishing a committee to examine residency claims of new
Kirkuk voters because it would likely take years to
implement. In addition, only allowing people who are
registered on the 2004 voter registration rolls was a red
line for the Kurds, Gilmour noted. He predicted that UNAMI,
the United States, and other concerned parties would need to
rally on the election law in early October.

Coordination on Kirkuk
--------------


4. (C) Responding to POL M/C,s description of the Embassy's
Kirkuk Action Plan, Gilmour affirmed that the USG position --
including advocacy of an interim special status and support
for a confirmatory vice decisional referendum -- was
consistent with of UNAMI. Gilmour added, however, that UNAMI
preferred the "Special Status-Dual Nexus" position outlined
in UNAMI's Kirkuk Options paper because it would be more
conciliatory to the Kurds. He also agreed that it would be
difficult to convince the Kurds, in particular Kurdistan
Regional Government President Masoud Barzani, to retreat from
their call for a decisional referendum. Gilmour suggested a
coordinated roll-out in which first UNAMI announced its
position on Kirkuk, then the USG followed with its own
announcement publicly voicing its support for UNAMI's
position.


5. (C) POL M/C underscored that the United States strongly
supported the UNAMI-sponsored process and that we would be
willing to take steps to help move the process forward. For
example, he noted, the EMBASSY could provide technical
Qexample, he noted, the EMBASSY could provide technical
assistance to expedite property claims. UNAMI's Stephanie
Khoury noted that she has already worked up a detailed plan
which she would share with the Embassy. POL M/C recommended
that Khoury liaise with Embassy's Rule of Law Coordinator
Doug Allen. POL M/C previewed Ambassador Hill's request for
Special Advisor for Northern Iraq Alan Misenheimer to
participate as an observer in UNAMI's High Level Task Force
(HLTF) meetings. Gilmour said he did not foresee any
problems with this and promised to discuss the suggestion
with SRSG Melkert upon his return. POL M/C mentioned that
the EMBASSY would be engaging the Kurds on Kirkuk and the
related hydrocarbons revenue-sharing law.

Mediating between the GOI and MEK
--------------


6. (C) POL M/C told Gilmour that senior USG officials in
Washington would want to discuss with visiting SRSG Melkert
the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK). Specifically, Washington would
be interested in exploring how the UN might facilitate a

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peaceful relocation of MEK members out Ashraf. POL M/C noted
USG disengagement coordinated with establishment of a UN
presence in Ashraf would allow for credible third-party
mediation and help ensure that the GOI abided by its
assurances to handle the MEK humanely and in accordance with
Iraqi and international law. It would also dispel the MEK's
willful misunderstanding of the United States obligations and
thus might encourage the MEK to cooperate with the GOI in a
peaceful resettlement.


7. (C) Gilmour noted that the MEK issue would fall under the
UN's human rights office, but agreed that it would be a good
idea for officials in Washington to broach the idea of UN
involvement directly with SRSG Melkert. Gilmour also
cautioned that Maliki would need some convincing about a UN
presence given his suspicion that a UN role could actually
embolden the MEK to instigate a confrontation. POL M/C
explained that the we planned to reiterate to PM Maliki the
merits of a UN presence and urge caution in dealing with the
MEK.
HILL