(U) DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002539

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: (U) DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MEETING WITH
IRAQI COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES MEMBER QASIM DAUD

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Gary A. Grappo. Reason 1.4
.(b),(d).


1. (U) Date and Venue: September 17, 2009; 11:00 a.m.;
Baghdad, Iraq.


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
Dr. James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary
Amb. Gary A. Grappo, POL M/C
Elissa Slotkin, NEA Senior Advisor for Iraq and Regional
Affairs
Mike Castiglione, Embassy notetaker

IRAQ
Qasim Daud, Council of Representatives member
Mohammad Daud, son of Qasim Daud


3. (C) SUMMARY: During a September 17 meeting in Baghdad,
Council of Representatives (COR) member Qasim Daud told
Deputy Secretary Steinberg of the trend among Iraqi leaders
to portray themselves as "national" and "secular" and
highlighted the potential for cross-sectarian political
cooperation. Daud, a member of the Iraqi National Alliance
(INA),explained that the INA wishes to include Kurdish and
Sunni Arab blocs and will campaign against the "incompetence"
of the current government. He said some in the COR want to
maintain a "closed list" for the January 2010 national
election and are using disputes over voter registration in
Kirkuk to delay a new election law. Daud warned of a coming
"war" in the COR between the INA and factions loyal to PM
Maliki. Steinberg stressed the U.S. commitment to Iraq and
the Security Agreement (SA),and the importance of promptly
adopting an election law. END SUMMARY.

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INA to Emphasize National, Secular Character
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4. (C) Daud noted that during the 2005 national election in
Iraq, sectarianism was the dominant political theme. The
Unified Iraqi Alliance (UIA) was formed as a Shia bloc and
only later tried to recruit some Sunni representation. Daud
explained that this effort failed because these Sunnis were
shunned by their communities and targeted for assassination.
In contrast, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) formed for the
January 2010 national election, Daud claimed, already has 25
Sunni members, is purposefully putting forth a secular face,
and is using "nationalist" rhetoric. Daud said the INA's
strategy is to first establish itself as a credible bloc and
then create alliances across communities with other credible
blocs; the INA hopes to broaden its party membership within
4-6 weeks. Daud claimed the INA has received "positive
signs" from the Kurds, and is talking to the Sunni Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) and the Sons of Iraq (SOI). He
elaborated that the INA, including many of its Islamist
members, is trying to recruit former PM Ayad Allawi to expand
the standing of secularists within the alliance, although
Daud remained skeptical that Allawi would join.

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Emergence of Cross-Sectarian Cooperation
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5. (C) The Deputy Secretary stated that Iraq's long-term
political challenge will be to allow for issue-based politics
and alliances, and to prevent the major parties from merely
representing each of the ethno-sectarian groups. He warned
that how coalitions campaign, especially the rhetoric they
use, will be important in whether they are viewed as
sectarian or national. Daud responded that there is
increasing cooperation across ethno-sectarian groups. In
2004, Daud said, Sunni and Shia officials in the COR did not
talk to each other but now there are cross-cutting social
relationships and short-term alliances between these groups
based on specific issues.

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QSeeks to Reverse "Incompetent" Maliki Government
-------------- ---


6. (C) Daud predicted the INA will campaign on a
"nationalist" platform for a more "competent government." He
criticized the Maliki government as incompetent, corrupt, and
lacking a long-term plan, especially regarding economic
development. Daud alleged that the Prime Minister had
violated the Iraqi constitution 52 times.


7. (C) Daud claimed that Maliki "fabricated evidence" to
link Syria and Ba'thists to the August 19 terror attacks.
Maliki's greatest source of popularity is the credit he gets

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for the improvement in security, even though U.S. Generals
Petraeus and Odierno were actually responsible for this.
After the August 19 bombings, Daud continued, Maliki wanted
to deflect blame away from his security efforts and portray
himself as a hero by finding the culprits. Daud agreed that
Syria is playing a "destructive role" in Iraq and said he is
pleased Damascus was under pressure. He warned, however,
that relying on false confessions is a dangerous practice.

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U.S. Can Defend Iraq's Progress
--------------


8. (C) Daud said he personally believes the U.S.-Iraq
Security Agreement (SA) should be extended to 2025 because of
the unreadiness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),but
realized the political unpopularity of such a position. He
said foreign investment is needed quickly and that the GOI
and USG must counteract the perception that foreign companies
merely want to "steal Iraq's oil." Daud asked for firm U.S.
support for the national election, especially assistance in
protecting Iraq from interference from neighboring
governments, including SAUDI ARABIA and Iran, that fear Iraqi
democracy will undermine their own rule. The Deputy
Secretary replied that the United States has a direct stake
in Iraq's success and reiterated U.S. commitment to the
Security Agreement and to upholding Iraq's sovereignty.

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Kirkuk Being Used to Keep Closed List Election
-------------- -


9. (C) Responding to the Deputy Secretary's question on the
status of a national election law, Daud responded that many
Iraqi politicians say they want "open" lists (i.e., a system
in which voters choose individual candidates listed by
parties/coalitions) but really want "closed" lists so that
the parties can determine who will represent them in the
parliament. Because Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has
called for open lists, Shia COR members cannot vote for
closed lists. Therefore, many are refusing to accept
compromises on voter participation and seat allocation in
Kirkuk in order to delay legislation and create a technical
reason for why the COR failed to adopt open lists, he said.
(Note: Some Iraqi Arabs and Turkomen claim that more than
300,000 Kurds have moved to Kirkuk in the last few years and
seek to block these new residents from voting in the
province. End Note.) Daud stated there is probably no
solution to the Kirkuk issue unless the COR falls back on the
2005 closed list election law; he claimed Arab and Turkomen
in Kirkuk would agree to use the 2005 voter registration in
the province. Steinberg pressed Daud to exert his leadership
in moving the COR to promptly agree on an election law.

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Likely Maliki-INA "War" in Parliament
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10. (C) Asked whether the COR can address other important
legislation, including on hydrocarbons, before the election,
Daud said a likely "war between the Prime Minister and INA"
will divert attention from new laws. Maliki is trying to
position himself for a second term as PM while the INA is
trying to embarrass him before the January vote, Daud
commented. He predicted the COR in the coming weeks will
resume questioning Cabinet officials, potentially leading to
a no-confidence vote against a minister, and added that the
COR will seek to prevent Maliki from using government funds
for election purposes. Daud also stated that the COR will
likely examine members of the Independent High Electoral
Qlikely examine members of the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC),although he agreed with the Deputy
Secretary that attacking IHEC just ahead an election risks
weakening the commission's capacity.
HILL