DIYALA IDPS: SHIA AND KURDS' COLD CALCULATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000252 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: DIYALA IDPS: SHIA AND KURDS' COLD CALCULATION REF: A. BAGHDAD 239 ¶B. BAGHDAD 49 Classified By: Acting DCM Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Diyala and ePRT South Diyala reporting cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Controversial statements by Shi'a and Kurdish political leaders about internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Diyala aim to underdermine the credibility and legitimacy of the provincial elections in the province. Provincial Council (PC) members from the Shi'a Alliance and Kurdish Coalition independently expressed concerns that 30,000 displaced families who have returned to Diyala could have difficulty voting in the provincial elections on January 31, effectively disenfranchising these families and potentially reducing voter strength for Shi'a and Kurdish political parties. Neither the Shi'a nor the Kurds we spoke with articulated what percentage of these families were Shi'a or Kurdish. Our sense is that the most recent security operations in the province took place in Sunni Arab areas and hindered Sunni Arab IDP voter registration. The Shia were likely less affected but they and the Kurds are nervous that the Sunni Arabs may score well in the January 31 election. The Shi'a and Kurd requests to postpone the provincial elections due to problems in processing returning IDPs seems rooted in political calculation rather than concern for disenfranchised voters as a whole. The Shi'a and Kurdish political leaders' may keep up the complaints, however, darkening the atmosphere around the post-election transition of power in Diyala. It is precisely because of this kind of rhetoric that the IHEC on January 28 decided to stand up 22 extra IDP voting centers around Iraq, including one in Diyala (ref A). The extra voting center won't handle more than a thousand or two voters in Diyala, but it may help IHEC blunt some of the accusations coming from the Shia and Kurds. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) Diyala PRT Team Leader met with PC members from various parties of the Diyala Shi'a Alliance. Aclam Abdul Abass (Islamic Teachers Organization) said there are 29,150 IDP cases in Diyala Province. She expressed concern that local authorities would deny IDPs the right to vote in the provincial elections. Saja Qad'duri (State of Law) alleged that local authorities are telling IDPs they must return to other provinces to vote. Dr. Ahmed Hamid (Reform Party) ;reiterated their concerns about IDPs, and criticized the election commission's "inadequate" efforts to educate people on voting requirements. According to these PC members, general confusion over the right to vote would prevent a significant number of IDPs from participation on Election Day, negatively impacting Shi'a political parties vote count. ¶4. (C) Ibrahim Hassan Ahmad Ali Bajelan (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan),Chairman of the Diyala Provincial Council and Co-chairman of the Kurdish Coalition, indicated that approximately 30,000 registered IDP cases in Diyala Province would be a major issue in the provincial elections since many would be unable to vote. He accused the central Government of Iraq (GOI) of delaying IDP relocation assistance payments, stating that of 10,000 eligible families, only 2,000 have received compensation to date. He also noted that the GoI has been slow to provide housing compensation for IDPs who had their homes destroyed during fighting in the province. ¶5. (C) In addition, Mr. Bajelan emphasized that fear of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is still preventing Diyalan IDPs from returning to their homes in Al Khalis and Muqtadiyah (NOTE: he did not mention any areas with significant Kurdish Qhe did not mention any areas with significant Kurdish populations lacking security. END NOTE). Through the press, he called previously for a postponement in the date of the provincial elections in Diyala due to the lack of security and the need to register more IDPs. ¶6. (SBU) Without knowing how many potential votes any of the ethnic-sectarian parties may lose or gain from IDPs, it is difficult to predict the impact of IDPs on the election process. Neither Shi'a nor Kurdish leaders have suggested how many Diyala IDPs could be their supporters. The Diyala branch of the Ministry of Migration and Displaced People published a report indicating that 29,195 IDP families have registered in Diyala as of January 2009. The report does not break down the IDPs in terms of sect and ethnicity. ¶7. (C) Operation Benevolent Diyala-Glad Tidings of Benevolence, the GoI-led security operation conducted from end July to end September 2008 has also potentially influenced the IDP situation. This operation spanned the month long supplemental voter registration period for IDPs who were not on the Public Distribution System (PDS) rolls in Diyala in 2008, a critical period that permitted returning IDPs to register to vote in Diyala for the provincial BAGHDAD 00000252 002 OF 002 elections. Diyala's Governorate Elections Officer, Amir Latif, has stated that supplemental registration in the areas where the security operation was conducted was notably low during the operation. (NOTE: This would disproportionately impact the registration of prospective Sunni Arab and Kurdish voters since the ISF conducted the operation almost exclusively in Sunni Arab and Kurdish areas. END NOTE). -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) The Shi'a and Kurd requests to postpone the provincial elections due to problems in processing returning IDPs seems rooted in political calculation rather than concern for disenfranchised voters as a whole. Aware that many Sunni Arabs who boycotted the 2005 provincial elections will vote this year, Shi'a politicians maybe trying to prepare this issue as a plausible excuse for losses of PC seats, since some of them sense that the political advantage is shifting toward Sunni Arabs. Shi'a politicians also favored postponing the election since the rate of return of former Shi'a residents of Diyala has not met their expectations. (See ref B.) ¶9. (C) Kurdish politicians may be making similar calculations regarding increased Sunni Arab representation in the PC. And like other Kurds, Mr. Bajelan is concerned that holding elections now could prejudice future implementation of Article 140, by reinforcing the precedent of Kurdish areas (Khanaqin and Jalaula for example) coming under Diyala's jurisdiction rather than Sulaymaniyah's. ¶10. (C) Sunni Arab may have the most at stake in having returning IDPs registered, but their relative silence on the IDP issue, and their emphasis on not postponing elections, may reveal their confidence in gaining more seats in the new PC. Furthermore, ISF operations during the last half of 2008 may have caused a net outflow of Sunni Arabs in several areas such as Al Khalis and areas south of Ba'aquba, according to several current PC members. Whether true or not, these perceptions have added to Sunni Arab politicians' judgment that it is better to hold the election sooner rather than later. ¶11. (C) IDP participation in the election in Diyala will remain a politically sensitive issue, and we believe that both the Kurds and the Shi'a are using the issue to question the validity of provincial elections results here. It is precisely because of this kind of rhetoric that the IHEC on January 28 decided to stand up 22 extra IDP voting centers around Iraq, including one in Diyala. The extra voting center won't handle more than a thousand or two voters in Diyala but it may help IHEC blunt some of the accusations coming from the Shia and Kurds. END COMMENT. CROCKER