IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY CHIEF: ELECTIONS ON TRACK;

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002456

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY CHIEF: ELECTIONS ON TRACK;
BROAD MALIKI COALITION UNLIKELY

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR GARY A. GRAPPO FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Iraqi Islamic Party leader Osama al-Tikriti
believes the Iraqi parliament will soon pass an election law
providing for multiple districts and a closed list, and that
national elections will occur on schedule in January. He
asserted that PM Maliki would not be able to gain broad Sunni
participation in his pre-election coalition, but noted that
"anything was possible" in the post-election government
formation process. Believing the Iraqi political system to
be too secular, Tikriti bemoaned the failure of Iraqi leaders
to directly engage the public on important issues. End
summary.


2. (C) During a September 7 meeting with Pol M-C, Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) Secretary General Osama al-Tikriti said
he believed Iraq,s parliament would adopt election
legislation by October and that despite scattered talk of
elections being delayed, national voting would occur, as
scheduled, on January 16. He acknowledged that an open list
voting system (with voters selecting named individual
candidates, as opposed to voting for a political
party/coalition in a closed list system) was the best option
and that it would encourage voters to turn out on election
day. However, he noted that open lists were not in the
political interest of some established parties, in particular
the Kurdish Alliance. (Note: It is widely believed that the
closed list would also benefit the Shi,a Iraqi National
Alliance (INA). End note). Consequently he expected the law
ultimately passed to provide for a closed list with multiple
districts.


3. (C) Regarding PM Maliki,s electoral strategy, Tikriti
said that even if Maliki renounced the INA, he would only
garner limited Sunni support in trying to form a pre-election
coalition. He said that an alternative to Maliki as PM was
desirable because of security and "other failures," but that
after the election "anything was possible" in terms of
creating the eventual governing majority in parliament.
Tikriti commented that Maliki had told him that resisting
Iran,s desire to play a major role in the election and
control events in Iraq was at core a nationalist endeavor,
rather than a sectarian one. According to Tikriti, Maliki
also claimed that "Iran wants to assassinate me." Tikriti
said he told Maliki that he was receiving disappointing
messages from around the country: "People are languishing in
jail; many are living in poverty; schools and hospitals are
in serious need of repair." He opined that Maliki had done a
poor job of power-sharing; by controlling too many positions,
Maliki had created an imbalance that was coming back to haunt
him.


4. (C) Tikriti criticized the Iraqi political process as
deeply flawed because political leaders refused to give up
their sectarian ways, including those within his own party.
He said there was an absence of leaders who talked directly
to the Iraqi people and explained the issues. He attributed
this shortcoming to a mindset from the Saddam era, which
accepted strong-armed rule that was distant from the public.
FORD