PM MALIKI ADVISOR ON SYRIA, ARAB-KURD TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002455

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI ADVISOR ON SYRIA, ARAB-KURD TALKS,
ELECTION COALITIONS, AND REGIONAL INTERFERENCE IN IRAQI
POLITICAL PROCESS

REF: BAGHDAD 02382

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo for reasons
1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Sadiq al-Rikabi, PM Maliki's political
advisor, told Pol M/C September 9 that Maliki was intent on
hitting every pressure point available, including through the
UN, to get Syria to stop harboring anti-GOI Ba'thists and
allowing insurgents to cross the border. Turning to Iran,
Rikabi emphasized that only Iraq's Shia could take on Tehran,
warning that efforts by outsiders--whether Sunni neighbors or
the United States--to directly counteract Iranian influence
would have the unintended consequence of sharpening
sectarianism and allowing Tehran to exaggerate its influence
in Iraq. Rikabi gave an upbeat assessment of his September 8
UN-sponsored meeting with Kurdish negotiators on the issue of
disputed internal boundaries (DIBs),but noted that KRG
President Barzani would have to abandon his demand for a
referendum if Arab-Kurd issues were to be resolved. Rikabi
claimed Maliki is committed to forging ahead with a renewed
State of Law (SOL) coalition for the national election. END
SUMMARY.

"We Want Syria to Stop"
--------------


2. (C) Asked what was the desired effect of the GOI's call
for an international investigation committee to examine the
August 19 bombings (Ref A),Rikabi replied simply, "We want
Syria to stop harboring anti-GOI elements and allowing
insurgents to cross the border to spill blood on Iraq's
streets." There was no doubt as to what Syria was doing,
Rikabi said, noting that the United States had shared photos
and other data with the GOI showing that there were terrorist
camps in Syria. The steps the GOI was taking now, including
going to the UN, were intended to demonstrate to Assad that
Maliki was serious and was prepared to act if Syria continued
to try to undermine the GOI in general and harbor wanted
terrorists in particular.


3. (C) Rikabi recounted how Damascus had given up the PKK's
Ocalan only after Ankara warned that Turkey was prepared to
go into Damascus to get Ocalan and began moving forces to the
border. Rikabi also pointed out that no insurgents crossed
the Syrian-Israeli border. "Why?" he asked rhetorically,
because the Syrians understood that there would be
consequences if Damascus were to allow something like that to
happen. These examples showed that Damascus would stop its
support for terrorists and anti-GOI elements only if it
believed that the GOI--and the United States, he
underscored--were serious and prepared to take action. Pol
M/C noted that the United States has long had concerns about
Syria's activities in this regard and wanted to continue to
work with the GOI on how best to influence Syrian behavior.

High-Level Task Force Discussed Property Disputes
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Rikabi said he and KRG representative Rowsh Shaways on
September 8 met as the HLTF to discuss building trust,
integrating KRG and GOI security forces, and coordinating
property disputes in disputed territories. Rikabi said the
HLTF would meet again after the Eid holiday (about 21
September). He confirmed the objective of the HLTF at this
point was to establish confidence-building measures and
expressed satisfaction with tMQ7QQQQthat the Iranian government was
"unhappy" that Maliki refused to join the INA.


6. (C) Rikabi dismissed rumors that Iraq's national election
might slip beyond January 2010. Such a delay would appear as
a failure of the democratic process in Iraq, he said. Pol
M/C underscored that Washington placed great importance on
Iraq holding legitimate and timely national elections.

Iraq Must Lead to Confront Iran
--------------


7. (C) Rikabi warned about repeating the "Lebanon experiment"
in Iraq, whereby the major domestic factions become proxies
of neighboring countries. Given Iraq's weakened current
position, he said, Iran sought to support Shia parties while
Saudi ARABIA and other surrounding Sunni states were backing
the most promising Sunni and "secular" parties, further
stirring up sectarian tensions before the vote. Rikabi said
if Da'wa tried to fight all fronts at once, "We will lose."
Therefore, Da'wa must accept some "cease fires" in order to
continue on, he said, hinting that the GOI might not be able
to aggressively protest interference from Iran at this point.
He advised the USG to discourage Sunni states in the region
from interfering in Iraq's political process. "We don't have
the influence you do with them," he said.


8. (C) As for Iran, Rikabi stressed, "Let us deal with them;
we know them and no one is better able to deal with the
Iranians than Iraqi Shia." Rikabi argued that the Iraqi Shia
would naturally resist Iranian influence as long as Iraq
could count on the United States as an ally and if its Arab
neighbors did not close the door to the Iraq. If
others--Iraqi Sunnis, Arab Sunni states or the United
States--attempt to attack Iranian influence, it might be
perceived as an attack on Shia. Iraqi Shia would likely
recoil and defensively move toward Tehran, he said. SAUDI
Arabia and Turkey might complain about Iranian interference
in Iraq, but if they were to criticize openly Iran's role in
Iraq or try to interfere themselves, Iraqi Shia would become
defensive, Rikabi cautioned. Given Iraq's history of
sectarian tension, Rikabi said, if the election were to
center around Shia/Iran versus Sunni/Arab, "we as
independents" (i.e. Da'wa) will lose the Shia vote to the
Islamist INA. Therefore, we must work together to resist
Tehran's attempt to elevate sectarian identities, Rikabi
advised.


9. (C) COMMENT: Rikabi, who is sometimes accused of having
Iranian sympathies, now appears to see the clear political
reality of sectarianism in the national elections.
Chronically insecure Shi'a would likely circle the wagons
around the Islamist INA, not only neutralizing Maliki but
also setting Sunnis and Kurds in opposing camps. END COMMENT.

FORD

BAGHDAD 00002455 002.2 OF 002


is, SOL would not fold itself into INA, but SOL and INA could
form a new alliance together, Rikabi said. (Note: SOL, a
grouping of Da'wa, Da'wa Tanzim and the Independent Bloc,
participated in the January 2009 provincial elections. End
note.) Rikabi acknowledged that the Iranian government was
"unhappy" that Maliki refused to join the INA.


6. (C) Rikabi dismissed rumors that Iraq's national election
might slip beyond January 2010. Such a delay would appear as
a failure of the democratic process in Iraq, he said. Pol
M/C underscored that Washington placed great importance on
Iraq holding legitimate and timely national elections.

Iraq Must Lead to Confront Iran
--------------


7. (C) Rikabi warned about repeating the "Lebanon experiment"
in Iraq, whereby the major domestic factions become proxies
of neighboring countries. Given Iraq's weakened current
position, he said, Iran sought to support Shia parties while
Saudi ARABIA and other surrounding Sunni states were backing
the most promising Sunni and "secular" parties, further
stirring up sectarian tensions before the vote. Rikabi said
if Da'wa tried to fight all fronts at once, "We will lose."
Therefore, Da'wa must accept some "cease fires" in order to
continue on, he said, hinting that the GOI might not be able
to aggressively protest interference from Iran at this point.
He advised the USG to discourage Sunni states in the region
from interfering in Iraq's political process. "We don't have
the influence you do with them," he said.


8. (C) As for Iran, Rikabi stressed, "Let us deal with them;
we know them and no one is better able to deal with the
Iranians than Iraqi Shia." Rikabi argued that the Iraqi Shia
would naturally resist Iranian influence as long as Iraq
could count on the United States as an ally and if its Arab
neighbors did not close the door to the Iraq. If
others--Iraqi Sunnis, Arab Sunni states or the United
States--attempt to attack Iranian influence, it might be
perceived as an attack on Shia. Iraqi Shia would likely
recoil and defensively move toward Tehran, he said. SAUDI
Arabia and Turkey might complain about Iranian interference
in Iraq, but if they were to criticize openly Iran's role in
Iraq or try to interfere themselves, Iraqi Shia would become
defensive, Rikabi cautioned. Given Iraq's history of
sectarian tension, Rikabi said, if the election were to
center around Shia/Iran versus Sunni/Arab, "we as
independents" (i.e. Da'wa) will lose the Shia vote to the
Islamist INA. Therefore, we must work together to resist
Tehran's attempt to elevate sectarian identities, Rikabi
advised.


9. (C) COMMENT: Rikabi, who is sometimes accused of having
Iranian sympathies, now appears to see the clear political
reality of sectarianism in the national elections.
Chronically insecure Shi'a would likely circle the wagons
around the Islamist INA, not only neutralizing Maliki but
also setting Sunnis and Kurds in opposing camps. END COMMENT.

FORD