Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD2454
2009-09-11 14:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ANTI-CORRUPTION UPDATE

Tags:  PGOV KCOR KDEM EAID IZ 
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VZCZCXRO3569
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2454/01 2541445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111445Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4667
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002454 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KDEM EAID IZ
SUBJECT: ANTI-CORRUPTION UPDATE

REF: A. (A)BAGHDAD 2424

B. (B) BAGHDAD 2385

Classified By: ACCO Anne Bodine, Acting, reason 1.4(b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002454 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV KCOR KDEM EAID IZ SUBJECT: ANTI-CORRUPTION UPDATE REF: A. (A)BAGHDAD 2424 ¶B. (B) BAGHDAD 2385 Classified By: ACCO Anne Bodine, Acting, reason 1.4(b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: A number of cases involving senior judicial and anti-corruption officials continue to bubble up in the media in Iraq, likely a manifestation of both intense political jockeying and real efforts to crack down on corruption, which polls show is an issue of increasing concern to Iraq's citizens. The Commission on Integrity (COI) is scoring some success with skillful use of the media (possibly prompting financial disclosure submissions by provincial officials with some well-placed criticism) and some concrete demonstration of newly acquired skills imparted by U.S.-funded and U.S.-staffed programs. Early Retirement Rumored for Key MOI Anti-Corruption Official -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Emboffs followed up on media reports last week about the possible removal (early retirement) of one of the government's most aggressive anti-corruption officials, MG Ahmed Taha, DG of Internal Affairs at the Ministry of Interior (MOI),Embassy rule of law officer met on September 9 with MOI contacts who said that both Taha and Major General/Director of Operations Abdul Kareem Khalaf (also said to be facing an early departure) were still on the job and would probably survive what seemed to be a political effort by the PM to remove them from office. ¶3. (C) The source said that PM Maliki had intended to "retire" MG Khalaf because of a letter that Khalaf allegedly sent to General Petraeus during the latter's tenure as MNF-I commander, criticizing Maliki and his staff. In the meantime, the letter was determind to have been forged, apparently deflecting the PM's ire from from Khalaf. The source said that Maliki did, in fact, prepare a letter ordering the firing of MG Ahmed Taha but has not signed the letter. As for Taha, Maliki was displeased that he was complaining publicly about Iran's involvement in terror attacks just as the PM was publicly castigating Syrian support for violence here. At the same time, the contact noted, the PM is leery of confrontations with officials who enjoy strong U.S. backing and who have solid records combating corruption. ¶4. (C) The source said that Maliki is unlikely to continue his push to fire Khalaf and Taha, but risks losing face if he backs off. He ex
pected more political jousting with staunch supporters of MOI Minister Bolani in the run-up to elections, which Bolani is expected to contest as a possible PM candidate. Taha is seen as Bolani's most trusted military ally. COI Sheds Light on Provincial Laggards and Reveals Skills Imparted by U.S. Trainers -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Commission on Integrity, meanwhile, is using the airwaves to publicize (and prompt corrective action of) sub-par ethics among provincial officials. Indeed, COI Commissioner Raheem told ACCO recently that the Prime Minister's Office has been prodding him to raise the level of public attention to enforcement of the anti-corruption statutes. COI told the press this week that, as of September 1, none of the heads of the provincial councils (among the 15 non-Kurdish governorates) and only five of the fifteen governors had submitted mandatory financial disclosure (FD) statements. Likewise, only a minority of council members had complied. The COI also revealed that the best compliance was in Diwaniyah, where four of the 28 council members had reported. In Babil, Ninewah, Kirkuk, Wasit, Najaf and Salah ad-Din, not a single council member had submitted their Qad-Din, not a single council member had submitted their information, while the Baghdad Council had turned in one FD statement. In response, Baghdad Provincial Council member Dr. Abbas Al-Dahlaki refuted the COI information in a follow up interview with "Al-Sabah" newspaper, saying 21 of the 57 members of the Baghdad Council had turned in disclosures in September. (COMMENT: COI's interview may have prompted hasty submission of the reports, showing some savvy public relations by the commission.) ¶6. (SBU) COI also seems to be flexing new muscles on the enforcement side. COI officials told ACCO liaison advisor Foulk that its pending bribery case against Deputy Transport Minister Adnan al-Abeidly (reftel A) was made possible by expanded capacity resulting from U.S. assistance. One element of this new capacity was the tip hotline (created in coordination with the U.S.),which provided COI with initial case information. The second element was COI equipment and skills (acquired from U.S. ICITAP trainers) used to set the BAGHDAD 00002454 002 OF 002 deputy minister up in a sting. In a departure from prior policy that kept evidence and publicity to a minimum until after trial, COI told us it is eager to air the tapes of the sting operation publicly, showing that political instincts may still outweigh good enforcement. On balance, however, operational aspects of the case seem to validate sustained USG support of the COI. (COMMENT: With attention zeroing in on a high-level Sunni enforcement official, it's not implausible that this case represents a counterweight to the forced resignation and prosecution of Shia Minister of Trade Sudani in spring.) New Polls Show Concern about Corruption Growing -------------- -- ¶7. (SBU) As public security concerns eased (at least prior to the Baghdad bombings on August 19),NDI polling showed that corruption had temporarily bypassed security as a top concern for Iraqis. Corruption was cited by 11% of the respondents as their top concern, while security was cited by only 10% of those polled. Access to key services (power, water) was the top issue for citizens (20%),with jobs in the number two spot (12%). Judiciary and Auditors Engage in Counter-Accusations -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) On September 7, as reported reftel B, press reports emerged about possible charges pending against another senior official on the anti-corruption circuit, Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) Abdul-Basit al-Turki. Turki is reportedly being investigated by the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) for his role in "wasting state assets" as part of Saddam's procurement programs in early 2003. On September 9, IHT President Arif told Embassy ROL officer that the charges will continue to be investigated and that the arrest warrant should be executed by the MOI. He also projected that once arrested, Turki would be denied bail, given the nature of the crime. Arif said the suspects could hire attorneys to seek a review of the warrant by the cassation court, which in turn could decide whether there was enough evidence for the issuance of the warrant. If the suspects themselves appeared before the court, they would be arrested. Turki gave an interview on September 9, denying the claims and the existence of the warrant. He demurred on whether the charges were political, but noted that his office had been investigating the IHT, implying a link between the accusations against him and his own spotlighting of misdeeds at the IHT. He said that his latest report on the IHT was due for release this month, and that it would contain evidence of several unspecified "violations." FORD

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