AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH IRAQI DEPUTY SPEAKER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002421 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH IRAQI DEPUTY SPEAKER ATTIYA Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b&d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 31 meeting, First Deputy Speaker Khalid al Attiya spoke with the Ambassador about security issues -- and the impact that internal political conflicts can have on security -- in the wake of the August 19 bombings. For Attiya, a a Shia independent and Maliki supporter, a non-sectarian governing coalition in which the Shi'a lead, but do not rule, makes the most political sense and will enable the strong government and effective parliament that he deems necessary for the success of democracy in Iraq. Attiya said that election year politics would dictate the work pace of the Council of Representatives (COR). He predicted passage of an Election Law and a 2010 Federal Budget Law, but was non-committal about the possibility of the COR passing other key items on the legislative agenda, such as a hydrocarbons law or an agreement on the presence of British forces. END SUMMARY. CONTENTIOUS DOMESTIC ISSUES AFFECT SECURITY -------------- ¶2. (C) In an August 31 meeting, First Deputy Speaker al-Attiya spoke with the Ambassador about security issues, and their relation to internal political factors, in the wake of the August 19 bombings. Attiya said that the recent lapses that led to the bombings would likely require a comprehensive review of security plans and enhanced cooperation with U.S. forces in Iraq, in a carefully calibrated manner that would address security challenges but not create an internal political backlash. ¶3. (C) According to Attiya, security would also be buttressed by resolving divisive internal political and economic issues. Attiya acknowledged the reality of foreign interference in Iraq, but emphasized that roiling domestic disagreements on key issues, that set important sectarian and ethnic communities against one another, allowed such intervention to get traction. While some progress had been made in resolving these contentious domestic issues, these limited successes had yet to bear much fruit. Iraq's political leadership might have to redouble its efforts on this domestic agenda to communicate the sense of political compromise and shared national destiny that will be required, said Attiya. Success on this front would send a message to the neighboring countries to cease their interference. MOVING BEYOND SECTARIAN POLITICS -------------- ¶4. (C) As the COR prepares to re-convene September 8, Attiya said that elections were on everyone's mind. As a Shi'a and a member of the sectarian majority in Iraq that had long been oppressed, he believed Shi'a had a key role to play. Nonetheless, they should not seek -- as Shia -- to rule Iraq, he insisted. According to Attiya, the Shi'a needed to run on a national agenda in the upcoming national elections, in order to communicate that they sought to govern Iraq as a nation and not simply in ways that benefited the Shi'a. If the Shi'a continued to behave in a sectarian manner in elections, they would cause other groups to continue in "the old mentality" and no progress in national reconciliation would be possible. HOPE FOR STRONGER, LESS DIVIDED GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) In Attiya's view, Iraq at present has neither a strong government to lead the country nor a strong Council of Representatives to legislate and to crack down on corruption. Continuing down this path would not solve Iraq's problems. Attiya expressed hope that the upcoming elections could help QAttiya expressed hope that the upcoming elections could help Iraq develop stronger governmental institutions and build a sturdier democracy, better able to address key political challenges. Iraq could reap the benefits of the Security Agreement and move on to the next phase provided for in the Strategic Framework Agreement. He said the Iraqi people understood the difference between those two agreements and wanted to see the transition to that next phase. ¶6. (C) Regarding elections, the Ambassador said the United States could not be seen as supporting one side or the other, but we could at certain moments stress the need for Iraqis to unite. Attiya responded that he had heard the same message from the Iraqi people. They want to see political parties focused on a national agenda. What they needed was encouragement and a government that would build bridges. He recommended that the Ambassador continue communicating the need for national unity. BAGHDAD 00002421 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Attiya also underlined the importance of success in the democratic experiment in Iraq, both for the Iraqi people and for the United States. If it succeeds, Iraq will be able to join the ranks of the sovereign states, as a democratic model for the region. But if the experiment fails, there will be regional repercussions. Everyone "will laugh and say that the United States came, spent a great deal of money and left with nothing," said Attiya. He also made the point that Iraq is like its neighboring states in that it shares with them a similar modern political development. Failure of democracy in Iraq could signal a return to an autocratic system here and reinforce anti-democratic tendencies in the region. Elections -------------- ¶8. (C) Regarding elections, Attiya said his basic sense is that the pace of the COR will be controlled by the politics of the electoral campaign. As a result, the COR would likely be able to focus on only the most important pieces of legislation. First and foremost are the Election Law and the 2010 Federal Budget law. While there is other undoubtedly important legislation, he doubted that it could be passed in the current environment. "We really need your calming effort in smoothing out the pressures in the parliament and achieving an atmosphere of calm in the Council of Representatives," he said, "so the members can focus on their work." ¶9. (C) On the election law, Attiya asserted that many individual COR members, in addition to Grand Ayatollah Sistani support the open list. Unfortunately some groups in the COR did not want an open list even though they publicly embraced it. Given that reality, Attiya emphasized that it was difficult to say with confidence how the election law would come out, although he assured the Ambassador that there would be an effort to pass a law that included the open list provision. Turning to the 2010 Federal Budget Law, Attiya said it would be important that the debate be professional and apolitical because it would set the budget for a government as yet unknown. Hydrocarbons Law, DIBS, and Role of Kurds -------------- ¶10. (C) Attiya expressed uncertainty about the prospects for passage of the hydrocarbons law and the new law for the National Oil Company. Regarding the British Forces (security) Agreement, he noted that the Sadrists were against it and had prevented a quorum each time the agreement had come up for a vote. In response to the Ambassador's observation that the British Agreement was of interest to the United States because there was currently no provision for security of Iraq's oil platforms, Attiya said he understood and was deeply embarrassed by the situation, but offered little hope that the proposed agreement would be passed. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador noted that Embassy officials were in Erbil discussing the hydrocarbons issue and that he would be traveling to Erbil in early September to discuss the issue of disputed internal boundaries (DIBS) with Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani. Attiya said the Kurds could play a more positive national role, but claimed they were focused more on what was happening inside Kurdish dominated territories and on "what they can grab." It was an attitude that would hurt Iraq, he emphasized. The Kurds must be a part of the new Iraq, insisted Attiya: the future of Iraqi political process hinged to a significant degree on their willingness to play a positive role. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) One of our more thoughtful Shia political interlocutors, Attiya is that rare Iraqi politician who is Qinterlocutors, Attiya is that rare Iraqi politician who is able to see beyond the partisan politics now afflicting Iraq and focus on the steps necessary for genuine political reconciliation and economic progress. Unfortunately, from his perch in the COR and despite his ties to the Prime Minister, he is unable to exert sufficient influence to ensure that those key political and legislative steps are taken. FORD