IRAQ'S PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: RAMIFICATIONS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000242 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ'S PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: RAMIFICATIONS FOR DIYALA Classified By: PRT Team Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (U) This is a Diyala PRT reporting cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: The outcome of the upcoming provincial elections will have important implications for the stability of Diyala Province and the region. The PRT predicts one of three likely scenarios to result from the elections: coalitions will form led by either Da'wa, IIP, or secular parties. In each case, the resulting coalition will have numerous members and will reflect a broad spectrum of the many ethnic and sectarian groups that comprise Diyala. The potential for gridlock, in such a situation, is likely and, hence, the effectiveness of the provincial government will be at risk. END SUMMARY. -------------- COMPLEX POLITICAL MOSAIC -------------- ¶3. (C) Due to its strategic position and diverse mix of sectarian, ethnic, and tribal groups, Diyala province offers a dynamic and complex political mosaic. Furthermore, Diyala is positioned between Baghdad, Iran, and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG),making it a crossroads of immense strategic importance. Thus, many political actors from outside its borders have a stake in the composition of Diyala's government and may seek to influence the outcome of the election. Moreover, each of the numerous sectarian, ethnic, and tribal communities has its own, often opposing, agendas. This complex mosaic of competing groups, coupled with the numerous political entities and candidates competing for office, makes the outcome of the upcoming provincial election in Diyala difficult to predict. ¶4. (C) In addition to the existing complexities, the voting system contributes to the complexity of the election. The system of proportional representation lends itself to the existence of a plethora of political entities, currently 44 in Diyala. Furthermore, the open list voting system encourages a multitude of candidates on the ballot, totaling ¶641. As a result, a large number of political entities will likely gain seats in the 29-member Provincial Council (PC) as the voting will be widely dispersed. In fact, the Governorate Elections Officer (GEO) predicts that between 10 to 15 political entities will have members in Diyala's newly-elected 29 seat PC. His views on the number of parties likely to win seats are consistent with those of leading Shia and Sunni politicians we have spoken to recently. 5 (C) In this scenario, it is extremely improbable that a single party would achieve anything close to a majority. The votes of single candidates or parties that fail to win a seat will be redistributed under the current voting law in a way that will favor the larger parties in the second and third round of vote reallocations. However the situation in Diyala is quite different from that in Baghdad Province. Looking at the number of candidates and parties in Diyala, it is clear that the vote here will be widely spread but not nearly as fractured as it will be in Baghdad and some other provinces where there are far more candidates and political entities on the ballot. Thus, the fractured vote in Diyala is likely, as the GEO predicts, to lead to a number of parties winning one, two or three seats on Diyala's Provincial Council. It is more likely that a coalition would have to be cobbled together with a half-dozen or more political entities. The PRT predicts three probable coalitions leading the new PC: A) a Da'wa-led coalition; B) a Tawafuq-led coalition; or C) a secular-led coalition under either al-Ja'affari or Saleh al-Mutlaq. Qeither al-Ja'affari or Saleh al-Mutlaq. -------------- DA'WA-LED COALITION -------------- ¶6. (C) A Da'wa-led coalition will very possibly lead the new PC. Although the Sunnis may be the largest group or even be a majority of Diyala's population majority, they may not win a majority of the seats. It is quite probable that the key will be who the Kurds choose to partner with. A Da'wa-led coalition would consist of the following members: Nation of Law Coalition (Da'wa),National Dialogue Front (Saleh al-Mutlaq),Islamic Remnant Party (Fadhila),National Reform Movement (Ja'affari),Free Independent Movement (Sadr), National Movement for Reform and Development, and the Iraqi Constitutional Party. (Note: it is possible but unlikely that this group of parties will win an outright majority of the seats, and will need additional support, which could lead to the Kurdish Coalition becoming a part of this coalition, or at least providing tacit support.) The almost certain choices for governor would be: Saad Chaloob (PM's Head of BAGHDAD 00000242 002 OF 003 Reconciliation) or Ra'ad Faris Alma'as Salman (Leader of the Nation of Law Coalition). ¶7. (C) Such a diverse coalition, which according to our Shi'a interlocutors would represent the major segments of the population, would act as a source of continuity in government style and direction for Diyala. This coalition would probably suffer from some of the same inefficiency and corruption that is found in parts of the current administration, as many of the current members of the provincial government would be retained in their positions. Not being punished in the election for past abuses, the government would likely continue these practices, despite PM Maliki's stated priority of combating corruption. Moreover, a victory by a Shi'a-led coalition could anger and/or disenfranchise much of Diyala's Sunni population who believe they are in the majority. On the positive side of the ledger, this coalition would enjoy excellent relations with the central government, since both would be controlled by the Da'wa party. Additionally, this coalition would also continue to work well with the Coalition Forces (CF) and PRT, building on the good relationships that already exist. In regard to Iran, this coalition would generally be more willing to work with Iran in a constructive manner than the other potential coalitions. -------------- TAWAFUQ-LED COALITION -------------- ¶8. (C) Another possible outcome of the provincial elections could be a Tawafuq-led coalition consisting of the following members: United Goodwill and Reform Front (Tawafuq, including IIP),Kurdish Coalition (PDK, PUK),National Iraqi List (Allawi),and the National Coalition of Diyala (ISCI, Badr). Under this coalition, a strong candidate for governor would be Hamdi Hasun (Head of IIP). ¶9. (C) In contrast with the Da'wa-led coalition, sectarianism and partisanship could be exacerbated under a Tawafuq-led coalition, especially if the non-ISCI/Badr Shi'a feel left out of the decision-making process. Furthermore, if religious and tribal leaders, harboring a partisan agenda, are brought into the government, these Shi'a would likely oppose the government. This would also strain relations with the Da'wa Shi'a-led central government, which would negatively affect the provincial government's effectiveness. Additionally, the Kurdish Coalition may push its separatist agenda with regard to Kifri and Khanaqin, as the price for its support, thereby aggravating the ethnic tensions in the province. ¶10. (C) Due to the inclusion of religious and tribal leaders within its ranks, a Tawafuq-led coalition would have difficulty separating themselves from undue sectarian influence. The two factors that could mitigate abuses of the system are: 1) the perception that Da'wa was defeated because of a public perception that they are corrupt; and 2) the existence of an opposition group (Da'wa and others not included in the ruling coalition) that would closely watch the new government. On the positive side, indications by PRT contacts in the IIP and Kurdish parties, suggest that a good working relationship would exist between a provincial government led by Tawafuq and the PRT and CF in Diyala. Also, a Tawafuq-led coalition would generally seek to limit ties with Iran and reduce the cross-border flow of people and materials. (Note: ISCI/Badr are the exception and would push for increased ties with Iran.) ¶11. (C) If the estimates of the Sunni political leaders are correct and Diyala is 55 to 60 per cent Sunni, it is possible that the Sunni Parties could win an outright majority of the Qthat the Sunni Parties could win an outright majority of the 29 seats or could form a Tawafuq-led coalition with only the support of the Kurds. Such a coalition would of course face greater challenges in dealing with Iraq's national government which would be leery that it would be setting the stage for a revival of a Sunni Arab political agenda. -------------- SECULAR-LED COALITION -------------- ¶12. (C) A third possibility exists for a secular coalition to form, led by either the National Reform Movement (Jaffari) or the National Project (Saleh al-Mutlaq). This coalition would be comprised of the following entities: National Reform Movement (Jaffari) or National Project (Saleh al-Mutlaq),Free Independent Movement (Sadr),Islamic Remnant Party (Fadhila),and the National Iraqi List (Allawi). Strong candidates for governor would include Mishan Mahdi Jabbar Nosaieb (Saleh al-Mutlaq ally) or perhaps Abdullah Hassan al-Jabouri (former Governor of Diyala). BAGHDAD 00000242 003 OF 003 ¶13. (C) Dr. al-Ja'affari has stated that one of his top priorities is to reduce sectarianism and the politics of division. If true, this coalition could ameliorate many of the sectarian tensions in the province. (Comment: Little in Ja'affari's tenure as Prime Minister would give us confidence in this assertion. End Comment.) This coalition might also attempt to recruit nonpartisan professionals into the provincial government and could combat corruption in support of the rule-of-law. Since this coalition would only have four or five members, its decision-making would be rather stream-lined, adding to its effectiveness. Thus, of the three likely outcomes, a provincial government under a secular coalition would likely be the most effective and professional. Such a coalition would enjoy reasonably good relations with the central government, adding to its effectiveness. Furthermore, such a coalition would not seek to build strong relations with Iran. On the other hand, this coalition would probably be more independent-minded and might keep the CF and PRT at arm's length. -------------- POLITICAL TRENDS -------------- ¶14. (C) Indications suggest a burgeoning trend towards secularism in Diyalan politics. Three elements support such a trend: 1) the proportional representation system ensures the survival of a plethora of political entities; 2) the open voting system encourages individuals to vote for well-qualified, professional candidates as opposed to party hacks; and 3) the reduced level of violence and instability in the province will bolster support for secular, professional candidates as opposed to populist candidates who, in many cases, seek to gain power through fear. The large majority of Diyala's people are wary of conflict and want the provincial government to provide essential services above all else. Increasingly, they are less concerned about the sectarian background of the candidate or party and more concerned with whether the candidate/party can be effective. Each of these three elements will tend to degrade the power of the large, religious parties in favor of professional, secular parties. Although a secular-led coalition is the least likely of the three scenarios in the upcoming provincial elections, in subsequent elections, should trends continue, a secular-led provincial government will be the most probable outcome. In any case, this election will provide a good indicator of how far and how fast Diyala's population wants to go in overcoming sectarian divisions in politics. CROCKER