Are the Iraqi Prisons Working Yet? -- An Assessment of

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002384 JUSTICE PASS TO ODAG - JJONES, OPDAT, IITAP STATE PASS TO INL, NEA-I SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PNAT PINS PHUM IZ SUBJECT: Are the Iraqi Prisons Working Yet? -- An Assessment of Ministry of Justice/Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) Operations (SBU) SUMMARY: While the Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) has made tremendous strides over the past six years, moving from non-existence to a very solid foundation for further development, there are still significant obstacles ahead for the creation of a sustainable and effective corrections system. Working within the Embassy's Rule of Law Coordinator's Office, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ/ICITAP) will continue to play an essential role in advising the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) on organizational and physical capacity building as well as continuing to institutionalize the precepts of international human rights standards. -------------- --- Empty Prisons, Corrections Chaos: Historic Background -------------- --- ¶1. (SBU) In October 2002, Saddam granted unprecedented amnesty to virtually all prisoners in Iraq releasing to the street as many as 100,000 convicted criminals. He publically stated this release was a 'thank you' to his countrymen for endorsing him as President in a national referendum. With the collapse of the corrections system and the subsequent Coalition advance, nearly all documents on the organizational structure and operation of the correctional facilities were lost or destroyed. Many officials with direct knowledge of facility operations disappeared, and Iraqi families had moved into abandoned prison and detention facilities as squatters. By the spring of 2003, most prison assets-once a key element of Saddam's security apparatus-- were either stolen or destroyed. ¶2. (SBU) In May 2003, a multi-national team of corrections professionals comprised of three INL-funded ICITAP selected former U.S. state corrections directors and three experts from Great Britain and Canada, deployed to Iraq and produced a comprehensive report on the state of the Iraqi corrections system. Issued on June 15, 2003, the report found that the Saddam regime maintained prisons in harsh and inhumane conditions ignoring international human rights standards while offering no professional training for officers and staff. These recommendations became the basis for the development of a strategic plan to establish a new Iraq Corrections Service (ICS). ¶3. (SBU) Further, the report noted that rampant corruption victimized inmates, inmate's families, and often, lower-level staff. With 15 specific recommendations for the establishment of a professional, secure, and humane correctional system to support the Iraqi criminal justice system, the DOJ/International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, or ICITAP, was deployed to develop a corrections system using international standards and best correctional practices conforming with Iraqi Law and Coalition Provisional Authority orders. ¶4. (SBU) Funded by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL),the corrections program at one time maintained 80 contract correctional advisors. (Comment: There are now 40 ICITAP advisors which will reduce to 37 by February 2010 with further reductions throughout 2010 due to funding reductions for the program. Additionally, the Department of Defense currently has an inter-agency agreement with ICITAP for the employment of four Corrections Advisors for their Security Detention program. End Comment.) ¶5. (SBU) Over the last 6 years, the ICS, under the MOJ, has successfully expanded to include 12 prisons and 6 detention Qsuccessfully expanded to include 12 prisons and 6 detention facilities. Over 14,000 Iraqi Correctional Officers (ICOs) have been trained. A national headquarters was established as well as a National Training Academy exclusively for ICO training. To combat abuse and corruption, an internal affairs section was formed to investigate any and all allegations of abuse, corruption and fraud. ¶6. (SBU) Since their initial assessment of the Iraq prisons in 2003, ICITAP's mission has been to assist the GOI in the establishment and development of safe and secure correctional facilities for the humane care, custody, and treatment of persons incarcerated in the Iraqi Corrections Sevice as a means of enhancing the public safety for the citizens of Iraq under the rule of law. ¶7. (SBU) ICITAP has functioned largely in a training/consulting/advising capacity at all levels of the MOJ assisting in the development of an ICS organizational structure; establishing standardardized policies, procedures and practices; assisting in the formulation of a professional organizational culture; assisting in the improvement of current facilities as well as the design and construction of new USG funded facilities. ¶8. (SBU) Throughout the recent history of the ICS, there have been significant senior management challenges. The first Director General (DG) of the ICS was removed in a management coup by his Deputy, who then served approximately four years before being arrested. He had become significantly influenced by the Jayash al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and ultimately controlled by their demands. This control turned to complicity and culminated in the arrest of both him and his Deputy in May 2008. These arrests marked the end of a period of increasing corruption. An acting DG was appointed, but was replaced within 45 days by another acting DG, Sharef Abdul-Mutalb Jasim al-Murtadha (recently named the official DG). This appointment was made by acting Minister of Justice, Dr. Safa al-Safi. Sharef has no corrections background or experience. (Comment: Al-Safi was not experienced in correction operations, was a noted sectarian, and did not work cooperatively with coalition forces and support personnel. His ineffective leadership crippled the growth of the ICS. Specifically, he refused to hire and train an adequate number of ICOs to fill vacancies in northern prison/detention facilities while over-hiring ICOs in the south, where his allegiance rested. End Comment.) ¶9. (SBU) The current Minister of Justice, Dara Nour al-Deen Baha' al-Deen, (confirmed on February 19, 2009) demonstrates a firm dedication to ensuring the ICS applies and enforces the rule of law in the prison system. The MOJ is a former Iraqi judge who, in 2002, was imprisoned in Abu Ghraib for issuing a judicial opinion contrary to Saddam's direction. Since assuming duties as the MOJ, he has met frequently with the US Embassy RoL personnel, and has specifically requested briefings and corrections recommendations from ICITAP advisors. This cooperative working relationship has already produced a number of positive changes in ICS operations. On August 9, 2009 a Diplomatic Note from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed the need for continuation of services provided by ICITAP to the Ministry of Justice/Iraqi Corrections Service, stating that the "consultants work in managing prisons and have extensive experiences that are needed at the present time by prisons administrations in Iraq." ¶10. (SBU) The MOJ has placed a priority on hiring adequate numbers of ICOs, and he recently joined in the ground-breaking ceremony for the GOI national training academy for ICS personnel. On his own initiative, the MOJ compelled the MOI to abide by Iraqi law and judicial rulings by either issuing new arrest warrants on detainees or approving their release from MOJ custody. Although far from complete, this MOJ initiative is a significant application of the rule of law in detention operations. This dedication to justice and the rule of law was not demonstrated by the previous minister. Unfortunately, unless nominated and re-confirmed by the GOI, the MOJ's tenure is scheduled to end upon the election of a new government. ¶11. (SBU) Over the past 5 years, Deputy Minister of Justice (DMOJ) Posho Ibrahim Ali Dizaye has weathered the storms of rotating ministers, arrests of senior staff, and militia influence. DMOJ Posho has always been a cooperative friend to ICITAP corrections advisors and coalition forces. Nearing retirement age, he has made fewer strategic decisions over the last few months and defers most major decisions to the Minister or DG. -------------- Repopulating the System: Current Status and Challenges of the ICS QRepopulating the System: Current Status and Challenges of the ICS -------------- ¶12. (SBU) In sharp contrast with the past, prisons and detention facilities in the ICS are generally well-run. Prisoners receive humane and respectful treatment (although the physical condition of many of the facilities is below international standards). The MOJ ICS directly attributes this change to the ICITAP Corrections Program and its advisors, who are directly responsible for implementing prison reform in Iraq. Additionally, the new MOJ recognizes the importance of the detention transition and supports an aggressive, proactive ICS approach which increases the demand for advisory input at critical levels. ICITAP advisors continue to provide security and organizational advice and information to the MOJ and his corrections staff regarding activation schedules, staffing analyses of various prisons, policy and procedures, prisoner population, and classification. ¶13. (SBU) There are currently 19,530 total prisoners in the MOJ ICS; 18,918 are adult male prisoners. The remainders are female and a small portion are juveniles. The MOJ ICS operates 11 prisons (not including the soon-to-be activated USG built Chamchamal Prison),and 6 detention facilities. There are 14,405 ICOs currently on the books with a need for approximately 4,100 more for the activation of three facilities and two additional renovation projects (Basra Central Prison; Chamchamal Prison; Taji Prison; Ft. Suse;, and Nasiriyah). There are only 1,800 authorized ICO positions remaining, leaving a shortfall of 2,300 positions needed from the Ministry of Finance. ¶14. (SBU) In practice, the correctional system in Iraq consists of the ICS national system and an independently operated system in the country's northern Kurdish Region. The Iraqi national system, headquartered in Baghdad, consists of adult male and females facilities under the authority of the ICS. Separate facilities are maintained for juveniles under the authority of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA). Today in the Kurdish Region, correctional facilities for males, females, and juveniles are operated by MoLSA. Jails are under the administrative and operational control of the Kurdish Ministry of Interior and the Kurdish Security Forces (Asaish). These interactions make the mission more difficult because of the number of independent agencies and ministries, as well as individual personalities, advisors work with in developing their detention operations. ¶15. (SBU) Although substantial gains have been achieved over the last five years, there are critical benchmarks ahead for detention transition: Coalition forces have set a target date to divest itself of security detainees by the beginning of 2010. This includes completing the Taji Theater Internment Facility (TIF) and staffing trained ICOs. Taji will house up to 5,600 prisoners, and will be turned over to the GOI in early 2010. There are currently fewer than 10,000 coalition force detainees who are scheduled for release or transfer to the GOI. Weekly transfers from Cropper to Rusafa of both convicted and detainees with detention orders and/or arrest warrants began in May 2009. Rusafa Prison Complex, the ICS' largest intake detention facility, will receive custody and control of these coalition detainees pending resolution of their cases in Iraqi courts. ¶16. (SBU) Task Force 134, Detention Operations, is constructing a Corrections Training Center at FOB Future for eventual turn-over to the MOJ ICS in March 2010. This center will become the National Training Academy for pre-service ICO training, mid-upper level management and leadership training, and ICS specialty training. The MOJ has committed to staffing this facility and taking operational control, and the National Headquarters of the ICS may also relocate to this site. ¶17. (SBU) Comment: This relocation will have a significant effect on the ICS. The DG currently is involved in routine prison operations at Rusafa because of his proximity to the detainees. He typically acts as a compound warden rather than a DG responsible for all prisons nationally. Once relocated to the National Training Academy, he can more readily focus on national issues, staffing, budget formulation, judicial throughput, and strategic planning. This is a highly important move which will benefit ICS organizational leadership capacity. End comment. ¶18. (SBU) Additionally, there is momentum and pressure now to implement Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)directive 10 which places full authority and control over all detention and prison facilities with the MOJ. On June 25, 2009, the Prime Minister ordered the Ministry of Defense to transfer all of its detainees (approximately 2500) to the Ministry of Justice. CPA 10 may incrementally take hold in the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) where there are two large, and persistently overcrowded, detention facilities. There are MOI and MOD facilities within Iraq that hold detainees without legal authority and under abusive and inhumane conditions. Placing authority and control under the MOJ, will, with Qconditions. Placing authority and control under the MOJ, will, with appropriate resourcing, reduce abuse and contribute to reliable and predictable case processing from arrest to post-trial incarceration. ¶19. (SBU) Comment: This will contribute to efficient detainee population management and help reduce internal corruption and inconsistent application of the rule of law. The major obstacle to implementing CPA 10 is the lack of inter-ministerial cooperation that is required to reallocate appropriate resources (funding, personnel, and facilities) to the MOJ. The successful implementation of CPA 10 will require a consistent application of Iraq Executive Order 207 (detention and case processing procedures) and personal emphasis at the Prime Minister/COR level. End comment. ¶20. (SBU) Newly constructed USG funded prisons and those still under construction are not yet staffed or activated. Chamchamal Prison is a 3,000 bed facility officially turned over to the MOJ on March ¶2009. Due to decisions made by the prior MOJ, and the delay in passing the 2009 budget, this facility is slow to activate. There are enormous requirements for the activation of a 3,000 bed facility. Many of these requirements are physical resources demanding human resource needs to set-up and organizationally activate the prison. ¶21. (SBU) Further, there is a 1,189 bed construction project on-going in Ft. Suse bringing that facility from 1,500 to 2,689 post-trial beds. Nasiriyah Prison is scheduled to double in size adding another 800 beds by December 2009. Finally, Basra Central Prison is scheduled for completion also by December 2009 adding another 1,200 beds to the ICS inventory. Once all USG prison construction efforts are completed, the ICS will have an additional 3,189 beds available for use in addition to Chamchamal (3,000 beds). The MOJ, without coalition or USG support, brought 2,600 post-trial beds on-line by renovating and re-opening Baghdad Central Prison (formerly Abu Ghraib). ¶22. (SBU) All the foregoing issues require significant oversight and assistance to ensure a safe and orderly transition of detainees to the GOI as expediently and professionally as possible. The oversight, exclusively provided by ICITAP corrections advisors, will ensure supervision and support of detainee population management at ICS facilities and the application of humane treatment and respect for detainees. The ICITAP corrections advisory program is funded by INL through December 31, 2009 on the current interagency agreement (IAA). A new IAA is expected to carry the mission through the end of May 2010 at lower than requested staffing, and funding beyond this date has not been identified. The program is expected to require 40 advisors from now through January 2010, 37 through May 2010, and a gradual reduction to 11 advisors through March 2011. All staffing projections are based on the challenges identified below and do not account for any significant changes impacting the ICS over the next year. -------------- Prospects for the Future - ICS Ability to meet Challenges -------------- ¶23. (SBU) Executive leadership in the ICS is notably lacking. The most consistent stable and cooperative force in the ICS has been the Deputy Minister of Justice, Posho Ibrahim Ali Dazaye. DMOJ Posho is nearing retirement age, and does not effectively make substantial decisions. The lack of experienced correctional senior level management is a handicap which limits a strategic direction for the ICS. Unless re-nominated and confirmed by the Council of Representatives, the Minister of Justice will step-down from his position when national elections occur in January 2010. ¶24. (SBU) At the working level, although there is increasing evidence that the ICS handles most emergency situations well, their management of life- threatening situations still places detainees and staff in jeopardy. For example, recently when a fight between detainees broke out in Rusafa, the ICOs responded and separated the detainees but failed to restrain them upon removal from the cell, allowing one of the detainees to run and retrieve a piece of metal. He returned swinging the 'club' at both the ICOs and the other detainee. ¶25. (SBU) With no template in place to ensure a seamless transition under CPA 10, success relies on inter-ministerial cooperation that reallocates and shares GoI resources to successfully transition detention facilities to the MOJ. Security and prisoner accountability during this transition is critical. Budgetary constraints that limit ICO hiring/training, and the lack of qualified supervisors to run the facilities remain a significant concern in this transition. Strategically planning for the transition of each facility must occur to ensure public safety and maintaining human rights standards. ¶26. (SBU) The 2009 MOJ budget is woefully inadequate. Although initially allocated with a sizable increase from 2008, the fall in oil prices resulted in a 39.7% reduction, making the 2009 MOJ budget less than last year's appropriation ($188M for 2008/$154 M for 2009). This reduction severely complicates the MOJ's ability to implement timely prison activation requirements. ¶27. (SBU) The additional transfers of detainees from coalition custody in the next eight months will burden an already taxed system of chronic pretrial detainee overcrowding, detainee population Qof chronic pretrial detainee overcrowding, detainee population management, and the ability to ensure provisional care to detainees. There is current overcrowding in existing pre-trial MOI facilities in the Baghdad area, many are waiting for bed space at Rusafa. ¶28. (SBU) Case processing is not improving fast enough to keep pace with GOI detainee intakes and the transfer of detainees from coalition forces in the coming months. This is causing many detainees to languish in detention for months or years. The GOI detention system will, under this scenario, become more of a warehouse than a detainee processing center for the courts. To address this problem, significant resources must be allocated for medical care and for programs that will offer adult basic education, vocational training, and recreation opportunities for all prisoners. -------------- CONCLUSION -------------- ¶29. (SBU) Comment: When considering the positive impact ICITAP corrections advisors have made upon the ICS, the question remains whether the gains are sustainable in view of the additional challenges ahead. Upcoming national elections, inter-ministerial implementation of CPA 10, transfer of coalition detainees to the GOI, slow judicial processing of detainees, continuing GOI budget problems, lingering influence of the previous acting minister, an inexperienced DG of Corrections, the drawdown of coalition forces and ICITAP corrections advisors, and the enormous task of transitioning the 5,600 bed Taji Prison and 3,000 bed Cropper from coalition forces, present significant challenges for the ICS.The GOI needs to maintain the political will to ensure a humane, functioning corrections system that would befit it as an emerging democracy. The USG should continue to maintain managerial and organizational support for the Iraqi Correctional Service during these challenging events and engage other international partners for their assistance to ensure success for the future. These actions will provide assurance that international human rights are upheld and the rule of law will continue to be an integral part of the Iraqi Correctional System. HILL 1