FM ZEBARI ON GOI PURSUIT OF UN CRIMINAL INQUIRY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002363 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY IZ SUBJECT: FM ZEBARI ON GOI PURSUIT OF UN CRIMINAL INQUIRY, IRANIAN/TURKISH MEDIATION ON SYRIA REF: BAGHDAD 2304 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: In a September 1 meeting, FM Zebari told Pol M/C the GOI has sent a letter formally requesting the UNSC to support formation of a UN-led fact-finding commission into the August 19 bombings, including Syrian complicity vis a vis Iraqis operating from Syria, and the broader scope of outside elements supporting terrorism in Iraq. According to Zebari, the move has rattled the Syrians and provoked separate "mediation" efforts by the Iranians and the Turks. Zebari provided brief readouts of recent FM visits to Baghdad (and follow-ons to Damascus) by both neighbors, characterizing the efforts as well-intended and well-received, but unlikely by themselves to persuade Syria to cut off its support for Iraqi Baathists. Zebari also offered a readout of his conversation with FM Mottaki on the three Americans in Iranian captivity (reported septel). Zebari warned that some Arab countries in the region -- in the wake of August 19 -- now "strongly believe" that all the political and diplomatic gains made in Iraq are reversible, a dangerous perception that will require focused U.S attention in the coming months to help counter. The FM said the MFA was continuing slowly to get back up and running, and he thanked the USG for its support. End Summary. MAKING THE REQUEST FOR UN INVOLVEMENT -------------- ¶2. (C) Zebari confirmed GOI intentions to press at the UN for a criminal inquiry into the August 19 bombings and more broadly into state- and non-state actors' involvement in terrorism in Iraq (reftel). He reported that the GOI had in the past few days sent a request to the UNSYG asking for support for a UN-led criminal investigation or "fact-finding" mission in Iraq, modeled on the one formed in 2005 in the wake of the Hariri assassination in Lebanon. He noted somewhat cryptically that this item would be raised in meetings surrounding the opening session at UNGA. Pol M/C cautioned that such a process was complicated and time-consuming and noted that the 2005 effort had required heavy U.S. involvement. He urged Zebari to keep the USG closely apprised of GOI intentions in this regard and observed that the stronger the case the GOI could build for outside involvement in the terrorism of August 19 and similar acts, the better the chances for success. (Note: Embassy will follow up over the weekend with relevant MFA legal and technical experts to learn the substance of the GOI appeal to the UNSYG.) RATTLING THE SYRIANS -------------- ¶3. (C) Zebari described this step as one in a series the GOI intended to take in the wake of the August 19 bombing. This call for this commission had really "rattled the Syrians, said the FM. He viewed the move as a way to keep up the pressure on Syria to compel them to turn over or expel key Iraqi Baathists operating in Syria. The FM acknowledged that bilateral relations had taken a hit and noted the hard-line comments from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which he described as "unpresidential and offensive" to Iraqis. Even before such public rhetoric, FM Mu'allim had bristled privately to Zebari that if the GOI insisted on recalling its ambassador, Syria would follow suit and would not return one until there "was regime change in Baghdad." "And Mu'allim is the nicest guy in that regime," lamented Zebari. THE IRANIANS AND THE TURKS GET INVOLVED -------------- Q -------------- ¶4. (C) It was the Syrians, despite their hard-line rhetoric, who had encouraged Iranian and Turkish diplomatic intervention to ease the crisis. Elaborating on the Turkish involvement, Zebari reported that Assad had telephoned GOT PM Erdogan to request such help. The Iranians had arrived first. He characterized the Iranians as concerned that two of its best regional allies were in a diplomatic crisis that had further potential for escalating. Zebari described Iranian FM Mottaki, who visited Baghdad August 29, as supportive of the GOI position on the UN commission. "This is your right," he quoted Mottaki as saying. Zebari reported the Iranians as much more heavily invested politically in Iraq than Syria, and claimed the Iranians had made clear on several occasions to senior Syrian leaders that they viewed violent Iraqi Baathist activity in Iraq as dangerous and destabilizing. The FM noted that the Iranians had told the GOI that the Syrian side was demanding evidence of any Syrian-supported Iraqi Baathist involvement in the bombings. The FM did not refer specifically to the mention of an BAGHDAD 00002363 002 OF 002 Iranian-organized neighbors' meeting on Iraqi security, alluded to in Mottoki's public comments in Baghdad. Zebari did say that this issue was likely to continue arising in a variety of regional and tripartite venues in the coming months, including at an upcoming Arab League ministerial in Cairo. ¶5. (C) Zebari described a very similar mediation effort mounted two days later when Turkish FM Davutoglu arrived in Baghdad August 31 for meetings at the MFA and with PM Maliki, the DefMin and Minister of Interior. Following up on a Erdogan call to Maliki, requesting that the Iraqis provide evidence, which the Turkish FM would deliver to the Syrians, the Iraqi side handed over a dossier of their evidence (and demands),said Zebari. It included information about six training camps in Syria where Baathists and foreign fighters allegedly trained, CD's with evidence of foreign fighters being facilitated in Syria, a list of Iraqi Baathists subject to Interpol Red Notices, and another list of Syrian security officers in charge of training and helping these groups to cross the border into Iraq. Zebari confirmed that the Turkish FM had taken all the evidence with him to Damascus but he discounted the possibility of serious Syrian movement on the issue, noting that the Syrians had dismissed similar evidence in the past. Zebari told the Turks that the GOI welcomed any visit by a senior Syrian intelligence officer to discuss their allegations and evidence. ¶6. (C) Zebari characterized these efforts by two important regional neighbors to ease GOI-Syrian tensions as reflective of "fierce competition" between Iran and Turkey to see which state could pull Iraq into its orbit. According to Zebari, while Iraq wanted good relations with both countries, it was unwilling to join in an axis with either of them. The FM characterized relations with Saudi Arabia as stuck, unable to improve because of the Saudi leadership's personal dislike and mistrust of Maliki. Joked Zebari, "we will need regime change here" before relations with Saudi Arabia could improve. AUGUST 19 AND THE PERCEPTION OF REVERSIBILITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Zebari warned that some Arab countries in the region now "strongly believe" that the political situation in Iraq is reversible. The spectacular attacks of August 19 had strengthened this perception dramatically, after a period of sustained security gains had devalued its currency, he insisted. He expressed concern that some neighboring countries will put their weight behind efforts designed to strip Iraq of the political and security gains it has made in last two years. He described the Saudis, Egyptians, Jordanians, and additional GCC countries as sharing this view and, repeating urgings he has voiced recently, called for the U.S to stay focused on Iraq in the critical upcoming 6-8 month period preceding and following the January 2010 elections. THANKS FOR USG ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶8. (C) FM Hoshyar Zebari told Pol M/C September 1 the MFA was continuing to re-build step by step in the aftermath of the August 19 bombings. (COMMENT: Despite his relatively upbeat assessment, contacts and anecdotal reports indicate the MFA remains just a shadow of its former self, with a still largely uninhabitable ministry building and with most employees at home. END COMMENT.) Zebari expressed appreciation for the successful transport (by U.S. Milair) to Spain of ten Iraqis with serious eye injuries and welcomed the offer of a MNF-I/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers team to Qthe offer of a MNF-I/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers team to assist in a structural assessment of the MFA and the Ministry of Finance building. Zebari complained mildly that since the Security Agreement had been signed, the relationship with the USG in Iraq has become increasingly bureaucratic, noting some difficulties and delays in getting the injured Iraqis to Spain. The FM also reported that on September 2, the UAE and Kuwait would fly some of the injured to their capitals for treatment. Zebari expressed interest in Pol M/C's suggestion that the USG could look into the possibility of providing the GOI a training program on crisis management/handling mass casualty incidents. HILL