NINEWA,S KING-MAKER ARTICULATES NATIONAL AMBITIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002357 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2010 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM PTER SUBJECT: NINEWA,S KING-MAKER ARTICULATES NATIONAL AMBITIONS BAGHDAD 00002357 001.4 OF 002 Classified By: Ninewa PRT Leader W. Patrick Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message. ¶1. (C) Summary: During an August 26 meeting with PRT Leader, Multi-national Division-North (MDN-N)Deputy Commanding General (DCG),and 3/1 Cavalry Brigade Commander, Sheikh Abdullah al Humaidi, head of the influential Arab Shammari tribe and the major force behind Ninewa,s governing Al Hadba coalition, announced he would soon form a party list to contest election for the Iraq Council of Representatives (COR) in January 2010. While his political and economic influence in Ninewa is substantial, Abdullah's ability to succeed in a national run is less certain. He expressed sympathy with the Ninewa Provincial Council,s recent decision to oppose an initiative for joint measures to increase security in disputed areas, but begrudgingly agreed to try to convince the Council there were no feasible alternatives not even his preferred option of having exclusive U.S. forces in the disputed boundary (DIB) areas. End Summary. Running for the Council of Representatives -------------- ¶2. (C) During a lengthy evening discussion with PRT TL and MND-N commanders (DCG and 3-1 Cav CO) at his northwestern Ninewa estate on the Syrian border, Sheikh Abdullah al Humaidi discussed his political future. The head of the influential Arab Shammari tribe, who delivered the majority of Ninewa Provincial Council seats to the governing Sunni Arab al-Hadba coalition, confirmed long-circulating rumors that he has national level political ambitions. Abdullah announced that he plans to launch a campaign, perhaps prior to the end of Ramadan, to run for the COR at the head of his own party list in the January 2010 election. ¶3. (C) Abdullah said that for now he has no designs on a national-level government position, but believes he has the influence to return Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to office &if I so choose.8 Adbullah described his platform as one of transparency, peace, and a united Iraq. He stated that since he lacks a national base, he had been in talks with other parties and political leaders seeking potential coalition partners. Abdullah cited his close ties to the head of the Awakening Council in Al Anbar province (intimating Ahmed al-Rishawi, aka Abu Risha, head of the Muatammar Sahawwat al-Iraq (MSI) party, noting that they speak daily by phone about forming a new political party. (Note: According to media reports on August 27, al-Rishawi announced he would run on PM Maliki's State of Law list in the upcoming election. End note.) ¶4. (C) Abdullah said he had spoken about his future plans with representatives of unidentified Shi'a parties, adding that he had not, however, spoken to Maliki or anyone from Maliki,s Da'wa faction. When TL asked if Atheel al-Nujaifi, Governor of Ninewa and head of the al- Hadba party, would play a role in Abdullah,s national ambitions, Abdullah replied that he didn,t think so, citing the Governor,s current decline in public support and opining that the Governor lacked the political acumen to take part on the national stage. (Note: Atheel's brother,Osama al-Nujaifi (a COR member elected on Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National List), told Poloffs in Baghdad that al-Hadba recently registered a new party, the Gathering of Iraqi Nationalists (GIN),and was working to develop a nationalist, cross-sectarian base in Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Diyala, Anbar and Baghdad. End note.) When asked about a possible coalition with Kurdish Qnote.) When asked about a possible coalition with Kurdish parties, Abdullah replied that if the Kurds pulled out of Ninewa back to the KRG, he would fully support or even collaborate with the Kurds. Everyone Trusts the U.S. -------------- ¶5. (C) Regarding an ongoing initiative to establish joint security in disputed areas, Abdullah said he had advised the Ninewa Provincial Council (PC) to press for an agreement that placed exclusive responsibility with U.S. forces, insisting that the people of Ninewa have great trust in the U.S. Acknowledging that the PC had unanimously voted down the joint initiative, Abdullah said without explanation that U.S. forces had &embarrassed the Council8 by forging an arrangement that involves joint collaboration among U.S., ISF, and Peshmerga forces. When TL said that PC Chairman Jabour Rabu had expressed new understanding of the need for joint security arrangements during a PRT/MND-N briefing the previous day, Abdullah retorted that Jabour had no influence with council members. ¶6. (C) Responding to the notion that the U.S. lacked BAGHDAD 00002357 002.3 OF 002 sufficient forces or mandate to take on a unilateral role for security in disputed areas, Abdullah countered that local militias, la the Sons of Iraq or Awakening Councils, could fill the same role. (Note. In the run-up to the provincial elections, Maliki attempted to pay for Isnad Councils in the disputed territories further exacerbating Arab-Kurd tensions. This was deemed illegal and a vehicle for Da,wa Party to buy votes in those ares. End Note) Following additional discussions on security realities in the disputed areas, however, Abdullah reluctantly accepted that neither militias nor unilateral U.S. forces were realistic and offered to talk to members of the PC with the goal of persuading them to support the joint initiative. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Sheihk Abdullah exudes confidence much in the manner that he displays the opulent wealth he has amassed from vast land holdings and from licit and illicit cross-border trade. His political and economic influence in Ninewa is significant; however, his reach beyond the immediate region is less certain. A vehement anti-Kurd, his track record of weak collaboration with Shi'a communities suggests that he has his work cut out for him in attempting a national run. (Note. Sheikh Abdullah,s father was close friends with KRG President Masoud Barzani,s father Mulla Mustafa. End Note)His limited influence on security in disputed areas reflects the limits of his writ. Like other Arab Sunni leaders in Ninewa, he is loath to support any action that legitimizes the &illegal8 presence in Ninewa of Kurd security forces. He recognizes that central GOI leaders are keen to forge a joint security presence in the troubled area, however, and is unlikely to publicly oppose ongoing negotiations to effect joint ISF-Peshmerga-U.S. checkpoints and patrols. End Comment. HILL