"BLAMESTORMING" OVER BAGHDAD BOMBINGS SHARPENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002319 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019 TAGS: IZ PGOV PINR PTER SA SY POL SUBJECT: "BLAMESTORMING" OVER BAGHDAD BOMBINGS SHARPENS SECTARIAN RHETORIC REF: A. BAGHDAD 2270 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2294 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The August 19 bombings in Baghdad prompted a flurry of finger-pointing, with government officials and politicians blaming various Sunni groups, especially Ba,athists in Iraq and Syria, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)and rival Shi,a groups. The Saudis and Syrians, too, have come under suspicion; in the latter case, serious enough to result in the recall of respective ambassadors. While the bombings have seen a rise in sectarian rhetoric, intra-governmental schisms that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the bombings appear to be closing, at least on the surface, and rhetoric has not translated into the kind of sectarian violence seen in 2006-2007. Still, the GOI and the public ) Shi'a and Sunni alike ) are nervous and further attacks could yet reverse recent political and security gains. END SUMMARY. RUSH TO JUDGMENT ¶2. (SBU) The August 19 bombings in Baghdad (ref A) prompted public statements by Government of Iraq (GOI) officials blaming Sunni interests and criticizing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Hours after the attack, Major General Qasim Atta said the Baghdad Operations Command blamed a "Ba'athist-Takfiri alliance" (the latter is shorthand for Sunni extremist groups). Later that day, PM Maliki said Sunni extremists had carried out the bombings, which he characterized as "a desperate attempt to derail the political process and affect the (upcoming) parliamentary elections." Hours later, a Sadrist Trend statement held U.S. forces responsible, but excoriated Iraqi security forces and said they should be purged of former Ba'ath Party members. PARLIAMENTARIANS ALLEGE "GAPS IN SECURITY SYSTEM" ¶3. (SBU) On August 21, the Council of Representatives (COR) convened an extraordinary meeting of heads of parliamentary blocs, the Ministers of Defense and Interior, the Minister of State for National Security, members of the Security and Defense Committee, and the Baghdad Operations Command senior officer to review the situation. Participants called for a national commission to review security forces' performance, improvement of the dissemination of intelligence, and military trials for soldiers at bombing sites who were deemed to have been negligent in their duties. First Deputy Speaker Khalid al-Attiya chaired the meeting and said the bombings "revealed gaps in our security system." Implying that ISF elements at checkpoints helped the attackers, Sadrist MP Falah Shanshal, who chairs the Accountability and Justice Committee (formerly the De-Ba'athification Committee),said there had been "infiltration into the security and defense apparatuses by ... senior Ba'athists." Shortly after the meeting, GOI officials announced that they arrested within hours of the attack members of a Ba'athist network involved in planning and executing the bombings, and had detained 11 members of the Iraqi Army and Police -- including a brigadier general, a lieutenant colonel, and a major -- for negligence. CALLS FOR RESIGNATIONS ¶4. (C) During the meeting, some MPs urged Minister of Defense Abd al-Kadir al-Ubaidi and Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani to resign. GOI Spokesperson Ali al-Dabbagh told Pol M/C on August 24 that VP Tariq al-Hashimi had recommended shortly after the bombing that he (al-Hashimi) and Maliki resign over what happened; al-Dabbagh told him that was not the proper course. (Note: As reported ref B, Ambassador and Emboffs have engaged with members of the Presidency Council, QEmboffs have engaged with members of the Presidency Council, COR, and Maliki's inner circle to strongly advise against politically motivated dismissals of Cabinet ministers or senior security officials. End note.) Senior advisers to VP al-Hashimi and Deputy PM Rafi al-Issawi told Emboffs that Iraqis were angry with the finger-pointing between GOI officials and the government's ineffectual response to the bombings. The advisers did not believe that Cabinet ministers would be dismissed, but did expect that more senior security officials would be fired. FANNING THE FLAMES ... ¶5. (SBU) In a series of remarks on August 21 and 22, FM Zebari said he could "not rule out complicity (in the attack) by government security services." Claiming regime opponents had shifted their focus to Baghdad, he said there had been a clear deterioration in security conditions for some time and "what is coming might be worse." He called on the GOI to "stop making overly optimistic statements" about ostensibly BAGHDAD 00002319 002 OF 003 improved security conditions. Influential Shi'a preacher Sayyid Muhammad al-Haydari sharply criticized the alleged involvement of Ba'thists and al-Qaeda in the attacks during his 'khutba' sermon on August 21, called for purges of Ba'thists from security services and dismissed Sunnis' calls for national reconciliation as disingenuous. Shi'a imam Sheikh Muhammad al-Hasani of Baghdad's al-Rasul Mosque was less subtle: "Once again, brothers, the Ba'athists and supporters of al-Qaeda have exposed their pale faces and black rancor." ¶6. (SBU) In a televised address on August 22, PM Maliki defended Iraq's security forces, blamed an alliance of the Ba'ath Party and al-Qaeda for the bombings and vowed to punish those responsible. On August 23, the GOI televised the confession of a former Diyala Province police chief and self-described Ba'athist, who claimed he organized the attack on the Ministry of Finance on orders from Syria-based Ba'athist Sattam Farhan (a member of the Muhammad Yunus al-Ahmad group). The alleged perpetrator said his group paid USD 10,000 to facilitate passage of the explosives-laden truck through checkpoints. Baghdad's Governor, Salah Abdel Razzaq (a member of Maliki's Da'wa Party),said in interviews on August 23 that the bombers were acting under the orders of Iraqi Sunni parliamentarians and that Arab states -- especially Saudi Arabia -- supported the Ba'athists, who carried out the attacks to weaken confidence in Maliki's government and influence upcoming elections. GOI UPS THE ANTE WITH SYRIA ¶7. (C) On August 25, AQI claimed responsibility for the bombings, saying they were meant to "wreck the bastions of infidelity" belonging to Maliki's "pro-Iranian" government. The statement concluded that "it would be better for the citizens of the Islamic state to perish to the very last one than to be governed by (Shiite) renegades." On the same day, GOI Spokesman Dabbagh issued a statement saying Iraq's Council of Ministers demanded that Syria expel terrorist organizations and extradite to Iraq senior Ba'ath Party leaders Muhammad Yunus al-Ahmad and Sattam Farhan for their alleged role in the bombings. Iraq's ambassador to Damascus was recalled to Baghdad for consultations, and the MFA was tasked with seeking UNSC support for establishing an international criminal court to prosecute those who carried out "genocide and war crimes" against Iraqis. Maliki advisor Sadiq al-Rikabi told Emboffs that the GOI issued the statement against Syria because "we could not remain silent," but conceded more information was needed to link the bombings to Yunus. SUNNIS LOW-KEY IN PUBLIC, BUT PRIVATELY ANGRY AND FEARFUL ¶8. (C) Sunnis have largely avoided public commentary on the attacks; however, two pro-Saddam Ba'athist groups issued statements blaming the bombings on the GOI, political militias, and U.S. forces. Others were more moderate: Sunni imams called on the GOI to deal firmly with the perpetrators of the attack in their sermons; Sunni MP Omar al-Jaburi said the bombings aimed to weaken Maliki as politicians were scrambling to form election coalitions; and Sunni MP Omar Abdel Sattar worried the attack could exacerbate Sunni-Shi'a tensions. Privately, some Sunnis seethed at the Maliki government's perceived rush to judgment. Many believe the GOI's capture of the alleged bombers and televised confession were fabricated; several contacts dismissed as "ridiculous" Maliki's public statement blaming Sunni extremists and criticized him for not appearing sooner on television to Qcriticized him for not appearing sooner on television to offer condolences. An influential Sunni sheikh and senior advisers to VP al-Hashimi and DPM al-Issawi argued that the bombings were an intra-Shi'a affair, supported by Iran and designed to signal to Maliki that the security gains of his government could be easily undone, and it would be in his interest to join the resurrected United Iraqi Alliance coalition. (Note: Maliki's former Shi'a coalition partners announced a new coalition on August 24 that Maliki's Da'wa declined to join. End Note.) Several sheikhs told Poloff they fear Maliki's government will use the attacks as a pretext to delay further integration of Sons of Iraq/Sahwa elements into GOI positions. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: If the intent of the August 19 bombers was to heighten sectarian tension and weaken the GOI, the "blamestorming" and finger-pointing in the immediate aftermath suggests that they achieved some initial success. The bombings may also have complicated ongoing electoral coalition negotiations, including efforts by Maliki to maintain his Shi'a base while reaching out to other potential partners. Reaching a modus vivendi with Sunni political groups could be more difficult in light of the PM's quick blaming of Sunni extremists and Ba'athists for the August 19 attacks. More significantly, the attack calls into question BAGHDAD 00002319 003 OF 003 the premise that Iraq had weathered the worst and arrived at a political space in which leaders and voters could seek to transcend old sectarian divisions. Divisions within the government over the bombings seem to have closed, at least on the surface. The Presidency Council has issued a statement calling for national unity (ref B) and public recriminations appear to be waning. FM Zebari told Pol M/C August 26 that the Cabinet had shifted away from casting blame, partly out of a sense that people were coming together. Further high-profile terrorist attacks, however, could reverse those gains and further stoke sectarian differences. END COMMENT. HILL