FM ZEBARI ON TRILATERAL PARTICIPATION, POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002304 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER UNSC IZ SY SUBJECT: FM ZEBARI ON TRILATERAL PARTICIPATION, POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM BOMBINGS Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 26 meeting at the MFA with Pol M/C, FM Zebari said that in light of Syria's involvement with Baathists suspected in the August 19 bombings, the GOI would have to defer participation in the upcoming U.S.-Syria trilateral border assessment that had been planned to begin in the near future. The FM reported that the MFA had a legal team examining the prospects for requesting a UN-led criminal investigation into terrorism in Iraq, similar to the UNIIIC effort that investigated the Hariri assassination. Zebari said that the mood in the Cabinet had shifted from recriminations to calls for national unity. He expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to assist the GOI in the wake of the bombings and hinted the GOI might be less legalistic in interpreting the Security Agreement, as it sought support to face the dangerous challenges ahead. He urged the United States not to shift attention to Afghanistan at the expense of Iraq, stressing that "the danger is great" in Iraq. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In an August 26 meeting, FM Zebari and his deputies cast serious doubt on whether Iraq would participate in the trilateral border assessment. The FM initially noted that in light of the recall of Iraq's ambassador from Damascus the previous day, the previous GOI agreement to participate was no longer valid. Zebari said he would need to "get you an answer." He then looked to his DFM, Labid Abbawi, who noted that "the timing for the assessment now is not good," pointing to Syria's recall of its ambassador in response to the GOI action. The DFM further noted that there could be "accusations and counter accusations," given the rising level of public animus in Iraq now directed at Syria, for its support of Iraqi Baathists thought to be involved in the August 19 bombings. TWO SIDES RECALL AMBASSADORS -------------- ¶3. (C) FM Zebari noted that emotions had run high at a Cabinet meeting August 25, where the Cabinet unanimously voiced support for the statement eventually issued, demanding that Syria extradite two senior Iraqi Baathists, Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmed and Sattar Farhan. Zebari added that it was not the first time they had demanded the two. In describing the recall of the Iraqi ambassador, Zebari said he had called his Syrian counterpart in advance. He described FM Mu'allim as agitated and uncomfortable with the message. He said he made clear to Mu'allim that the Syrians could turn the two over to the Iraqis or to others (given the Interpol Red Notice against them). Mu'allim indicated the Syrians would not take the requested action. Zebari said that the recall of the ambassador is a temporary move, noting that "this is not the end of Iraqi-Syrian relations," but he could not offer a time-frame for the ambassador's return. (NOTE: The Syrians have since responded in kind and recalled their Ambassador. END NOTE.) ¶4. (C) Zebari made clear the Iraqi side holds Syria partially responsible for August 19, not for the bombings themselves, but for allowing key Iraqi Baathists to operate in Syria. Articulating a message rapidly becoming conventional wisdom in Baghdad, Zebari insisted that the Iraqi Baathists had done the planning and logistics, while the actual suicide bombing mission had been carried out by al-Qaida. While not offering much in terms of proof, Zebari noted that until the GOI put out its August 25 statement, accusing the Baathists and serving notice on Syria (with the Qaccusing the Baathists and serving notice on Syria (with the recall),there had been no public claims or disavowals of responsibility. After the GOI issued its statement, in short order, al-Qaida in Iraq claimed responsibility and the Baathists issued a statement disclaiming any responsibility, said Zebari. "There is a connection," he claimed, noting later that the GOI is continuing to investigate and wants to prove this collaboration. INTEREST IN A UN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION -------------- ¶5. (C) The FM also expressed interest in taking this issue to the UNSC, noting that the MFA had a legal team examining the prospects for proceeding "along the Lebanon model," following the Hariri assassination, with a UN-led criminal investigative commission into terrorism in Iraq (preceded by a fact-finding mission). (Note: Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi and other key Iraqi leaders for some time have asked why there is no international process to investigate the training, funding, smuggling, and support for suicide bombers and terrorist-related activity that flows through many countries and into Iraq. End Note.) Zebari noted that the UN International Independent Investigative Commission BAGHDAD 00002304 002 OF 002 (UNIIIC) and the threat of a tribunal implicating Syrian officials had had A huge inhibiting effect on Syrian meddling in Lebanon. Pol M/C said the USG would want to stay fully apprised as the Iraqis developed their plans in this direction, and cautioned that it would likely be a very time-consuming process if they went down this path. ¶6. (C) Regarding the political aftermath of the attacks in Baghdad, Zebari said that the mood had shifted from one of recriminations and finger pointing to a sense that the attacks were bringing people together. (COMMENT: The FM did quite a pirouette himself in shifting to this perspective since in the immediate days after the attack, he was attacking the government publicly and privately for incompetent security performance and -- at a low level -- with some degree of collusion with the bombers. END COMMENT.) The FM characterized the bombings as a turning point, making clear to Iraqis that the perpetrators wanted to cripple the government and demonstrate that "everything since 2003 is reversible." ¶7. (C) Zebari underscored that the dangers and challenges were not over yet and urged the USG to balance its efforts between Iraq and Afghanistan. He subsequently returned to this point, urging the United States not to "absolve yourselves of responsibility," saying that Iraq needed the United States during this critical period. The FM also hinted that the GOI would strive not to be overly "legalistic" in looking at the Security Agreement, and pointed to the possible need for the U.S. military to take up certain responsibilities. "The danger is great," he emphasized. FOLLOW-UP ON ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶8. (C) Pol M/C asked the FM how the MFA was coping with the aftermath of the bombings and reiterated that the we were looking into ways the USG could help. Without making specific commitments, he mentioned the possibilities of 1-2 MNF-I trauma specialists working with Iraqi physicians on some of the most critical cases. MNF-I CJ9 Deputy Director affirmed that this and other types of assistance could be available. Pol M/C also mentioned that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could work with Iraqi counterparts to do a structural damage assessment of the MFA building. He also asked about the state of the MFA's communications equipment. Noting again that he was not making promises at this point, Pol M/C asked the FM to put together a list of some of the Ministry's most urgent needs. The FM expressed appreciation for the USG agreement to fly some 30 critically injured patients to Germany, where the German and Spanish governments had agreed to provide medical care. INTERNAL POLITICS -------------- ¶9. (C) In response to a question from Ambassador's Special Advisor, Zebari characterized the formation of the new Shia-led electoral coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance, as a major development. He described it as fairly broad-based, with the most important element being the cooperation of the Sadrists and ISCI. Zebari noted that the INA's effort to keep the door open for the possible entry of Maliki's Da'wa's party at a later stage was also significant. For the moment, Da'wa was isolated, he claimed. "They have cornered themselves," noted Zebari. He left open the possibility that PM Maliki and Da'wa might be able to put together a new, cross-sectarian coalition. Zebari's kind words for the new INA (and his characterizing it as containing some "Sunnis," of which there is but a token) is probably indicative of the Kurdish position as the Baghdad dating game heats up: sit on QKurdish position as the Baghdad dating game heats up: sit on the sidelines, remain united, and be kingmakers after the election. HILL