SRSG FOR UNAMI DISCUSSES ARAB-KURD, CHAPTER VII

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002298 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KU IZ SUBJECT: SRSG FOR UNAMI DISCUSSES ARAB-KURD, CHAPTER VII ISSUES Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Ford, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 23 meeting with the Ambassador, UNAMI SRSG Melkert expressed concern about the ability of GOI forces to provide security, in the wake of the breakdowns evident in the August 19 bombings. Melkert said he intended to convene the High Level Task Force on disputed internal boundaries (DIBs) this week and would explore modest ways to re-energize the largely stalled process. The Ambassador emphasized the USG was considering a more comprehensive approach on Kirkuk as a means of supporting the UN-led process. Regarding Ashraf, Melkert said UNAMI favored setting up a small facility near the camp to facilitate voluntary departures from the camp. Melkert assessed that progress had stalled on a new resolution to facilitate the GOI's exit from Chapter VII status and sought close coordination with the United States going forward. In a separate meeting the same day, DCM for Assistance Transition conveyed to Melkert our serious concerns with the lack of planning for an ICI Ministerial. End Summary. CONCERNS ABOUT SECURITY -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador August 23, Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) Ad Melkert noted that in the wake of the August 19 bombings it would be difficult to trust Iraqi forces to provide security for UNAMI and the wider diplomatic community. Melkert questioned the Ambassador closely about how much supervision U.S. military forces were providing at Iraqi-manned checkpoints. The Ambassador responded that while August 19 represented a serious failure that day, the security breakdown did not appear to represent a systemic failure. The Iraqi Security Forces are capable of doing the job, and MNF-I forces will be offering assistance and guidance at some checkpoints, said the Ambassador. Melkert noted that he planned to meet with General Faruq al-Araji, Director of the Office of the Commmander-in-Chief (OCINC),to discuss security for UNAMI. Melkert also accepted the Ambassador's suggestion that he meet with Acting CG MNF-I LTG Hunzeker to discuss his concerns about the performance of Iraqi security forces. The Ambassador expressed concern that the GOI could overreact and "start firing people" instead of soberly examining the failures and learning from them. ARAB-KURD ISSUES -------------- ¶3. (C) Melkert said he planned to chair this week a "technical, exploratory meeting" of the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on disputed internal boundaries (DIBs). He also planned to start meeting the players and exploring how he could move the process forward, noting that he planned to visit Erbil September 1-2. While he had relatively modest expectations, given the intractability of the issues and the elections season heading into full swing, he wanted to see what was possible. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador encouraged this approach, while concurring that there was a range of factors that would likely prevent any major breakthroughs. He pointed out that Talabani's PUK -- normally the more dominant Kurd party in and around Kirkuk -- had been weak in the recent KRG elections, allowing KDP leader Barzani to assume a more active -- and problematic -- role on DIBs, and in particular Kirkuk. The Ambassador told Melkert the USG was considering rolling out a comprehensive approach on Kirkuk that would aim to temper Barzani's hardline rhetoric and encourage GOI engagement. The Ambassador emphasized that the USG intended to continue to support the UN mediation effort, and any Qto continue to support the UN mediation effort, and any adjustment in USG approach would be intended to add momentum to UNAMI's process. The Ambassador added that he had recently appointed a senior FSO who would be based in Kirkuk, as his Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq. ¶5. (C) With regard to DPM Issawi's mediation efforts in Ninewa, the Ambassador characterized them as an effort to get the Sunnis from Baghdad to press the Sunnis on the Ninewa Provincial Council, led by Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi from al-Hudba, to show more flexibility. Issawi was working with Barzani to get the key Kurdish player, Kesro Goran, to also show flexibility. The Ambassador's Special Advisor for Legal Issues noted the effort had gained some traction in the past few weeks, and that PM Maliki was providing political and financial support for Issawi to use for small projects to encourage flexibility on both sides MEK AT ASHRAF -------------- BAGHDAD 00002298 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) In response to Melkert's question about GOI intentions regarding the Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MEK),the Ambassador noted that the GOI wanted to move the group out of Ashraf after Ramadan. He said he had warned GOI officials that moving the MEK would prove difficult, as the group was likely to resist. Melkert said he favored setting up a facility near the encampment to make it easier for potential defectors to leave voluntarily, and he is working to persuade New York to accept this idea. For the proposal to work, the GOI would need to give any defectors some sort of (temporary) legal status. Moreover, other countries, including the United States, would need to be willing to repatriate MEK defectors. Pol M/C cautioned that the MEK's designation by the USG as a foreign terrorist organization would constrain our ability to act. He also noted that there were GOI warrants for the arrest of a few MEK leaders. The Ambassador agreed to have the Political Section discuss this initiative further with UNAMI. KUWAIT AND CHAPTER VII -------------- ¶7. (C) Melkert observed that efforts in New York to remove Chapter VII sanctions on Iraq seemed to have stalled. The Ambassador agreed we were unlikely to move PM Maliki to sign a letter reaffirming UNSCR 833 in toto, especially in the run-up to the January election. Rather than attempting to demarche Maliki yet again, the P3 should consider creative formulas for re-affirming UNSCR 833 and its obligations, without precluding the ability of sovereign states to peacefully discuss technical adjustments on demarcations of borders. At the same time, the Ambassador said, it was critical for the Kuwaitis and Iraqis to talk directly, and, toward that end, he would continue to press PM Maliki to name an Ambassador to Kuwait and empower him to discuss these issues with the Kuwaitis. ¶8. (C) With regard to the actual obstacles to Iraq's ships passing through the Khor Abdullah waterway, Melkert told the Ambassador that there was no merit to the GOI's complaint that Iraqi access to Um Qasr was impeded by the current boundary. Rather, Melkert observed, the Iraqis seemed concerned that Kuwait had sovereignty over a significant part of the deep-water channel, a legal status that the Iraqis feared might prove problematic down the road, after U.S. forces departed. Melkert said he had asked for a technical briefing at the UN on the issue, including archival background on 833, but that he had been disappointed with the lack of information. MEETING WITH DCM ON ICI, DEVELOPMENT ISSUES -------------- ¶9. (C) In a separate meeting the same day, DCM for Assistance Transition told Melkert of our serious concerns with the lack of planning for an International Compact with Iraq (ICI) Ministerial. Melkert said he needed a few days to do an internal stock-taking at UNAMI. He would be looking at what the remaining potential could be in the ICI mechanism and a possible meeting, what the GoI's actual level of interest is, and how to bridge the ICI into coordination around a new mechanism, such as the National Development Plan (NDP). UN agencies were planning their future activities using the NDP as a guiding document. Melkert suggested that the GOI should create a partnership forum for the donors under the NDP. He said he would be focused on two major projects in the short term, on Public Sector Modernization and Private Sector Development. It would be critical to both projects to identify, based on an analysis of what is truly needed in Iraq, the key interventions that need to be made Qneeded in Iraq, the key interventions that need to be made with the GOI. Melkert expressed strong interest in the agricultural sector and said he would be looking at ways to get the Ministry of Agriculture more involved in policy formulation. Melkert echoed our concerns with the World Bank presence in Iraq and said he would be raising this with the Bank both locally and back in Washington. Finally, noting Ambassador Haslach's coordination of all of our assistance related to women's issues, Melkert reported that a new gender advisor had just been appointed within UNAMI and that this person, to arrive shortly, would coordinate all gender programs within UN agencies. FORD