MANAGING IRAQI POLITICAL RESPONSE TO BAGHDAD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002294 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER IZ SUBJECT: MANAGING IRAQI POLITICAL RESPONSE TO BAGHDAD BOMBINGS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert Ford for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Responding to reports that PM Maliki is considering firing senior officials, including Interior Minister and PM-hopeful Jawad al-Bolani, in reaction to the recent Baghdad bombings, the Ambassador and Emboffs engaged with members of the Presidency Council, parliament, and Maliki's inner circle to discourage such a move. President Talabani agreed with the Ambassador that dismissing a Cabinet minister or top security official could further the bombers' goal of undermining public confidence in the GOI; Talabani subsequently passed on our views to Maliki and guided the Presidency Council in issuing a statement calling for national unity. While acknowledging that the hasty sacking of officials could create divisions and fuel further recriminations, other interlocutors asserted that PM Maliki had to respond quickly to strong public pressure to hold accountable public officials whose negligence or incompetence contributed to the bombings. Our full court press appears to have stayed any sackings for now, but we will need to continue to encourage Maliki and the GOI not to engage in political recriminations that will exacerbate political tensions and distract from shoring up security measures. END SUMMARY. PRESIDENT TALABANI ASKS FOR ADVICE -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) In a hastily arranged meeting convened at his request, President Talabani told the Ambassador on August 23 that PM Maliki had recently called him in Erbil and asked him to return to Baghdad as soon as possible to discuss the removal of government ministers (NFI) and security officials in response to the August 19 bombings in the Iraqi capital. Looking at the Ambassador, Talabani stated, "I need your advice (on what to do)." The Ambassador made clear that while it is important to hold individuals accountable, the hasty firing of senior officials would be viewed with great concern as a politically motivated reaction to a national security problem. What is most needed at this time, the Ambassador stated, is a show of national unity and strength by the government, including robust determination to go after the perpetrators of the bombings. The sacking of officials, however, would serve to divide both the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people, and undermine public confidence in the government, which is exactly what the bombers wanted. Another problem, the Ambassador noted, was finger-pointing and the leveling of accusations among different government agencies and officials. ¶3. (S/NF) Talabani agreed that calls for the resignation of government officials, including those directed against PM Maliki, were unhelpful. He commented that Iraqis should have learned from Saddam Hussein that important actions should not be taken out of anger. By firing senior officials, he continued, Maliki could further deepen the crisis and deflect attention from investigating the bombings and prosecuting the culprits. ¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador stated that the hasty dismissal of senior officials would be interpreted as a sign of government weakness, when what was needed was a show of strength. He suggested that the Iraqi government consider forming a national committee of inquiry to produce a report on the bombings; he also recommended that the government issue a call for all Iraqis to come together and unite against further terrorist violence. The Ambassador further advised Talabani that ministers should be told to tamp down their QTalabani that ministers should be told to tamp down their public criticism of the government, as this was proving divisive within the Cabinet and among the Iraqi public. Talabani responded that FM Zebari had been particularly critical of the government and accordingly needed to tone down his remarks. Such criticism was angering Maliki, who could be tempted to lash out to accusations by going after his rivals. Talabani thanked the Ambassador for his advice and said he would try to convey the points discussed to the Prime Minister. (Note: In a telephone call with the Ambassador that evening, Talabani confirmed that he had met with Maliki, who appeared to still be considering sacking government officials, particularly Bolani. End Note.) GOVERNMENT UNITY VS. DEMANDS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Subsequent to the Ambassador's meeting with Talabani, DCM, Pol M/C and Special Advisor (SA) McGurk fanned out on August 23 and 24 to express our concerns and views on this subject to key political leaders and members of Maliki's inner circle, including Sadiq Rikabi (senior advisor to the BAGHDAD 00002294 002 OF 003 Prime Minister),Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, First Deputy Parliament Speaker Khalid Attiya (Note: Speaker Samarraie is out of the country. End Note.),Yassin Majeed (media and political advisor to the Prime Minister),Sami al-Askary (member of parliament and senior Da'wa Party official),and Ali al-Dabbagh (GOI Spokesperson). In all these engagements, senior Emboffs expressed their condolences over the bombings in addition to Washington's concern that they not become overly politicized. They explained that the recent remarks by FM Zebari, as well as other criticism directed at ministers (including the PM) and security forces, only worsened the situation. It was important for Maliki and his Cabinet to present a show of unity, strength, and resolve since any divisions in the government would play into the hands of the terrorists. Moreover, they noted, the dismissal of government ministers would have to go to parliament for debate and a vote, which could easily degenerate into heated finger-pointing and accusations (including against Maliki) that would distract from important legislative priorities. ¶6. (C) In separate meetings on August 24, Vice President al-Mahdi and First Deputy Speaker Attiya agreed on the need for the government to appear "strong and united." Al-Mahdi noted that the Presidency Council, chaired by President Talabani, had issued a statement on August 23, following Talabani's meeting with the Ambassador, that emphasized this point. The statement also called for the formation of a "special committee" overseen by the parliament to investigate the bombings. The final sentence of the statement reads as follows: "It is necessary that all institutions of the state stand together to reassure the Iraqi people and public opinion that these terrorist attacks with be confronted with all determination and resolve in order to prevent the enemies of Iraq from destroying state institutions and disrupting the political process. Attiya similarly agreed that the government could not give the impression that its security apparatus is under suspicion. ¶7. (C) Da'wa party officials close to Maliki also acknowledged that the point of the terrorists' attacks was to shake the confidence of the Iraqi people in their government and security forces. However, while recognizing that casting accusations of blame within the government was unhelpful, they stressed that the Iraqi public was insistent that officials who contributed to the bombings through neglect, carelessness or worse, be held accountable. Sadiq Rikabi, for example, stated, "They want accountability for something as big as this. Any person involved has to pay a price." Yassin Majeed asserted that Iraqis wanted to know who was responsible for security lapses that allowed the bombings and to be assured that these individuals were no longer in charge of protecting them. Sami al-Askary concurred that it was "very important" that the government not appear shaky or divided, but added that the public demanded that prompt measures be taken against those who contributed to the bombings. In response to these statements, Emboffs carefully noted the importance of holding officials responsible for dereliction of duties. However, they explained, given the need to preserve unity and avoid recriminations, disciplinary action should be taken after conducting a thorough investigation through a defined legal process, which would take time. BOLANI UNDER FIRE -------------- ¶8. (C) Minister of Interior Bolani was personally singled out Q8. (C) Minister of Interior Bolani was personally singled out for criticism in several exchanges. Rikabi claimed that Maliki had issued a clear directive to the Interior Minister to prevent any truck from coming near the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but that this order had obviously been disregarded. He further accused Bolani of ignoring his security responsibilities in order to focus on his new political party. Al-Askary stated that Bolani, who he claimed had little support in parliament, needed to decide whether he should "leave his party and go back to his job, or leave his job for his party." Ali al-Dabbagh likewise commented on Bolani's "part-time" status in the Interior Ministry. (Note: According to press reports and contacts, Bolani is expending considerable time and effort in trying to building an electoral alliance in anticipation of the January polls that would compete against Maliki. End Note.) Late in the evening of August 24, al-Dabbagh told Pol M/C that Maliki had decided not to ask for Bolani's resignation. But al-Askary held out the possibility that Bolani might feel compelled to resign, albeit at a later date. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: According to several reports, Maliki was BAGHDAD 00002294 003 OF 003 intent on firing Bolani, and perhaps one or more top security and/or military officials, after the August 19 bombings in Baghdad. Our emphasis on the consequences of this move, including the likely negative perception in Washington and elsewhere, and the need to unite the country against future terrorist attacks appears to have stayed any precipitous sackings. Maliki likely now recognizes that he lacks a consensus on dismissing Bolani. This emotional and politicized play, however, is not over. There may yet be a push to "persuade" Bolani to "voluntarily" resign, as suggested by al-Askary in his meeting with Pol M/C. Moreover, further security lapses could give Maliki the consensus he needs to make his move against Bolani. Finally, the PM would have to secure parliamentary approval to sack Bolani. Moving such a matter to the parliament, as all our interlocutors agreed, would likely lead to a far more grim and destructive debate, possibly including calls for a no-confidence vote against Maliki himself. Embassy will continue to urge the GOI to maintain public unity while also addressing security shortcomings. END COMMENT. FORD