PM MALIKI ON TRILATERAL SECURITY EFFORT, AUGUST 19

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002271 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IZ SY SUBJECT: PM MALIKI ON TRILATERAL SECURITY EFFORT, AUGUST 19 BOMBINGS Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill. Reasons 1 .4 (b),(d). ¶1. (S) Summary: In an August 20 meeting, Iraqi PM Maliki expressed appreciation for the Ambassador's offer of condolences on the previous day's bombings, as well as for the technical assistance U.S. experts were providing in the field. Maliki requested the USG delay any further release of detainees, given what he termed "problems" with the program. The PM also: -- expressed his discomfort with the recent U.S.-Syria meeting in Damascus and said the GOI would participate in the upcoming border assessment (because of Washington's strong interest) but would not participate in further trilateral activities; -- could not understand the rationale for the trilateral border security initiative or the U.S. insistence on connecting it to broader Middle East peace efforts; -- welcomed the Ambassador's briefing of a fuller U.S. approach on Kirkuk, but underlined that any decision on "special status" needed to wait until after the January elections; and -- discounted the significance of the Council of Ministers' recent action regarding a possible law for a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Maliki confirmed the visit to Iraq of a envoy from the Saudi royal family to see Ayatollah al-Sistani. End Summary. THE BAGHDAD BOMBINGS -------------- ¶2. (S) PM Maliki expressed appreciation for the Ambassador's offer of condolences on the previous day's bombings and for Vice President Biden's telephone call. He also noted that U.S. experts were in the field providing technical assistance and cooperation to GOI authorities investigating the bombings. The Ambassador emphasized our strong support for Iraq in the face of these attacks. We had strongly supported the UNSC Presidential Statement and were encouraging Iraq's neighbors to voice their outrage as well. He underscored that he and GEN Odierno were prepared to consider whatever assistance the GOI might request. ¶3. (S) Maliki confirmed that the attacks had been carried out by suicide bombers. He said he believed the explosion at the Al-Rashid Hotel had been intended for him, as he had previously been scheduled to attend a conference there. Based on the intelligence reports he had seen, he said, he expected similar attacks would occur in the next phase. GOI 
authorities had already found large amounts of C4 and suspicious vehicles. Prior to yesterday's bombings, he had met with his security ministers and instructed them to undertake exceptional procedures, and as a result a number of individuals had been arrested in the last few days. Maliki then noted "problems" with the detainee release program, saying that some of the detainees released from U.S. custody were very well trained terrorists. For this reason, GOI security leaders requested that the USG delay detainee releases, despite political pressure from some parties to move forward with the releases. ¶4. (S) Turning back to the previous day's events, Maliki said GOI security forces had found a third VBIED near a housing compound that had failed to detonate. This truck, which Maliki said "looked foreign," had large water tanks that had been filled with C4 explosive. SYRIA BORDER ASSESSMENT -------------- ¶5. (S) Maliki told the Ambassador that, during his August 18 trip to Damascus, he had spoken frankly and honestly, and had conveyed Iraq's desire for a more cooperative bilateral relationship, beginning with the strengthening of commercial and economic ties. The two sides had agreed on economic Qand economic ties. The two sides had agreed on economic cooperation, and Maliki hoped this would have a positive effect on Damascus' support for elements of Iraq's Ba'ath Party and induce Syria's cooperation in apprehending those involved in anti-GOI activities. ¶6. (S) The Ambassador raised our desire to conduct a trilateral assessment of the Iraq-Syria border, pressing Maliki to authorize GOI participation. Commenting that he had been uncomfortable with the recent U.S.-Syria meeting in Damascus, he said Iraq would participate in the upcoming trilateral border visit because of the strong interest in this from Washington and Damascus. He made clear, however, that Iraq would not participate in further trilateral activities. Further, while he supported continuing U.S.-Syria bilateral dialogue, he sought an assurance that BAGHDAD 00002271 002 OF 003 the United States would not insist on trilateralizing the issue. ¶7. (S) In response to the Ambassador's explanation of our intent in pursuing trilateral cooperation, Maliki said, "We blame you a little for doing things with the Syrians that we were not aware of." He stated that he could understand neither the rationale for the trilateral arrangement nor the reason for connecting the border issue to our broader Middle East peace effort. Connecting the two would enable Syria "to get away with many things." Iraq preferred to deal directly with the Syrians on this issue, but the Syrians had insisted on holding a trilateral because it was in their interest. He recalled that he had told the Syrians that as two sovereign nations, the two should deal with the Iraq-Syria border issue bilaterally. Maliki noted he had made the similar points to Ambassador Crocker when the United States sought to engage Iran through Iraq. KIRKUK -------------- ¶8. (S) The Ambassador told PM Maliki the USG was considering adopting a fuller U.S. approach on Kirkuk intended to encourage all parties to be more reasonable. One element might be that the United States would make clear its support for a referendum to support a political agreement on the status of Kirkuk, but not a referendum to decide the status of Kirkuk. We would state that Baghdad and Erbil would have to solve the issue of Kirkuk between the two of them, but that in the interim, Kirkuk would need to have some form of an interim "special status" that would be subject to review after several years. A mandated periodical review could be dangerous in that, if residents calculated that Kirkuk would be made part of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),the Arabs would use the interim period to move elsewhere. Thus, if "special status" were to be made subject to re-examination, the parties should also agree beforehand that final status would have be based on "a consensus, not a census." Doing so would then likely result in the long-term continuation of "special status." In the immediate term, what was most critical was to get all parties to calm down. The Ambassador informed Maliki that he had named a senior FSO, Alan Misenheimer, to work on the DIBS process for the Embassy. ¶9. (S) PM Maliki agreed with the approach described by the Ambassador. However, he added that trying to solve the status issue now would only destroy the entire effort. A solution could not be imposed; it must be adopted by consensus, he stressed, which would take time. He quipped that the Kurds seemed to support consensus only if they were sure they would get the right answer: that Kirkuk is part of the KRG. Maliki recalled that he had told the Kurds during his August 2 meeting with Masoud Barzani that Article 140 could not solve the status of Kirkuk and that a referendum could only be held by a decree of the Presidency Council. President Talabani, who was at the meeting, told Barzani that the Presidency Council could not determine boundary issues. Maliki emphasized that it would take time for a peaceful solution to be found, and that it should await the January election. In the meantime, the various groups in Kirkuk needed to find a way to live with each other. The emergence of the Change (Goran) List in the KRG would make a solution more possible in the future. Rather than focus on Kirkuk's status, residents should deal with their immediate problems first, for example, as related to oil company operations. He observed that although he had named a representative for the UNAMI process, the Kurds had still not sent anyone to QUNAMI process, the Kurds had still not sent anyone to participate in the talks. With the KRG election behind them, Maliki expressed hope that the parties could turn the page on campaign rhetoric and get to work. SECURITY AGREEMENT REFERENDUM -------------- ¶10. (S) Maliki greatly downplayed the significance of the Council of Ministers' instruction to the Council of Representatives to draft a law on a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. "Don't go crazy over it," he said. He strongly counseled the USG against taking any action, as events would unfold "naturally." The majority of the COR (the 8th wonder of the world, he quipped) supported the SA, he observed. SHI'A POLITICS -------------- ¶11. (S) Maliki expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the Dawa party conference earlier in the week. He said his position of cross-sectarian nationalism had been adopted by the party. The Ambassador underscored the importance of BAGHDAD 00002271 003 OF 003 ending sectarian strife and encouraged Maliki on his outreach efforts. ¶12. (S) Maliki confirmed that the Saudi royal family had sent an envoy to visit Ayatollah al-Sistani in Najaf. The envoy, a dual Iraqi-Saudi citizen named Adil Mandeel, had strong ties to the royal family and had conveyed an invitation from them for Sistani to visit Saudi Arabia. Maliki had hosted the envoy for dinner. As an aside, Maliki encouraged the Ambassador to seek a meeting with Sistani, too. ¶13. (SBU) The Ambassador was joined by Pol M/Couns, Pol-Mil M/Couns, Special Advisor, and Pol notetaker. Maliki was joined by his chief of staff. HILL