IRAQ NATIONAL LIST MEMBERS WEIGH IN ON PROVINCIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000224

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ NATIONAL LIST MEMBERS WEIGH IN ON PROVINCIAL
ELECTIONS, BLOC DISARRAY

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Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Timothy A. Lenderking for rea
sons 1.4(b) and (d).

1.(C)Summary: Meetings with several current and former
members of Ayad Allawi,s Iraqi National List (INL) Council
of Representatives (CoR) bloc reveal a movement in disarray,
beset by petty differences and internal bickering. With
provincial elections quickly approaching, the prospects for
the INL remain unclear. Though some bloc members close to
Allawi have offered outlandish predictions of success, other
current and former bloc members are less optimistic. Once
hailed as a secular, moderate alternative to the religious
parties, the INL has found itself increasingly on the margins
of Iraqi politics. Though Allawi still enjoys a fair degree
of popularity among Iraqis, a poor showing in the upcoming
provincial
elections, which many are already predicting, could
ultimately hasten the demise of the INL. End Summary.

A Bloc in Disarray, From Top to Bottom


2. (C) During a 1/14 meeting, INL CoR bloc leader Mehdi
Hafith provided a scathing critique of Allawi. Hafith told
Poloff that Allawi simply cannot accept his diminished role
within the Iraqi political arena, and has subsequently placed
the blame for his demise on the U.S., whom he feels abandoned
him. Hafith claimed this was particularly evident during the
security agreement debate in late-2008. According to Hafith,
Allawi,s opposition to the agreement had little to do with
substance and was instead driven by his anger at the U.S. He
further claimed that many in the INL actually supported the
agreement from the very beginning, but Allawi directed his
bloc to oppose the agreement, and even censured those who
spoke out in favor of the agreement. Only after intense
lobbying efforts by the U.S. and the GOI did Allawi come
around, which Hafith claimed provided the egotistical Allawi
with the attention and recognition he constantly demands.


3. (C) In discussing the bloc, Hafith told Poloff that it is
really a collection of individuals with disparate and often
competing agendas. Hafith criticized Allawi,s leadership,
stating that Allawi has created an environment in which the
CoR bloc members often behave like children, competing for
Allawi,s attention while fighting among themselves. Hafith
seemed particularly distressed that the INL has deviated from
its secular, moderate principles. He also questioned
Allawi's alliances with what he termed "distasteful" partners
- notably the July 22 bloc (Fadhilah, Hewar, Sadr Trend, and
other Sunni independents)- which he commented "have nothing
in common with us." In addition, he said that Allawi's
unwillingness to engage with the current government has been
disastrous for the bloc. Though
he claimed that there are many others in the bloc that are
exhausted with Allawi,s antics and the direction of the
party, including the party,s senior member, Adnan Pacchachi,
they do not know how to move forward.


4. (C) These internal divisions were on vivid display during
a 12/16 meeting with INL CoR members Osama Najafi, Hussam
Azzawi, Khairallah al-Basri, Aliyah Obeidi, and Sheikh Jamal
al-Shammari. The assembled bloc members spent much of the
meeting bemoaning past grievances about the 2005 elections,
alleging that Iran had stolen the past elections from the INL
while expressing concern that the same could happen again in

2009. Suddenly and without warning, Basri launched into a
profanity-laden rant about the failure of democracy in Iraq,
asserting that the religious parties have all used the
democratic system to consolidate their power and that there
Qdemocratic system to consolidate their power and that there
was no democracy in Iraq. He lambasted IHEC, claiming that
the institution had been dominated by the religious parties,
which drew Obeidi's assent. For this and other reasons,
Basri said that he supported the single region project
initiated by former Iraqiyyah member Wael Abd al-Latif and
his cousin, Governor Wa,ili (Note: The organizers of the
Basrah referendum project failed to obtain the necessary
signatures - 10% of Basrah,s registered voters - required to
move the
referendum process forward). This immediately drew a strong
rebuke from Osama Najafi, who blasted Basri, claiming that
the Kuwaitis and Saudis were using the lure of federalism as
a means to dismember and weaken Iraq. Basri then responded
by insulting Najafi, who stormed out of the room along with
Hussam al-Azzawi. A visibly embarrassed Shammari then
scolded Basri for his behavior, prompting him to walk
out, muttering obscenities under his breath. Following
Basri,s departure, Najafi and Azzawi rejoined the meeting.

Provincial Elections: Delusions...


5. (C) In a 1/15 meeting, INL CoR member Hussam Azzawi
outlandishly yet earnestly predicted that the INL would win
30-40% of the PC seats throughout the country - provided the

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Iranians do not interfere in the elections. Azzawi also
claimed that Allawi had been greeted by enormous crowds in
several campaign trips throughout Iraq. In a subsequent
meeting on 1/20, INL CoR member and Allawi loyalist Falah
Naqib made a similar assertion, claiming that Allawi's recent
campaign trips have been highly successful and that Iraqiyyah
could win 25-30% of the provincial council seats in Baghdad,
Anbar, and Ninewah, as well a sizable number of seats in
other provinces. Echoing Azzawi, he quickly qualified his
projections by stating that Iranian interference in the
elections could jeopardize the INL,s success, likely
providing himself with an out should the INL fail to achieve
these lofty numbers. When asked by Poloff how they had
formulated their assessments, both men said that their
projections were based on internal INL polling, and Falah
claimed that these numbers were supported by polls conducted
by the Iraq Center for Strategic Studies (Note: An INR Office
of Research poll, conducted in late-December 2008, reveals
that the INL
polled fairly well in several provinces, though not at the
levels claimed by Azzawi and Naqib. However, a more recent
poll conducted by the National Democratic Institute in
January shows that overall, only 7% of the Iraqi electorate
identified Iraqiyyah as their first choice at the polls. End
Note).

...And Reality


6. (C) In a 1/15 meeting with Poloff, INL member Osama Najafi
was less sanguine than Azzawi and Naqib, estimating that
overall, the INL may get 10% of the vote in the provincial
elections - "better in some, worse in others." He expressed
more confidence in his own Ninewa-based Hadba list,
predicting that they could pick up several seats in the
Ninewa PC, and that the combined Sunni lists would win a
majority of the seats in that province. Offering an even
more realistic assessment of the INL,s prospects, INL CoR
member and Najaf native Radwan Killidar told Poloff on 1/15
that he was doubtful that the bloc would be able to pick up
more than 5-10% of the vote in many of the southern
provinces. Though he added that the INL may have a decent
showing in Najaf,s urban areas, t he said that he still
expected ISCI to win the election - and perhaps an outright
majority - in Najaf. He freely admitted that in the south,
the INL
would be unable to counter ISCI,s tremendous resources and
organization, or Dawa,s superior campaigning. Commenting on
the race in Basrah, Killidar said that he expected a tight
contest between ISCI and Dawa, but that the INL could emerge
either third or fourth behind these two parties.


7. (C) Perhaps the bleakest assessment came from INL bloc
leader Hafith, who had previously expressed confidence about
his bloc,s chances in a 12/11 conversation with Poloff.
During a subsequent conversation with Poloff on 1/14, he was
much more pessimistic. Discussing the INL's chances, Hafith
claimed that Iraqiyyah would be lucky to garner between 5-10%
of the vote in the majority of the
provinces. Though there are some in the bloc who believe
otherwise, he said that he simply doesn,t see anything to
support their optimism. In contrast to Azzawi and Naqib,
Hafith said that Allawi had been less than successful on the
campaign trail, and that he lacked the resources to run an
effective campaign, let alone compete with ISCI and Dawa.
Hafith also tipped his hat to the PM, stating that Dawa's
State of Law coalition was running a strong campaign and
attracting a large segment of the
secular, moderate vote - people who would have likely voted
Qsecular, moderate vote - people who would have likely voted
for the INL in the past.

Future Implications


8. (C) Hafith opined that if the INL performs as poorly as he
thinks it will, there could be an exodus from the bloc prior
to next year,s national elections. Hamid Majid Mousa, the
Communist bloc CoR leader who left the INL in 2007, was more
pessimistic, telling Poloff on 1/15 that "Iraqiyyah (INL) was
finished." On 1/21, former INL member and independent CoR
member Safia Suhail echoed Hafith and
Mousa,s views, stating that the INL's likely poor showing in
the provincial elections would hasten the bloc,s demise.
However, though Suhail said that she could believe Mehdi
Hafith and some of the other party members may abandon the
bloc for other parties, the majority will stay put, simply
because "no one else wants them." Continuing, she said that
though Allawi will "always have a seat at the table,
because he knows how to look out for himself," the INL in its
current form would probably cease to exist after next year,s
national elections.


9. (C) Comment: Though a poor showing in the upcoming
provincial elections may lead to defections from the party in

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the run-up to the national elections, it is likely that
internal differences, as well as frustration with the bloc
leader, Ayad Allawi, may likely be more of a contributing
factor. Moreover, though several current and former bloc
members are pessimistic about the bloc's chances in the
provincial elections, even a 10% showing in some provinces
could put the INL in an enviable position as post-election
coalition building begins in earnest. Given the delusions of
grandeur that some in the bloc continue to hold, it remains
to be seen whether the bloc will accept the results as an
accurate barometer of the bloc's 2009 position and move
forward, or simply remain in denial and offer up
another four years' worth of excuses and recriminations. End
Comment.
CROCKER