ASSESSING RECENT VIOLENCE IN ANBAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002163

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2019
TAGS: IZ KDEM PGOV PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: ASSESSING RECENT VIOLENCE IN ANBAR

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Classified By: PRT Anbar Team Leader James Soriano for reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable.


2. (U) Summary. Six car bombing and suicide bomber attacks
in Anbar Province since mid-July appear to have been
conducted by remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or by
nationalist insurgent groups to create an atmosphere of
instability and to degrade the effectiveness of the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF). Despite recent headlines about
bombings in Fallujah and Ramadi, there has been no notable
increase in the underlying patterns of violence in Anbar
Province. To the contrary, insurgent-related violence in the
province remains at historically low levels. Local political
and security officials acknowledge the seriousness of recent
car bomb attacks and say they are committed to dealing with
the situation. The public appears to feel secure enough that
most Anbaris continue to welcome the departure of U.S.
military forces from the cities. While the overall rate of
security incidents in Anbar, including the recent attacks,
has consistently averaged about one per day over the past
three months, the lethality of the multiple car bomb and
suicide bomber attacks since mid-July does represent a
departure from the norm and is being watched closely by both
Iraqi and US security forces. End summary.

No change in overall security trends
--------------

3. (C) Although the recent attacks have been more lethal than
other security incidents in recent months, cumulatively they
do not break a long-established pattern of a low level of
violence in Anbar. According to MNF-West statistics, there
were 35 security incidents in the whole province in July,
which is generally in line with the 90-day average of
slightly more than one incident a day. This level of
violence is a fraction of the 1,600 to 1,900 incidents
recorded in a typical month in late 2006, the high point of
the Battle of Anbar. In short, although the number of
attacks is in line with the recent averages, the quality of
the attacks in terms of the use of car bombs and suicide
bombers in relatively quick succession is a new development
that bears monitoring.


Recent attacks
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4. (U) Nonetheless, several high-profile attacks have been
reported by the press since mid-July, some causing multiple
casualties. In Ramadi, a policeman and five civilians were
killed on July 15 when a suicide bomber attacked a checkpoint
of Iraqi soldiers and police officers. On July 20, a car
bomb exploded near the Government Center in central Ramadi,
killing two policemen, and the next day another car bomb
detonated near a north Ramadi restaurant, killing two and
injuring 20. On July 25, a reported truck bomb detonated
near the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) headquarters, and on the
following day a suicide bomber killed four people and wounded
nine others at a funeral in Fallujah. On August 2, a suicide
car bomb targeting a police checkpoint on the outskirts of
Fallujah killed two people and wounded seven.
A closer look
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5. (C) Several points can be made about the above attacks:
-- They appear to be perpetrated by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
remnant cells, or of the so-called &national resistance8
forces that have long been present in Anbar.
-- Most of the attacks have targeted Iraqi security forces
(ISF). None has been against the Coalition Forces (CF).
-- The attacks do not appear to have the intended purpose of
creating mass casualties, a typical AQI signature when
targeting Shia Muslims and other groups.
Police response
--------------
Q --------------


6. (C) Instead of demoralizing the security forces, the
attacks may actually result in stepped up law enforcement
efforts. In the wake of the attacks, the police have shown
newfound confidence and capability. They have set curfews,
vehicular travel bans, and have conducted security sweeps and
made arrests as appropriate.

7. (C) The attacks were the lead subject at the August 3
weekly staff meeting of the Anbar Operational Command (AOC),
which brings together the province,s key Army and police
officials. The AOC commanding general, Major General Murthi
Al-Mahali, acknowledged the seriousness of the car bombings
and instructed his subordinates to redouble operational and
intelligence-gathering efforts. There was no talk about a
possible AQI resurgence, nor was there a request for
Coalition assistance in the fight against the terrorists.
Instead, officials acknowledged their security problem and
talked about ways of dealing with it. Intelligence officers
at the meeting pointed to Baghdad as the staging area for car

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bombs that are later driven to their targets in Anbar.

8. (C) The following day, Anbar Governor Qassim Al-Fahadawi
and Major General Murthi gave a similar security assessment
to senior CF leadership at a meeting at Camp Ramadi. The
tenor of that discussion was on the security measures that
need to be taken against AQI. On a related front, Governor
Qassim met recently with security officials and key judges to
review the processes and procedures for improving actionable
intelligence and prosecutable evidence for use against
accused terrorists.

Public mood
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10. (C) Fears about a renewed insurgency have long been
absent in PRT and MNF-West discussions with local contacts.
What polling data exists suggests that Anbaris are more
concerned about inadequate essential services and with
violent crime than with a possible renewed insurgency.
Security issues rarely are raised in typical PRT and MNF-West
engagements with governmental leaders and tribal sheikhs.
The population seems to have taken notice of ISF responses to
the recent attacks and has approved the efforts. In general,
it views the security forces as competent, even without
Coalition support.


11. (C) Anbaris appear to feel secure enough that they
continue to want the U.S. military to depart the cities. On
that score, the June 30 &Out of the Cities8 milestone has
widespread public approval. At the same time, many Anbaris,
especially the political and tribal elite with whom we have
regular contact, want the U.S. military to remain garrisoned
in bases in the nearby desert. The U.S. should go away, but
not too far, seems to be the prevailing mood.


12. (C) Governor Qassim echoed this view when he recently
told two visiting Washington-based security analysts that he
would like the U.S. military to stay in Iraq far beyond the
December 31, 2011, departure date. It should be noted,
however, that such sentiment for a long-term U.S. military
presence appears to be motivated more by Anbaris, desire for
protection against Iran, not against Al-Qaeda.

Comment
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13. (C) Although AQI is still able to conduct high-profile
attacks, it is no longer a true insurgent force that enjoys
popular support. The movement has long been expelled from
Anbari cities and towns. It has been tactically disrupted.
The fact that most of the attacks can be linked to cells
operating from Baghdad Province suggests that AQI is not on
the cusp of rebuilding itself in Anbar.

14. (C) While lethal, the fact that none of the recent
bombings appears to have been intended to cause mass
casualties suggests that the the Anbar attacks represent
Sunni-on-Sunni violence, rather than part of a campaign to
foment Sunni-Shi,a sectarian strife. That said, it does not
appear that the attacks are linked to intra-Anbari Sunni
political maneuverings. As noted in paragraph 4, one of the
recent attacks reportedly targeted the IIP headquarters in
Fallujah. Various groups of radicals, such as Hamas Al-Iraq,
orbit along the outer fringes of the IIP, and the Fallujah
bombing may be part of a struggle among them or IIP factions.
Instead, the objectives seem to be to create the perception
of instability, to demoralize the security forces, and to
send the public the message that AQI is still a force to be
reckoned with. Creating an atmosphere of instability could
force local officials to strike a deal with AQI operatives,
granting them space to reorganize and re-establish itself.
Many Anbari leaders reached such an accommodation during the
height of the 2004-2006 insurgency. Nonetheless, there is
Qno evidence to suggest that the public would countenance a
bid by AQI to insinuate itself into Anbaris, daily lives to
the extent that it had previously done.

15. (C) Anbar Province is still not out of the woods on
security. AQI can and does strike with lethal effect. There
is nothing new in those assessments; however, despite the
recent car bombing and suicide bomber attacks, the
encouraging development on the local scene has been improved
police performance. The ISF have responded properly, with
confidence, and without CF assistance, highlighting the turn
of Anbari public opinion against the insurgents and the
increased efficacy of ISF operations.
HILL