FM ZEBARI URGES MORE SUPPORTIVE USG STANCE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002108 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC PTER KU IR IZ SY SUBJECT: FM ZEBARI URGES MORE SUPPORTIVE USG STANCE ON CHAPTER VII ISSUES; DETAILS ASHRAF SITUATION Classified By: POL MINISTER COUNSELOR GARY GRAPPO, FOR REASONS 1.4 B AN D D. ¶1. (C) Summary: FM Hoshyar Zebari, during an August 4 introductory call by Pol M/C, called for greater USG effort to help Iraq get out of Chapter VII, as it had committed to do. He criticized the initiative of recently departed SRSG de Mistura and blamed him for the current complications with Kuwait. Zebari said the GOI accepted UNSCR 833 and its obligations but said Iraq's maritime access needed to be resolved. On a separate issue, Zebari acknowledged the poor timing of the recent GOI move against the MEK at Ashraf but said the action was not prompted by any recent developments or pressure but based on previous unanimous Cabinet decision. He described formal relations with Syria as good but acknowledged ongoing problems with cross-border infiltration by suicide bombers and apparently increasing support for Iraqi Baathists. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In an August 4 introductory call by Pol M/C, FM Zebari spoke very positively about PM Maliki's July 23-24 visit to Washington, noting that the GOI side had come came away reassured by what he termed the new Administration's firm expressions of commitment to Iraq and to a "responsible redeployment." He described the next six months in the run-up to Iraqi parliamentary elections as critical. Zebari said the Washington visit had helped create positive momentum for the critical August 2-3 meeting that the PM held at Lake Dokkhan with KDP head (and recently re-elected KRG President) Masoud Barzani. (Note: Zebari's readout of the Maliki-Barzani meeting to be reported septel.) Out from Under Chapter VII -------------- ¶3. (C) FM Zebari spoke at length about Chapter VII issues, noting that he had been struck by what he described as the lack of knowledge at the Security Council about the substantial work that the Iraqis and Kuwaitis have already done on the cluster of issues involved. He asserted that Iraq maintained good bilateral relations with Kuwait and that the two were cooperating on a variety of fronts. "There is no deadlock" in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations he said. While acknowledging that in the past the Kuwaitis had often shown more diplomatic talent than the GOI in working this issue at the UNSC, he stated that "this time we beat them," expressing �00A;satisfaction with the amount of input his people had had on the Secretary General's recently issued report. ¶4. (C) Emphasizing that the GOI would not be content with merely "a paper exercise" at the UN, Zebari called for a more robust USG effort to help Iraq exit Chapter VII status, insisting that the GOI had "sold the SOFA to the Iraqi public" on the basis of the U.S. commitment to help Iraq move beyond Chapter VII. Pol M/C stated that the USG stood by that commitment, but stressed the need for the GOI to take concrete steps and engage in confidence building measures with Kuwait. ¶5. (C) The FM explained that he was attempting to keep this issue from becoming a political football in Parliament and the PM's office. He described a GOI inter-ministerial series of meetings, with the participation of the MFA, Justice, Oil, Finance, and Defense, to work the issue and strengthen the process already established for working issues such as Kuwaiti MIA's and their missing archives. Zebari expressed reservations about the efforts of former SRSG de Mistura, claiming his mission to Kuwait had complicated the issue. According to Zebari, de Mistura solicited ideas from PM Maliki prior to going to Kuwait, and absorbed the PM's view QMaliki prior to going to Kuwait, and absorbed the PM's view that the issue should be resolved in "some kind of grand bargain" on borders, compensation, Kuwaiti missing, and debt relief. That approach had put off the Kuwaitis and raised false hopes on the Iraqi side, leading to the current lack of movement. ¶6. (C) When he addressed the border issue, Zebari expressed understanding about Kuwaiti fears that if Iraq were to get out from Chapter VII status, the Kuwaitis could somehow be left without ironclad assurances about the border delineation. He underscored that Iraq accepted UNSCR 833 and recognized the border as demarcated therein. Nonetheless, pulling out a large UN map, Zebari began to expound about the problems Iraq faced with regard to maritime access in the Shatt al Arab (Khor al Zubayr and Khor Abdullah). He claimed that the maritime border as drawn in 833 prevented Iraqi naval vessels at Um Qasr from having sufficient maritime access. He laid even more stress on the fact that Iraqi commercial vessels lacked access on the Iraqi side of the border to deep water at Khor Zubayr, requiring its ships to raise a Kuwaiti flag as they passed through GOK waters. (Note: Raising this "courtesy" flag is not required by the BAGHDAD 00002108 002 OF 002 UNSCR or by international maritime law, but Kuwaiti domestic law could require foreign ships to fly courtesy flags in its internal waters. We do not have verification that this is in fact the case.) The situation was worse at Khor Abdullah, he added. Pol M/C reminded Zebari of what he had himself acknowledged, that the border established in UNSCR 833 was final, while adding that the two sides could possibly address access issues at a technical level. Zebari expressed readiness to explore this possibility. MEK --- ¶7. (C) FM Zebari explained that the GOI move against the MEK at Ashraf represented a unanimous Cabinet decision -- and a Constitutional issue -- that had been taken a while back and did not represent any recent response to events or to Iranian pressure. (Note: We are not aware of a decision by the Council of Ministers to establish a police station at Ashraf, which was the stated purpose for the entry of Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police forces last week.) Zebari acknowledged long-standing Iranian pressure on the GOI to close the camp and remove the MEK from Iraq but said it had not provoked the recent GOI action. According to Zebari, Iran has in the past offered to supply all camp residents with Iranian passports, provided that they left Iraq and went to third countries. Zebari acknowledged that the timing was unfortunate, but noted that the GOI could not allow armed groups to operate inside its borders, intent on launching cross-border attacks. (Note: Ashraf residents disarmed, renounced violence, and entered into a cease-fire agreement with Coalition Forces in May 2003.) He pointed to a group of Turkish Kurds in a camp in the Kurdish region, noting that the GOI had had to take similar action to get control of the camp. (Comment: Embassy Baghdad is not sure just which camp he is referring to.) He claimed the PKK would also be subject to such control. Zebari also noted that discussion between Iraq authorities and senior Ashraf residents had taken place before Baghdad's formal take-over of the camp. ¶8. (C) Zebari made clear the GOI stood by the commitments it had made in a Note Verbale to then Ambassador Crocker and would not forcibly repatriate the MEK camp residents to Iran, or to any other country against their will. (Comment: This is welcome since the PM's representative Ali al-Yassery has echoed the policy but denied the existence, or binding nature, of said exchange.) Zebari expressed the hope that many of them would voluntarily accept repatriation, possibly to European countries, while acknowledging that at present these countries had shown no interest in making such an offer. He described the MEK camp residents as members of a "cult," with a powerful PR machine behind them in Europe and to a lesser degree in the United State. Relations with Syria -------------- ¶9. (C) FM Zebari described relations with Syria as good, especially on the political and economic fronts, but noted that the Syrian PM on his last visit had expressed disappointment that while the two sides had signed numerous cooperation agreements, primarily focused on economic issues, there had been little or no implementation. On the security side, Zebari said that the GOI still received reports of foreign fighters infiltrating across the Syrian border, although the overall numbers were down. However, Syrian support for Baathist groups had recently increased. (Zebari pointed more broadly to a group of other regional neighbors -- including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and others, Q-- including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and others, including the GCC, also intent on trying to influence the January parliamentary elections.) According to Zebari, the Syrians were also meddling "significantly" in Mosul. HILL