FM ZEBARI URGES MORE SUPPORTIVE USG STANCE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002108

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC PTER KU IR IZ SY
SUBJECT: FM ZEBARI URGES MORE SUPPORTIVE USG STANCE ON
CHAPTER VII ISSUES; DETAILS ASHRAF SITUATION

Classified By: POL MINISTER COUNSELOR GARY GRAPPO, FOR REASONS 1.4 B AN
D D.


1. (C) Summary: FM Hoshyar Zebari, during an August 4
introductory call by Pol M/C, called for greater USG effort
to help Iraq get out of Chapter VII, as it had committed to
do. He criticized the initiative of recently departed SRSG
de Mistura and blamed him for the current complications with
Kuwait. Zebari said the GOI accepted UNSCR 833 and its
obligations but said Iraq's maritime access needed to be
resolved. On a separate issue, Zebari acknowledged the poor
timing of the recent GOI move against the MEK at Ashraf but
said the action was not prompted by any recent developments
or pressure but based on previous unanimous Cabinet decision.
He described formal relations with Syria as good but
acknowledged ongoing problems with cross-border infiltration
by suicide bombers and apparently increasing support for
Iraqi Baathists. End Summary.


2. (C) In an August 4 introductory call by Pol M/C, FM
Zebari spoke very positively about PM Maliki's July 23-24
visit to Washington, noting that the GOI side had come came
away reassured by what he termed the new Administration's
firm expressions of commitment to Iraq and to a "responsible
redeployment." He described the next six months in the
run-up to Iraqi parliamentary elections as critical. Zebari
said the Washington visit had helped create positive momentum
for the critical August 2-3 meeting that the PM held at Lake
Dokkhan with KDP head (and recently re-elected KRG President)
Masoud Barzani. (Note: Zebari's readout of the
Maliki-Barzani meeting to be reported septel.)

Out from Under Chapter VII
--------------


3. (C) FM Zebari spoke at length about Chapter VII issues,
noting that he had been struck by what he described as the
lack of knowledge at the Security Council about the
substantial work that the Iraqis and Kuwaitis have already
done on the cluster of issues involved. He asserted that
Iraq maintained good bilateral relations with Kuwait and that
the two were cooperating on a variety of fronts. "There is
no deadlock" in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations he said. While
acknowledging that in the past the Kuwaitis had often shown
more diplomatic talent than the GOI in working this issue at
the UNSC, he stated that "this time we beat them," expressing
satisfaction with the amount of input his people had had on
the Secretary General's recently issued report.


4. (C) Emphasizing that the GOI would not be content with
merely "a paper exercise" at the UN, Zebari called for a more
robust USG effort to help Iraq exit Chapter VII status,
insisting that the GOI had "sold the SOFA to the Iraqi
public" on the basis of the U.S. commitment to help Iraq move
beyond Chapter VII. Pol M/C stated that the USG stood by
that commitment, but stressed the need for the GOI to take
concrete steps and engage in confidence building measures
with Kuwait.


5. (C) The FM explained that he was attempting to keep this
issue from becoming a political football in Parliament and
the PM's office. He described a GOI inter-ministerial series
of meetings, with the participation of the MFA, Justice, Oil,
Finance, and Defense, to work the issue and strengthen the
process already established for working issues such as
Kuwaiti MIA's and their missing archives. Zebari expressed
reservations about the efforts of former SRSG de Mistura,
claiming his mission to Kuwait had complicated the issue.
According to Zebari, de Mistura solicited ideas from PM
Maliki prior to going to Kuwait, and absorbed the PM's view
QMaliki prior to going to Kuwait, and absorbed the PM's view
that the issue should be resolved in "some kind of grand
bargain" on borders, compensation, Kuwaiti missing, and debt
relief. That approach had put off the Kuwaitis and raised
false hopes on the Iraqi side, leading to the current lack of
movement.


6. (C) When he addressed the border issue, Zebari expressed
understanding about Kuwaiti fears that if Iraq were to get
out from Chapter VII status, the Kuwaitis could somehow be
left without ironclad assurances about the border
delineation. He underscored that Iraq accepted UNSCR 833 and
recognized the border as demarcated therein. Nonetheless,
pulling out a large UN map, Zebari began to expound about the
problems Iraq faced with regard to maritime access in the
Shatt al Arab (Khor al Zubayr and Khor Abdullah). He claimed
that the maritime border as drawn in 833 prevented Iraqi
naval vessels at Um Qasr from having sufficient maritime
access. He laid even more stress on the fact that Iraqi
commercial vessels lacked access on the Iraqi side of the
border to deep water at Khor Zubayr, requiring its ships to
raise a Kuwaiti flag as they passed through GOK waters.
(Note: Raising this "courtesy" flag is not required by the

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UNSCR or by international maritime law, but Kuwaiti domestic
law could require foreign ships to fly courtesy flags in its
internal waters. We do not have verification that this is in
fact the case.) The situation was worse at Khor Abdullah, he
added. Pol M/C reminded Zebari of what he had himself
acknowledged, that the border established in UNSCR 833 was
final, while adding that the two sides could possibly address
access issues at a technical level. Zebari expressed
readiness to explore this possibility.

MEK
---


7. (C) FM Zebari explained that the GOI move against the MEK
at Ashraf represented a unanimous Cabinet decision -- and a
Constitutional issue -- that had been taken a while back and
did not represent any recent response to events or to Iranian
pressure. (Note: We are not aware of a decision by the
Council of Ministers to establish a police station at Ashraf,
which was the stated purpose for the entry of Iraqi ARMY and
Iraqi Police forces last week.) Zebari acknowledged
long-standing Iranian pressure on the GOI to close the camp
and remove the MEK from Iraq but said it had not provoked the
recent GOI action. According to Zebari, Iran has in the past
offered to supply all camp residents with Iranian passports,
provided that they left Iraq and went to third countries.
Zebari acknowledged that the timing was unfortunate, but
noted that the GOI could not allow armed groups to operate
inside its borders, intent on launching cross-border attacks.
(Note: Ashraf residents disarmed, renounced violence, and
entered into a cease-fire agreement with Coalition Forces in
May 2003.) He pointed to a group of Turkish Kurds in a camp
in the Kurdish region, noting that the GOI had had to take
similar action to get control of the camp. (Comment:
Embassy Baghdad is not sure just which camp he is referring
to.) He claimed the PKK would also be subject to such
control. Zebari also noted that discussion between Iraq
authorities and senior Ashraf residents had taken place
before Baghdad's formal take-over of the camp.


8. (C) Zebari made clear the GOI stood by the commitments it
had made in a Note Verbale to then Ambassador Crocker and
would not forcibly repatriate the MEK camp residents to Iran,
or to any other country against their will. (Comment: This
is welcome since the PM's representative Ali al-Yassery has
echoed the policy but denied the existence, or binding
nature, of said exchange.) Zebari expressed the hope that
many of them would voluntarily accept repatriation, possibly
to European countries, while acknowledging that at present
these countries had shown no interest in making such an
offer. He described the MEK camp residents as members of a
"cult," with a powerful PR machine behind them in Europe and
to a lesser degree in the United State.

Relations with Syria
--------------


9. (C) FM Zebari described relations with Syria as good,
especially on the political and economic fronts, but noted
that the Syrian PM on his last visit had expressed
disappointment that while the two sides had signed numerous
cooperation agreements, primarily focused on economic issues,
there had been little or no implementation. On the security
side, Zebari said that the GOI still received reports of
foreign fighters infiltrating across the Syrian border,
although the overall numbers were down. However, Syrian
support for Baathist groups had recently increased. (Zebari
pointed more broadly to a group of other regional neighbors
-- including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and others,
Q-- including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and others,
including the GCC, also intent on trying to influence the
January parliamentary elections.) According to Zebari, the
Syrians were also meddling "significantly" in Mosul.




HILL