THE LIMITS OF CROSS-SECTARIAN POLITICS BEFORE THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002105 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: THE LIMITS OF CROSS-SECTARIAN POLITICS BEFORE THE NATIONAL VOTE REF: A. BAGHDAD 001925 ¶B. BAGHDAD 002014 ¶C. BAGHDAD 001889 ¶D. BAGHDAD 001744 ¶E. BAGHDAD 000306 ¶F. BAGHDAD 000659 Classified By: DCM Robert Ford for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Iraqi politicians are seeking to brand their parties as non-sectarian amid a whirl of alliance negotiations before the January national parliamentary election. A significant cross-sectarian, national electoral alliance would be a very positive development in Iraqi politics. Formation of such a coalition, however, will have to overcome Iraq's entrenched ethno-sectarian voting patterns, incentives to pander to one's sectarian base, lingering fears about Ba'athists and Iranian influence, and anti-Kurdish sentiment that have marked past attempts at cooperation between Sunni and Shia parties. Given these obstacles, the most likely outcome is electoral coalitions that call themselves "national" but in reality are dominated by the old, ethno-sectarian parties with token representation from other groups. Those seeking new political allies now may have an advantage in joining a majority cross-sectarian governing coalition after the elections. End summary. Ethno-Sectarian Voting Patterns -------------- ¶2. (C) Voting behavior in Iraq largely falls along ethno-sectarian geographic lines, as demonstrated most recently by the results of the January 2009 provincial elections. For example, although backers of Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law (SOL) coalition tended to portray themselves as part of a "national" list, SOL received nearly all its seats from the Shia-dominated south, winning only four of its 127 seats from non-Shia majority provinces. Within the Shia-majority provinces and Baghdad, SOL won merely 26 percent of the vote, albeit a plurality. ¶3. (C) Iraq still lacks a major party with wide national roots. Most derive their support from specific ethno-sectarian or regional constituents. Hadba and Sahwa al-Iraq (SAI),new parties that emerged through the January vote, are rooted in the Sunni communities of Ninawa and Anbar, respectively. The major Kurdish parties remain locked in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and disputed territories. As Poloffs this year met Faily (Shia) Kurds living in Baghdad, we found them often pro-Maliki, not pro-KDP or PUK. The major coalition that most closely approximated a cross-sectarian list, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National List (INL),ended up tied for fourth in the January vote, garnering only 26 of the overall 440 provincial council seats. Pandering to Sectarian Base -------------- ¶4. (C) Shia politicians are currently engaged in talks to revive the Unified Iraqi Coalition (UIC) in the belief that being seen as promoting Shia unity will yield votes from Iraq's Shia majority (ref A). MPs Ali al-Alaq (Da'wa) and Abd al-Hadi al-Hassani (Da'wa Tanzim) on July 27 told Poloff that Shia parties are concurrently focused on how to rebrand the new UIC as non-sectarian, such as renaming the UIC the National Iraqi Coalition. MP Abbas al-Bayati (UIC independent) told Poloff on July 16 that any new UIC would have to make policy changes to attract liberal Shia and non-Shia parties. Shia MPs admit, however, the primary objective of UIC negotiations is to bring the original Shia Islamist parties back together. Only later will the door be truly opened to Sunni or Kurdish groups, who will likely have to join (if they choose to do so) on Shia-dictated terms. MPs, including Alaq and Hassani, also admit that during talks QMPs, including Alaq and Hassani, also admit that during talks to revive the UIC, the most important issues -- divvying up seat allocation and selecting new leadership -- have been set aside for now, giving credence to claims by our Da'wa contacts that talk of a reconstituted UIC is only for "media purposes." Shia parties, irrespective of their electoral strategy, understand they will lose support among their constituents if blamed for causing an intra-Shia schism. ¶5. (C) MP Qasim Daoud, a member of the UIC, told Poloffs on July 28 that he is advocating a "super coalition," to include the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and the two major Kurdish parties, to run together in the January election. Daoud said, however, many in the UIC are resisting this idea and complications have emerged over how to allocate among the ethno-sectarian parties the seats won in the mixed provinces of Baghdad, Salah al-Din, and Diyala. BAGHDAD 00002105 002 OF 003 Animosities Linger: Ba'athists and Iranian Pawns -------------- --- ¶6. (C) To emerge as a national force, any Sunni-Shia electoral coalition will have to overcome persistent fears of Ba'athist and Iranian meddling. Shia clerics and officials this month in the media, through sermons, and in private conversations with Poloffs have expressed misgivings that the United States may be open to the revival of the Ba'ath Party (ref C),citing in particular news report of U.S. "negotiations" with the Political Council for Iraqi Resistance (PCIR). Qasim Daoud, the UIC MP, told Poloffs that even Grand Ayatollah Sistani had expressed concern to him about the U.S. meeting "insurgents" -- that is, the PCIR -- in Turkey this spring. The public flare-up over the past two weeks over these U.S.-PCIR meetings demonstrates that Iraq's Shia politicians believe playing up and denouncing the Sunni threat remain a useful political tactic. Similarly, some Shia leaders fear that taking a softer line on national reconciliation efforts might appeal to Sunnis but risks alienating their ethno-sectarian base. ¶7. (C) Sectarian animosities also give some Sunnis pause in considering alliances with Shia leaders. The head of the Sunni waqf, Ahmed Abd al-Gaffour al-Samarrai, on July 22 told Charge and Poloffs that his new "nationalist" party would be open to aligning with Maliki if the prime minister were to offer an attractive national program. Abd al-Gaffour then whispered to Charge, "I don't trust Maliki. Deep down, he is incredibly sectarian." Sunni MP hardliner Salih al-Mutlaq similarly told Poloffs this month that he cannot align with Maliki (and assumedly other Shia-dominated parties) because his constituents perceive Maliki as sectarian and an ally of Iran. However, Mutlaq subsequently has told Poloffs that he remains in discussion with Maliki's Da'wa party. ¶8. (C) Despite ongoing UIC negotiations, Maliki's close advisors tell us he seeks to build upon his State of Law (SOL) coalition and set aside some Shia Islamist parties. Maliki has benefited from the "law and order" reputation he gained after 2008 security operations in Basrah, Baghdad, Maysan, and Diyala. The middle class in Baghdad in particular credits Maliki with providing security that could spur economic growth (ref D). To expand SOL's electoral reach into Sunni areas, Maliki met Sahwa al-Iraq (SAI) leader Ahmed al-Rishawi (aka Abu Risha) and other Anbar sheikhs on July 6 near Ramadi. Abu Risha told Iraqi media on July 28 that he wanted to join Maliki's coalition, because the PM "stood up against...sectarian violence, militias and al-Qaeda." "National List"--Anti-Kurd Overtones -------------- ¶9. (C) Talk of a "nationalist list," when not an attempt to re-brand the UIC, may be code for seeking a Shia-Sunni political alliance built on a particular unifying issue: a desire to check perceived Kurdish autonomy and expansion into disputed territories. Maliki probably gleaned from provincial elections that pushing the Kurds and exerting central government authority wins votes. On July 29, KRG President Masoud Barzani and KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani both stressed to visiting SecDef Gates that they fear Maliki and other Iraqi Arab political leaders will whip up anti-Kurd sentiment as an election tactic. ¶10. (C) From the north, Hadba co-founder Osama al-Nujayfi told us on July 27 that his party is seeking to broaden its appeal from its Ninewa stronghold by moving into other Sunni dominated provinces, as well as Kirkuk and Baghdad. Hadba won Qdominated provinces, as well as Kirkuk and Baghdad. Hadba won a majority of seats in Ninewa during provincial elections largely by tapping into Arab anger against the Kurds (ref E and F),and probably will use the same strategy for the national election. While expressing reservations about Iraq's Shia political parties, Nujayfi said he was talking to Shia groups about forming an alliance emphasizing Iraq's "Arab identity." The Exception: Allawi Plus Some Fractured Sunnis -------------- --- ¶11. (C) Iraq's Sunnis remain mostly splintered among Islamists and secularists. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) Secretary General Osama Tikriti told Poloff in early July that he realized his party needed to expand its base to include more secularists if it is to perform well in the January elections. He also noted, however, that efforts at intra-Sunni reconciliation were not going well. Tikriti's point was amplified when Salih al-Mutlaq, leader of the Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (IFND),told Poloffs, "Never!" when asked if he would ally with the IIP. ¶12. (C) In fact, rather than seeking a united Sunni front, BAGHDAD 00002105 003 OF 003 some former IIP members are exploring cross-sectarian alliances with Shia groups. Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi, chanting the secular national mantra, told Poloff he is talking to Hadba (Sunni),Allawi's INL (mixed),IFND (Sunni),and Interior Minister Jawad Bulani's rather weak Constitution Party (Shia) about an electoral coalition. Nujayfi, the Hadba member, confirmed to us he is considering an alliance with this currently disjointed group. Many of the leading Sunnis, however, are bargaining from a position of apparent weakness because of their internecine competition. ¶13. (C) Moreover, in contrast with 2005, Grand Ayatollah Sistani (Iraq's preeminent Shia cleric) may be more reluctant to advocate formation of a unified Shia list. According to MP Qasim Daoud, Sistani said in private that he would not push a particular electoral alliance or encourage voters to select a specific list. Daoud told us Sistani stated he would intervene in the election only to discourage the selection of incompetent candidates. Daoud also corroborated Sistani's support for open list elections that allow voters to select the best qualified candidates. (Note: As reported ref B, Iraqi Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said Sistani had told him the same thing. End note.) Comment: Compromise Needed for Government Formation -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) The barriers to an electoral alliance that truly transcends sectarian representation are formidable, especially as the age-old tactic of stoking fear and sowing external suspicion remain potent. Nevertheless, the trend towards branding one's party as "national" and non-sectarian, even if for purely PR purposes for now, represents a positive development in Iraqi politics. Moreover, some parties in parliament this year demonstrated significant cooperation on issues of common concern. The Shia Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),IIP and the Kurds, for example, rallied together multiple times to exert greater legislative heft against the Prime Minister's Office. MP Qasim Daoud and ISCI MP Jalal al-Din al-Saghir predict this ISCI-IIP-Kurdish grouping will reemerge after the election even if they campaign against each other. ¶15. (C) Comment continued: If parties pander too far to their respective ethno-sectarian base during the election campaign, there is a danger these issue-based groupings may become harder to sustain. However, Iraqi political leaders, including PM Maliki, understand that no one party and no one ethno-sectarian group can govern Iraq alone. We can help temper the most extreme electoral tactics by reminding Iraqi officials that compromise will be needed during next year's government formation and that focusing one's message on providing services -- not sectarianism -- is a winning electoral strategy. End comment. HILL