PLANNING MINISTER BABAN ON SFA, 2009 BUDGET, ICI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000021 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2018 TAGS: PREL EAID EFIN ECON IZ SUBJECT: PLANNING MINISTER BABAN ON SFA, 2009 BUDGET, ICI REF: 08BAGHDAD3476 Classified By: EMIN- Marc Wall, Reason E.O. 12958 1.5 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Emin Ambassador Wall and Treasatt met with Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) Ali Baban December 31 to discuss mechanisms for implementing the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA),asset transfers, the Iraqi fiscal outlook and development prospects, and Embassy's efforts to support Iraqi budget implementation. Baban welcomed the SFA and offered MoPDC support for its implementation, and he said the MoPDC would do its part to effect the asset transfer despite reservations in some ministries. Baban also said he had changed his mind on drawing down Iraqi currency reserves (since reftel conversation),since he has learned that there may be as much as USD 35 billion in combined Development Fund for Iraq and GOI fiscal accounts. He said the PM, however, was intent on drawing down USD 7 billion in currency reserves to fund the projected 2009 deficit. Rather, he said, the GOI should be far more transparent about its reserves and it should be better at forecasting budgets and deficits. End Summary. -------------- SFA and Bilateral Economic Agreements -------------- ¶2. (C) EMIN Ambassador Wall and Treasatt met December 31 with MoPDC Ali Baban as part of a series of meetings Mission has been having with senior GOI officials to launch implementation of the SFA (other meetings reported septels). Baban, who has been a strong and public booster of the SFA, said he was happy that MoPDC, which had been overlooked at first, was now in the SFA implementation committee structure. In response to EMIN's comment that we would like to set up the SFA implementation committees in about two weeks, Baban said the USG will need to "push us along." ¶3. (C) EMIN noted that there are a number of outstanding bilateral agreements that have been signed by our respective governments but which the Iraqis believe require ratification in the Council of Representatives. These include the bilateral assistance (USAID) agreement, an Investment Incentives agreement which would permit OPIC to offer coverage, and the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. Asked whether the SFA might supersede the need for ratification of these agreements, Baban replied he had not focused on these, and, taking notes, promised to raise the 
issue in the Council of Ministers. ¶4. (C) In addition, EMIN noted that we were interested in working with the GOI to transfer to Iraq assets built by the USG over past years. An agreement to do that has been reached and EMIN wished to have a line of communication on the issue with Baban as we moved forward. Baban welcomed the task, and said the MoPDC had been involved in organizing the inventory of the US-built assets, some of which were not known to Iraqi authorities. He related that there had been some reservations on certain asset transfers, mostly from the Education and Municipalities Ministries, but he said that MoPDC had he would work with DPM al-Issawi to help move the process along. -------------- 2009 Budget -------------- ¶5. (C) Baban launched into a long soliloquy about the Iraqi 2009 budget, reminding us that in a previous meeting he had expressed an interest in bringing down the CBI's currency reserves to a more "normal" level. Now, he said, having learned that there were greater than anticipated amounts in the Development Fund For Iraq (DFI) and in the GOI's fiscal reserves -- which could reach as high as USD 35 billion -- he believed there would be no need to tap currency reserves. He Qbelieved there would be no need to tap currency reserves. He said he was pressing the COM to be more transparent on the amount of reserves that are available from the DFI and fiscal accounts, and on the GOI's plan to fund the deficit, but that they are not responding. In fact, according to Baban, PM Maliki has asked the COM to deliver a decision to tap the CBI reserve to the tune of USD 7 billion. EMIN pressed Baban on this, noting that once a decision has been made to tap the CBI currency reserves that could be no end to it, with dangerous implications for the Iraqi currency and inflation. (Note: currency appreciation is the CBI, main tool in fighting inflation. End note). Baban agreed and reiterated that the GOI needs to demonstrate full transparency on this issue. ¶6. (C) Baban said that the GOI needed to become more proficient in how it generates its budget forecasts and estimates future oil earnings. He complained that the Finance Ministry had estimated oil prices too high even in BAGHDAD 00000021 002 OF 002 the latest revised budget, and said the GOI should count on no more than USD 37 per barrel. "If it's more, then we can adjust upward -- even with a supplemental." Min Fin Jabr insisted on the current figure of USD 50 per barrel only because other countries in the region are using it, he said. Furthermore, he said that this current oil-dependent budget once again demonstrates Iraq's "unacceptable" dependence on a single commodity. ¶7. (C) Baban reiterated his earlier frustrations on the lack of a diversified Iraqi economy (reftel). He agreed with EMIN that one way out of Iraq's fiscal constraints was to attract investment, but said investment is made more difficult by remaining security concerns, poor governance, the lack of an effective finance sector including banking and insurance, missing legislation, and poor infrastructure. -------------- PFMAG, Development Strategies and the ICI -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked by Treasatt whether the National Development Strategy (NDS) guides the GOI's budget development, Baban said that the MoPDC has strategic plans, but that the rest of the GOI treats development strategies as "suggestions." Baban said, "it takes two to tango and we're still waiting for a dance partner!" Treasatt explained the Embassy's new Public Finance Management Action Group (PFMAG) which has ideas for projects that will help the MOPDC to monitor capital budget execution and identify and seek to resolve any roadblocks. He noted that this may duplicate in some sense the work of the MoPDC, which should be avoided. Baban was enthusiastic about getting this technical help and offered to meet again with Treasatt and staff to work out a way to make it happen. ¶9. (C) Treasatt noted that the 2007-2011 NDS was prepared in 2006 and asked what plans the MoPDC had to update it. Baban acknowledged that the original NDS was created from within the MoPDC and said that a revised version should use a different model to develop (note: presumably involving greater consultation with line ministries). However, he had no plans to address the issue this year -- in 2010 the MoPDC would initiate the process of reviewing and updating it. ¶10. (C) Asked about the intersection between the NDS and the Joint Monitoring Matrix benchmarks of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI),Baban replied that the ICI was moribund. Insisting that the issue of a lack of momentum behind ICI implementation is a political problem from the "highest level" of the GOI, Baban said Iraqi officials (aside from the ICI secretariat, who he called enthusiastic) simply do not understand it. Baban would support the Prime Minister's call at the Stockholm ministerial meeting of the ICI for Baghdad to host the 2009 ministerial. And he recognized that such events can prod the process along. But he insisted that Iraqis "must show they are serious about the ICI and live up to their commitments." CROCKER