THE SPEAKER'S RACE 3-RING CIRCUS: PARLIAMENT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000206 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: THE SPEAKER'S RACE 3-RING CIRCUS: PARLIAMENT, PRIME MINISTER AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 4007 ¶B. 08 BAGHDAD 4019 ¶C. 08 BAGHDAD 4030 ¶D. 09 BAGHDAD 0127 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Tim Lenderking, for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The race for Speaker of the Council of Representatives (CoR) is wide open again as Acting Speaker Khalid al Attiya announced a special vote for February 4 to select the speaker. Any bloc may submit a candidate, although the lead candidates remain nominally Ayad al Samarraie, leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). The Prime Minister, anxious to forestall the IIP controlling the parliament when its vice president is already a stern foe, is lobbying against Samarraie. The Prime Minister's allies are pushing forward another, more obscure Sunni Arab, Abid Mutlak al Jaboori, of Iraqi Arab Independents (IAI) (reftel). Current CoR alliances suggest a roughly equivalent vote base of approximately 105-115 votes for each man. Predictions have also included either a caretaker speaker, such as the aging Sunni Arab figure Adnan Pachachi. There is also the possibility that current CoR alliances will shift substantially after the upcoming provincial elections, with subsequent effects on the speaker's race. Many think that the IIP, and Samarrai'e ally, the Shia Islamist ISCI party, will score poorly, and thus their parliamentary bases may weaken against those of Maliki and his parliamentary allies. It is clear now that the speaker race is about more than the leadership of the Parliament. It is also about the Prime Minister and whether he has the ability to shoot down potential opponents in the Parliament. End Summary. The Special Mechanism -------------- ¶2. (C) At the January 18 session of the CoR, after Attiya resignedly announced that bloc leaders still had not agreed upon a single candidate for speaker, he said they had agreed upon a mechanism and a timeline to address the problem. Attiya declared that (1) any bloc could submit a candidate; (2) all names must be submitted no later than February 4; (3) all names would be voted on by secret ballot, and; (4) if no one candidate received the required 138 votes, there would be a secret ballot runoff among the top three vote-getters on February 5. No arrangements were made should more ballots be required. The CoR Alliances -------------- ¶3. (C) The alliances noted a week ago in reftel have not changed significantly - yet. For now, ISCI/Badrs' 30 MPs and the Kurds' 60 MPs still support al Samarraie based on the informal agreement that resulted in former speaker Mahmoud Mashhadani's ouster (reftel). With 30 members still in Tawafuq, al Samaraie and the IIP have a base of approximately 110-115 votes. Abid Mutlak probably still has the backing of Dawa and Dawa Tanzim (25),and the Parliamentary Coordination Group (PCG),composed of MPs from Fadhila, Sadrists, and Arab independents (50-60). With the non-IIP Sunnis (35),Abid Mutlak may have a base of about 105 - 115 votes. A Wide-Open Field -------------- ¶4. (C) Information from CoR members clearly indicates a race in flux. Al Samarraie himself noted that there were seven candidates for speaker and the number could go as high as ten or perhaps more. Interlocutors from the Hewar, Iraqiyya, Sunni Independents and Shi'a independents have all concluded that Ayad al Samarraie can no longer win. Most assess that in an open race, it is unlikely that any IIP candidate could win, since many MPs remain adamantly opposed to IIP control of all of the top Sunni-designated positions in the Qof all of the top Sunni-designated positions in the government (reftel). ¶5. (C) Some CoR members, however, have suggested that there will be no quick resolution and offered several scenarios. Attiya could remain as acting speaker until new elections are called (about 9 months). Some Shi'a members and others have suggested Adnan Pachachi's as a caretaker speaker, despite his advanced age and increasing infirmity. Some Hewar members opined that by February 4th, Tawafuq will have re-welcomed Khalaf al Alayan's National Dialogue Council (NDC),and will submit a Tawafuq candidate who certainly will not be IIP or al Samarraie. This last prediction meshes with al Samarraie's claim that bloc leaders also agreed, if Tawafuq could select a single candidate before February 4, that the special vote would be unnecessary. BAGHDAD 00000206 002 OF 002 The Interplay with Provincial Elections -------------- ¶6. (C) Complicating Tawafuq's position is the fact that the IIP will certainly lose seats in the upcoming provincial elections. The election outcomes will yield insights about the strength of the IIP's popular base and thus its parliamentary bargaining position. With a significant loss, it would be very difficult for the IIP to justify their continued lock on the leadership positions. ISCI, one of the IIP/Tawafuq key coalition partners in ousting Mashadani and in anti-Maliki parliamentary jockeying, may experience a similar dynamic. ISCI's performance in the upcoming provincial elections not only will affect its parliamentary bargaining positions vis-a-vis Dawa, it will likely affect the continued utility of Tawafuq/IIP-ISCI collaboration. The Interplay with the Maliki Government -------------- ¶7. (C) Several MPs have noted that Maliki is strongly opposed to an IIP speaker, in part because he fears this person would lead the CoR into a vote of no confidence. Several CoR members and parliamentary staff have reported that Dawa and Dawa Tanzim actively campaigned against Ayad al Samarraie - and every other IIP member. Maliki's choice is allegedly Abid Mutlak al Jeboori, whom many Shi'a MPs and some Kurds note is Maliki's man, or at least more malleable than any IIP candidate. ¶8. (C) With the delay of speaker selection until after the provincial elections, one MP, Jabir Habib Jabir (Shia Islamist Coalition independent.),claimed that Maliki had outwitted his parliamentary adversaries. If Maliki does well in the provincial elections, as some observers predict, a strong Dawa showing similarly will strengthen Maliki's popular and parliamentary base. If Maliki does especially well, or the IIP and ISCI do especially poorly, or both, it is almost guaranteed that the next speaker will not be from the IIP. ¶9. (C) If Tawafuq can bring the NDC back into the fold, as some Hewar members suggested, then the speaker still could be a non-IIP Tawafuq candidate, although this decision would have to be reached before provincial elections, according to Saleh al Mutlaq (Hewar). The deadline problem with this scenario is that if the IIP does especially poorly, there is little incentive for any group to rejoin Tawafuq. And as Shia independent Jabir also pointed out, while there are many MPs opposed to Maliki, they are unlikely to line up behind ISCI, the Kurds, and the IIP against a popular PM whose support may only increase after the provincial elections. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) In the byzantine interplay that is Iraqi politics, one thing is clear. Many of the key players are jockeying for position, but the IIP appears to be falling back in the race while Maliki is moving further to the inside. The speaker's race may be another attempt on Maliki's part to limit a competing power in the parliament, or it may simply be a case of bad political judgment on al Samarraie's and the IIP's part or both. It is also clear that the stakes are about more than just who sits as speaker; Maliki and his allies perceive that the race is at least in part about the survival of the Prime Minister himself. Ironically, Samarraie himself has underlined to us that he doesn't want to pick fights with Maliki, but Maliki appears quite unwilling to take a chance. CROCKER