IDP RETURNS INITIATIVE IN ABU GHRAIB GATHERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001981 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2029 TAGS: PGOV IZ PHUM PREF PREL SUBJECT: IDP RETURNS INITIATIVE IN ABU GHRAIB GATHERS MOMENTUM WITH TRIBAL SUPPORT REF: BAGHDAD 1558 BAGHDAD 00001981 001.4 OF 004 Classified By: USAID Deputy Mission Director Thomas Delaney for reason 1.4 (b). ¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. personnel arranged a visit by representatives from the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) and Deputy Prime Minister Rafi Al-Essawi's staff to Abu Ghraib July 12 to discuss potential for large scale IDP returns to the area with local council members, tribal leaders and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Abu Ghraib participants said they welcome the initiative and that security conditions are suitable for returns, although attacks against returnees could occur as squatters are evicted from returnee homes. Abu Ghraib participants emphasized that the presence of some 4,000 IDPs from other areas in Abu Ghraib presents the largest obstacle to returns because those IDPs occupy homes and in many cases are suspected of ties to the extremist groups who displaced residents from Abu Ghraib to other areas. MoDM representatives, Essawi staff, Abu Ghraib representatives and Kadhamiya representatives will meet the week of July 19 to discuss organizing the movement of IDPs between Abu Ghraib and Kadhamiya. (A group of IDPs in Abu Ghraib are reportedly Sunnis from Kadhamiya, while Shia from Abu Ghraib were displaced to Kadhamiya). At a separate meeting July 15, Abu Ghraib tribal leaders met with representatives from MoDM, Essawi's office, Baghdad Provincial Council, Baghdad Governorate and Iraqi Security Forces and agreed to guarantee the security of returnees and not seek revenge against returnees for tribal blood debt. Although U.S. personnel arranged the initial meeting at the request of MoDM, Iraqi stakeholders appear to be taking ownership of the initiative and moving forward on their own. End summary. Background ¶2. (SBU) On June 4 the MoDM Department for Humanitarian Affairs requested help from the Prime Minister-appointed Implementation and Follow Up Committee for National ReconciliationFQQ|QQIM1 although security incidents continue to occur every few days. Several participants, including those from the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police, accused the media of sensationalizing attacks and creating the impression that the area is more dangerous than it really is. Abu Ghraib participants noted that hundred of families 
have already returned to the area despite lingering security problems and poor essential services. Participants said they welcome returns to the area and agreed that the largest obstacle to returns is the ongoing presence of IDPs from BAGHDAD 00001981 002.2 OF 004 other areas. Iraqi Police and Army representatives said there is sufficient ISF presence in the area to maintain security but emphasized the importance of close cooperation with the community to carefully manage the inflow of returnees in order to avoid destabilizing the area. Community Leaders Say IDPs from Other Areas Present Security Threat ¶4. (SBU) Abu Ghraib participants said the ongoing presence of IDPs from other areas presents the largest obstacle to returns because those IDPs occupy potential returnee homes and because some of those IDPs are, or are perceived to be, linked to the same kind of extremist elements that displaced residents from Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib participants said that most IDPs in the area came from Latifya (southern Baghdad province),Mada'en (eastern Baghdad province) and Diyala province and that their refusal to return in spite of improved security conditions in those areas suggests they are wanted by security forces or tribes for having committed crimes or terrorist attacks before they fled. They said that displaced Abu Ghraib residents would be reluctant to return and live amid neighbors who they perceived as a potential threat. ¶5. (SBU) ISF representatives said that the ongoing presence of IDPs in the area facilitates terrorist attacks because it is relatively easy for perpetrators to hide among a population not well known to the community. They added that it is difficult for security forces to determine who is a legitimate IDP, who fled to the area because they are a fugitive elsewhere, and who is a terrorist hiding amid a transient population. One tribal leader said that the lack of tribal structure amid the IDP population in Abu Ghraib makes it more difficult for security forces to police the area. He explained that when security incidents occur in a community with strong tribal structures, the tribe usually knows who perpetrated the attack and can enforce disciplinary measures within its rank and file. He added that under such circumstances security forces could cooperate with tribal leaders, who would police their kin, rather than policing the entire populace. Another tribal leader said that without the presence of such a large displaced population in the area it would be difficult to perpetrate an attack within a tribe's area of influence because the community could easily spot an outsider. He said that since IDPs came from different areas and different tribes, it is more difficult for security forces or indigenous tribal leaders to police the community in their traditional way. Squatters Occupy Potential Returnee Homes ¶6. (SBU) Abu Ghraib participants said that in addition to real and perceived security threats posed by IDPs in the area ,the IDPs also present an obstacle to returns by squatting in homes vacated by those who fled. Tribal participants said that some returnees would be reluctant to evict squatters lest they or their homes be targeted in revenge attacks. ISF participants acknowledged that a number of attacks on returnees and their homes occurred in late 2008 but said the attacks were less inspired by the returns themselves than by the way the former Iraqi Army commander in charge of the area, General Nasser, used returns for propaganda and to demographically engineer the area. Note: In the end of 2008 Qdemographically engineer the area. Note: In the end of 2008 General Nasser and his notoriously pro-Shia Muthanna Brigade escorted dozens of Shia returnees back into the predominantly Sunni area and abruptly evicted Sunni squatters, many of them legitimate IDPs who were unable to return to their homes. Some speculated that General Nasser was engineering returns to build a "Shia wall" as a last line of defense along the border of predominantly Shia Baghdad and predominantly Sunni Anbar. Several dozen returnee houses were bombed amid the highly publicized returns, eventually prompting U.S. and Iraqi forces to impose a halt to all IDP returns to the area. Most of the house bombings were apparently designed to avoid injuries; many returnees received letters warning them to vacate their homes before the explosions, while other house bombings occurred after squatters were evicted but before returnees moved back in. General Nasser was transferred to another area and in January of 2009 U.S. and Iraqi forces lifted the ban on returns and established a process of screening and registering returnees to avoid another series of destabilizing attacks. Returnees were required to present their jinsiya (national identity card),shahadat jinsiya (nationality certification),ration card, residency card and BAGHDAD 00001981 003.2 OF 004 either a deed or a rental agreement to prove their identify and demonstrate prior residency in the area. Returnees were required to have their documents inspected by a representative of the nahia (neighborhood) council, qada (district) council, the Iraqi Police and the Iraqi Army. Nahia and qada council representatives would determine whether the potential returnee was actually from the area and Iraqi Police and Army representatives would determine whether there were arrest warrants for anyone on the ration card. Once all four entities approved the return, ISF inspected the returnee home to make sure it was structurally sound and not booby trapped. They also cleared out weapons caches and evicted squatters. Returnees were notified once their homes had been inspected and deemed suitable for return. Returnees then received paperwork allowing them to pass through checkpoints with their furniture. Without such paperwork, ISF would not allow passage to or from the area with furniture because of the widespread looting that accompanied displacement and returns. End note. ¶7. (SBU) Abu Ghraib representatives said that many Shia IDPs displaced from Abu Ghraib are currently living in makeshift shelters in the Chicook IDP cluster in Kadhamiya (northwest Baghdad),while Sunnis displaced from Kadhamiya are squatting in vacated homes in Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib qada council chairman Kamel Abbas suggested the same group meet with representatives from Kadhamiya's district council, sheikh councils and neighborhood councils to discuss organizing the voluntary return of IDPs between the two areas. Note: On July 16, MoDM Director General Samir Nahi told USAID/OFDA rep that Deputy Prime Minister Essawi's office will host a meeting with representatives from Abu Ghraib, Kadhamiya, MoDM and IFCNR next week. OFDA rep spoke to Kadhamiya district council members last week about the possibility organizing returns between the two areas and they seemed interested in cooperating. End note. Participants Discuss Next Steps ¶8. (SBU) Deputy Prime Minister Essawi's representatives asked Abu Ghraib participants about gaps in essential services in Haswa and said they would enlist support by line ministries to improve electricity, water, health care and schools in order to attract returns. Abu Ghraib Qada Council Chairman Kamel Abbas and Qa'em Maqam (the governor's representative in the qada) Shakir agreed to provide a detailed assessment of service needs by next week. MoDM representatives invited qada council members to the MoDM Karkh Returns Assistance Center July 19 to discuss organizing a mass registration of those who have already returned to Abu Ghraib. USAID/OFDA implementing partner International Medical Corps (IMC),which staffs the MoDM Karkh Returns Assistance Center and manages much of its operation, said it will arrange a visit by the center's mobile team to Abu Ghraib following the July 19 visit. Registering returnees with MoDM entitles them to a one million dinar (about $800) stipend and supporting documentation to facilitate the transfer of ration cards, re-registration of children in public schools, and return to government jobs. MoDM Says Abu Ghraib Sheikhs Agreed to Guarantee Returnees' Security, Forgive Tribal Blood Debt ¶9. (C) MoDM Director General for Humanitarian Affairs Q9. (C) MoDM Director General for Humanitarian Affairs Samir Nahi told OFDA rep July 16 that he attended a tribal reconciliation conference in Abu Ghraib the previous day along with representatives from Essawi's office, Prime Minister Maliki's office, Baghdad Provincial Council, Baghdad Governorate, the IFCNR-appointed Abu Ghraib Support Council, the Abu Ghraib Tribal Council, and other Abu Ghraib community leaders. Nahi said the tribal leaders signed an agreement to guarantee the security of returnees in their areas and to refrain from taking revenge on returnees with whom their tribes have blood debt. Nahi said the tribesmen agreed to provide a copy of the agreement to the Prime Minister's office. Note: An agreement by Abu Ghraib's tribes to refrain from taking revenge on returnees with whom they have blood debt represents a milestone that could create the confidence necessary for returns to Abu Ghraib to gather momentum. Tribes are probably better situated to guarantee returnees' security that Iraqi Security Forces in some areas of Abu Ghraib, both because they have more influence over their rank and file and because they pose the primary threat to some potential returnees. End note. ¶10. (C) Nahi said that he told the group he would task the BAGHDAD 00001981 004.3 OF 004 Karkh Returns Assistance Center with coordinating with Abu Ghraib's community leaders to register returnees who have already returned to the area. He said the ministry will allow even those who had not registered as IDPs to register there as returnees and that the ministry would work to expedite registration through repeat mobile team visits. Note: Nahi's pledge is welcome and USAID/OFDA will follow up with the Karkh Returns Center and IMC mobile team staff to ensure follow through. Mobile registration drives in other areas have experienced mixed success, depending on how well community leaders spread the word about what documentation is required and where and when the registrations will take place. End note. Comment ¶11. (C) MoDM representatives and Essawi's staff appear to have secured the necessary support from local government, community leaders, ISF and tribesmen to gain traction with an organized return to Abu Ghraib. Essawi's office appears prepared to enlist line ministries to support the effort, but the pressure will be on for quick, tangible improvements. Abu Ghraib representatives said repeatedly that they wanted action rather than empty promises. Significant work remains to be done before returns commence. MoDM has still not begun an intentions survey to determine where there is interest in returns to Abu Ghraib or returns of IDPs in Abu Ghraib to their original locations. Returnees from extremely poor areas like Chicook IDP cluster will likely need more material support than the Government of Iraqi is equipped to quickly provide, including shelter rehabilitation, rent subsidies, income generating projects, and legal services. USAID/OFDA, REF, ePRT and the U.S. military will continue to follow the initiative closely and are prepared to provide support. End comment. FORD