SPEAKER OFFERS KIRKUK SOLUTION, PESSIMISTIC ON UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001964

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SPEAKER OFFERS KIRKUK SOLUTION, PESSIMISTIC ON UK
AGREEMENT

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: Ayad al Samarraie, Speaker of the Iraqi
Council of Representatives (CoR),suggested a possible
solution for the issue of Kirkuk and upcoming national
elections during a meeting with Ambassador Christopher Hill
on July 17, 2009. Samarraie suggested a temporary governing
council with quotas for Arabs, Kurds, Turcomen and
minorities, a strategy he said that the UN endorsed, but
would require international pressure on the Kurds to succeed.
Samarraie also shared his thoughts on coalition strategies
for the Iraqi Islamic Party and a pan-Shia party. He said it
would be hard to get a large enough quorum to vote on the UK
or the NATO Agreements, not only because of Sadrist
opposition, but also because of weak party discipline and
MPs' summer-season apathy. He assured Hill that he would
whip the MPs as much as he could, and work with the deputies,
but he remained pessimistic. Samarraie also outlined a
series of economic woes, including budget shortfalls which
were affecting Sahwa payments, the lack of a supplemental
budget and the difficulty of arranging the GE payments. He
noted, however, that he would try to push the four pending
U.S.-Iraqi economic agreements through the voting process.
The Hydrocarbons Law, he reported, was being held up by the
Kurds, who wanted to bundle it with other related
legislation.

Kirkuk
--------------


2. (C) Samarraie discussed Kirkuk and its problems for the
national elections law. Referencing the 2005 law and the
Article 23 Committee extensively, Samarraie noted that the
law remained on the books; now, a special law was needed for
Kirkuk provincial elections, to prevent interference with the
national elections law. He said that the UN preferred a
"council" with quotas representing the Kurds, Arabs,
Turcomen, and other minorities, to address the power-sharing,
land restitution, and other thorny issues, for one four-year
electoral term only.


3. (C) Samarraie opined that the Arabs, the Turcomen, and the
UN accepted the quota-council solution, but he also said he
doubted Kurdish acceptance of the plan. Samarraie suggested
two options. The first involved putting the quota-council
arrangement to the CoR for a vote, which he said would
probably pass, but then Kurdish President Jalal Talabani also
probably would veto it. The second option was to use
"international influence" to convince the Kurds to accept the
temporary arrangement.


4. (C) When Samarraie solicited Ambassador Hill's thoughts on
these choices, Hill noted that little would be accomplished
until after the KRG elections, but that a temporary solution
might be helpful. Samarraie allowed that former SRSG Stefan
di Mistura also had said little would be possible until after
the KRG elections. No solution, Hill stressed however, should
disenfranchise the voters. Hill further stressed that the
solution must be an Iraqi-led solution, a point with which
Samarraie vociferously agreed. Samarraie said that the U.S.
should not be out in front, but that it could can play a
supporting role, helping to push forward an emerging
consensus. Special Advisor Brett McGurk noted that the aim
was to get the main political leaders, including Talabani,
who has shown flexibility in private on the Kirkuk issue,
together and in agreement, thereby isolating the hard-line
position of KRG President Massoud Barzani. Samarrraie added
that if the international community and UNAMI advised the
Kurds on the wisdom of such an approach, the Kurds would be
more likely to cooperate. Samarraie concluded by stating
Qmore likely to cooperate. Samarraie concluded by stating
that if the U.S. didn't think this solution would work, it
should say so, and the CoR would not waste time on it, but
pursue other strategies.

Party/Bloc Strategies
--------------


5. (C) Samarraie described IIP strategies for the upcoming
national elections. The first option included building an
alliance among the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),
Dawa, the Kurdish parties and Tawafuq, but noted that the he
was not optimistic that such an alliance would be fruitful.
The second option was an alliance among tribal parties,
former PM Ayad Allawi and other secular groups, and perhaps
the Kurds. Samarraie said he thought this path was more
likely.


6. (C) He noted that the Shia seemed to prefer a Shia
alliance, with a few Sunni members. He said he thought that
a pan-Shia alliance, like the first IIP option, would
probably replicate many of the same mistakes of the past four

years. When Samarraie sought the Ambassador's analysis of
these alliances, the Ambassador stressed the importance of
cross-sectarian and issues-based coalitions, and the ability
of more groups to join the political process.


7. (C) Samarraie sought assurances about the direction of
U.S. engagements. He said that all the political groups were
preparing for elections and watching U.S. actions closely.
He noted that all the parties would be affected by the U.S.,
Iran, Arab neighbors, and Turkey, and that the parties would
arrange their alliances according to these varied
international influences. The Ambassador assured Samarraie
that the U.S. would not pick a winner, but that it would
support the institutions and the processes. The Ambassador
further noted that it was a positive sign that no one
community (Shia, Sunni, Kurd) was likely to win a governing
mandate alone and would have to build an issues-based
coalition.

UK, NATO, and U.S. Bilateral Economic Agreements
-------------- ---


8. (C) Samarraie was not optimistic about the vote on the UK
training agreement. He concurred when the Ambassador stressed
the importance of the agreement for the security of Iraqi oil
platforms in the Gulf. Samarraie said that the Sadrists had
told him they were under direct orders from Moqtada al Sadr
to block the agreement. At the Ambassador's questioning, he
allowed that Moqtada's orders could well be at the behest of
Tehran. He also opined that it was not just the Sadrists,
some members of ISCI (including Humam Hamoudi, who absented
himself from Iraq during voting on the U.S. SA and SFA) and
Osama Najaifi (Tawafuq) also stood to walk out.


9. (C) At Hill's urging, Samarraie said he would whip Tawafuq
members to be present, and that he had spoken with Second
Deputy Speaker Arif Tayfur to get maximum Kurdish attendance.
He also said that Barzani would have to weigh in. When asked
about First Deputy Speaker Khalid al Attiya, Samarraie said
that he thought perhaps Solidarity Bloc leader Qassim Daoud
might have more influence on the independents, but also that
many of the MPs did not care. Moreover, he said, the blocs
were disintegrating, there was no party discipline and many
MPs knew they would not be returning until after the summer
season. Samarraie predicted that the NATO agreement would be
treated in the same manner if presented to the CoR.


10. (C) When asked about the draft law ratifying four
U.S.-Iraq economic agreements pending since 2005, Samarraie
assured Hill that he would try to push them through the
voting process. When the Ambassador inquired about the
hydrocarbon framework law, Samarraie noted that the Kurds had
blocked it in committee by insisting that the law be bundled
with all the other hydrocarbons-related laws.

Budget Woes and GE Payments
--------------


11. (C) Samarraie reported a number of budget woes facing the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and other ministries experiencing
shortfalls. He reported that that Mohamed Salman, director
of the Implementation and Follow-up Committee on National
Reconciliation (IFCNR),complained to Samarraie that Sahwa
payments in some provinces were now two months in arrears
because of insufficient funds. Samarraie also said the MOF
had not submitted a supplemental budget to the CoR although
it was due by the end of May. The General Electric payments
issue was creating difficulty for the MOF, but Samarraie
offered some possible solutions. These solutions included a
letter from the Central Bank guaranteeing the bonds would be
non-transferrable (NFI),amending the 2009 budget law, or a
Qnon-transferrable (NFI),amending the 2009 budget law, or a
supplemental budget. Samarraie said he thought the first
solution to be the most workable. Although there is currently
an amendment to the budget law in the CoR, Samarraie noted
again the difficulties of obtaining a quorum and thought a
supplemental budget would be unlikely before September.
FORD