PRIME MINISTER MALIKI'S VISIT: LAUNCHING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001932 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2024 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER MALIKI'S VISIT: LAUNCHING THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Prime Minister Maliki returns to Washington for the first time since July 2006, having grown in three years from the feckless neophyte other leaders thought they could control, to a proven leader, who those same leaders now purport to fear. Maliki believes, unlike his Green Zone rivals, that he has legitimate and popular support as a national and unifying figure -- having taken on the Shia extremist Jaysh al-Mahdi, built ties to Sunni tribal leaders, and succeeded beyond expectations in local elections. He is now seeking to build a broad national alliance to compete in national elections. On this visit, Maliki will be seeking to deepen Iraq's long-term partnership with the United States, building normalized ties in security and non security areas, with bilateral relations governed by the Security Agreement (SA) and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA),which he hopes to be the trip's focal point. He will also seek U.S. support internationally and at the United Nations, fearing plots from neighboring Sunni states to keep Iraq weak, divided, and paying for Saddam's Crimes, through Chapter VII restrictions and debt burdens. -------------- ENHANCING STABILITY THROUGH ENDURING TIES -------------- ¶2. (C) The Prime Minister's visit comes three weeks after U.S. combat forces withdrew from Iraqi cities under the Security Agreement. The event has proven to be a psychological watershed for Iraqis, the first major on-the-ground milestone in fulfilling the U.S. commitment to withdraw forces from Iraq. Maliki told us he would use this event to begin making the case inside Iraq for a long-term relationship with the United States, beyond security and military areas, and he has begun to do so. Maliki told the Ambassador on July 16 that if this trip had a title he hopes it is "Launching the Strategic Framework Agreement." He hopes to hear that Iraq remains a priority for the United States, that the United States is committed to the SA and SFA, and that we are thinking of Iraq as a long-term partner and ally. The visits this year by the Secretary of State and the Vice President have helped set the right foundation, and his visit can drive it home. Assuring Maliki and all key political leaders that the United States views Iraq as a long-term partner can help them broker compromises on outstanding political issues, such as disputed internal boundaries. Pressure alone does not work, and often works against our interests, as the different groups return to their sectarian corners and harden their bargaining positions. Maliki sees the U.S. relationship as the key to unlock the relationship with Sunni Arabs. ¶3. (C) Maliki will raise the issue of Chapter VII obligations and outstanding debts and claims in most of his meetings. We do not believe he is sectarian, yet his bitterness at the Sunni Arab world is palpable. He considers Iraq and in particular the Shia community to be the primary victims of Saddam -- losing a member of his family and fleeing the country as Saddam was being supported and bolstered by Saudi Arabia and other key Arab states. He saw the international community rise to force Saddam out of Kuwait only to turn away as Saddam slaughtered tens of thousands of Shia in southern Iraq. With this history, for Maliki and most of the post-Saddam Qthis history, for Maliki and most of the post-Saddam leadership it is in their view a gross injustice that they are now saddled with paying tiny Kuwait billions of dollars in compensation and remain under Chapter VII restrictions dating to 1990. They understand they represent Iraq and have obligations to meet, but they want to hear that we understand their plight (and that we will help them on Chapter VII issues pursuant to Article 25 of the SA). With this understanding and assurance, Maliki should be encouraged to "help us help him" on Kuwait and other issues by embracing the way forward proposed by former SRSG Staffan de Mistura, and by working with us in the UN Security Council on Iraq's remaining Chapter VII obligations. -------------- -------------- MALIKI'S STATE OF MIND: A NATIONAL LEADER, OR BUST BAGHDAD 00001932 002 OF 004 -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Maliki is the compromise political candidate who has grown into his job, much to the consternation of his rivals. He is greatly constrained by the system of checks and balances under the Iraqi constitution, especially when combined with the ethno-sectarian division of spoils from the December 2005 elections. He controls at best a handful of the 275 seats in parliament. Key members of his delegation to Washington, such as Minister of Interior Bolani, are openly competing to unseat him from power. Key members his cabinet, including his two deputies (one Sunni, one Kurd) routinely conspire against him and seek to block his initiatives; other ministers answer to their political parties, not to him -- yet he lacks legal authority to build a cabinet or fire ministers. Maliki chafes at this state of affairs and has sought to compensate for it by using his constitutional authority as "Commander in Chief" to bolster his command of Iraqi Security Forces. While his rivals cite this as an example of "dictatorial" tendencies, the picture is far more complicated, and he is by no means the Saddam-in-the-making those rivals suggest. ¶5. (C) Maliki hopes to build a national alliance (Shia, Kurd, Sunni) to compete in elections, and win a majority that would allow him to build a cross- sectarian government and advance an ambitious economic agenda. He believes he has popular support for such a move, and recently visited Anbar Province to burnish his credentials with the new tribal-based Sunni leadership there. His tenure in power, however, has given rise to so many opponents and antibodies that his ability to forge such an alliance is questionable. Pressure from his Shia bedfellows, and from Iran, are also pushing the Shia parties together again, to compete in a grand sectarian-based coalition that will protect the only Shia Arab state from the Sunni world. Maliki and his primary political advisor Sadiq Rikabi tell us repeatedly that he wants to break away from this alliance, but without any strong Sunni or Kurdish partners, he probably cannot do so. The Sunni and Kurdish "Green Zone" set, for their part, are trapped in an "anyone but Maliki" mindset -- and may be forcing the Shia back together, since nobody but Maliki appears to have the strength or determination to break away. ¶6. (C) It is unclear what Maliki will do if the Shia Alliance reconstitutes, particularly if he is not guaranteed the premiership after the January elections. While he clearly wants to stay in office, he has begun in recent weeks to discuss (perhaps only half in jest) retiring to his farm south of Baghdad and growing watermelons. Maliki tells us he does not want to use the U.S. visit to bolster his political credentials in Iraq, and instead hopes to bolster enduring long-term ties between the United States and Iraq that will outlast successive Iraqi and U.S. administrations. He takes great credit for starting this process, by closing the SA and SFA, and he hopes to establish real traction on both before he leaves office or begins a new term. He has said he plans to pay tribute to U.S. sacrifice, through a wreath laying at Arlington and through public remarks before and during the trip. (Note: The Arlington visit is locked; the public remarks have yet to be seen. End Note.) Whatever Maliki's long-term future, this will likely be his last official visit to Washington during his Qbe his last official visit to Washington during his tumultuous term as Prime Minister -- a term that has spanned a horrific sectarian war, the surge, and now relative stability. -------------- BUILDING TOWARDS NATIONAL UNITY -------------- ¶7. (C) The Prime Minister over the past 90 days has sought to stabilize the political environment through regular meetings with parliamentary blocs, the Presidency Council, and other key leaders, such as the Chief Justice and Speaker of Parliament. He has pledged to support an agenda under the "Government Reform Document" that passed near unanimously through the parliament, supported mainly BAGHDAD 00001932 003 OF 004 by Maliki's political rivals. He has told us quietly that he fully supports the political issues we continue to press: the UNAMI DIBs process; SOI integration; hydrocarbons reform. But he complains that public statements decrease his maneuvering room and makes any compromise appear to be at the behest of American pressure, the death knell for any leader here. He will be eager to address his plans on these and other issues in the meetings with U.S. officials, but hopes in public to advance a message of normalization and enhancement of ties across all civilian fields (education, economics, culture, trade) as our military forces draw down. It will be helpful for Maliki to hear that we understand his constraints, but expect him to lead, particularly on the issue of disputed internal boundaries. ¶8. (C) Disputed internal boundaries is one of several issue that could derail Iraq's progress over the next 12 months. We can emphasize our strong line with Massoud Barzani -- but expect Maliki to follow our efforts by appointing serious and high- level negotiators to participate in the UNAMI process. Maliki must also be mindful of the perception created when security operations target local Sunni political leaders (such as happened recently in Diyala). When reminded of this, Maliki will point to statistics that Iraqi forces round up Shia detainees at an outsized ratio to the population (demonstrating, in his view, the non- sectarian nature of his policies),and that nearly nine in 10 of MNF-I detainees were Sunnis (but nobody accused MNF-I of being sectarian, he says). The facts, however, matter far less than the perception, and Maliki can do a better job at enhancing the transparency of security operations, particularly sensitive ones that target high profile local leaders. Mistreatment of detainees and overcrowding in Iraqi prisons and detention centers has also angered Sunni and Shia communities. Maliki has responded positively to complaints, but he will be judged by the extent of his follow-through. -------------- -------------- REGIONAL RELATIONS: STRAINED IN THE BEST OF TIMES -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Maliki sees potential enemies surrounding Iraq and believes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, and Iran, seek to keep Iraqi fractured, weak, and divided. (Note: This is one reason he seeks tangible signs of a long-term security relationship with the United States, such as through sale of M1-A1 tanks, and F16s. End Note.) He likens the situation to Germany after 1919, and believes Iraq is unfairly being asked to pay for the sins of Saddam (and being branded as a danger to the neighborhood six years after Saddam's fall). He has sought outreach and built solid relations with Turkey, Jordan, and most recently with Egypt (although follow through on the latter has yet to be seen). He has promised to personally handle the Kuwait issue and broker a compromise, telling us he is "willing to accept injustice" and stand up to a popular tide of opinion running against Kuwait's public efforts to keep a Gulf War compensation scheme in place (under which Iraq pays $2 billion per year to Kuwait). On Saudi Arabia, Maliki has hit a brick wall with King Abdullah, and openings appear closed, at least until after national elections in January. Maliki complains about Fatwas from Mecca justifying the killing of Shia under Koranic law -- and Abdullah Qkilling of Shia under Koranic law -- and Abdullah complains about Maliki as a leader who can't be trusted and is too close to Iran. The big unanswered question is whether (Maliki or no Maliki) King Abdullah can ever accept a Shia Prime Minister in Baghdad with popular support and legitimacy among the Shia masses here. While we need to pressure Maliki to keep reaching out to the Sunni Arab states (even if he needs to hold his nose) we must also press Sunni Arab leaders to establish a diplomatic presence in Baghdad and work with Maliki on issues of mutual interest. It is their absence which could ultimately drive Iraq into Iran's sphere of influence; as of now, Iraq is seeking to tilt slowly but surely towards the west, the Arab world, and global integration. -------------- BAGHDAD 00001932 004 OF 004 COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Like most leaders here, Maliki is imperfect at best, but he has managed over three years to do things nobody thought he could -- and he expects some credit for the remarkable turnaround in Iraq's fortunes since the dark days of 2006. His overall mindset of hope beset with paranoia reflects the general population here: fiercely proud and independent, yet fearful and isolated, haunted by the past, unsure about the future, surrounded by interventionist neighbors, and trying against the odds to overcome two generations of social and economic dislocation, foreign wars, and internal violence. A message that the United States stands with the Iraqi people and seeks to transform our bilateral relationship -- from decades of hostility, to occupation, and now to a genuine partnership based on respect and mutual interests -- will be extremely well received. It will help Iraqi leaders build towards durable political compromises and further take the steam out of those few remaining groups willing to take up arms against U.S. forces and the Iraqi state. HILL