Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD188
2009-01-26 03:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SECOND MEETING OF JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS

Tags:  MOPS MARR MASS PREL IZ 
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VZCZCXRO4690
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0188/01 0260310
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260310Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1383
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000188 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2019
TAGS: MOPS MARR MASS PREL IZ
SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING OF JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS
COORDINATING COMMITTEE (JMOCC) CONFIRMS PROCESS DESPITE
DISTRACTIONS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 0082

B. BAGHDAD 00149

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000188 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2019 TAGS: MOPS MARR MASS PREL IZ SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING OF JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COORDINATING COMMITTEE (JMOCC) CONFIRMS PROCESS DESPITE DISTRACTIONS REF: A. BAGHDAD 0082 ¶B. BAGHDAD 00149 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (U) Summary. On January 19, the United States and the Republic of Iraq conducted the second meeting of the Joint Military Operations Coordinating Committee (JMOCC),a military operations steering committee established under the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA). Consistent with the first JMOCC, the Iraqis used a substantial portion of the meeting to resolve internal organizational issues, including the Minister of Defense,s (MinDef,s) replacing the co-chair of the joint subcommittee on Provincial Security (PS),National Security Advisor representative Dr. Hamza Sharif Hasan, with Air Force General and Vice Chief of Staff Nasier Abadi. MinDef also announced that General Babakir, co-chair of the Military Operations, Training, and Logistic Support (MOTLS) JSC, will be replaced for future meetings by LTG Ali, Iraq Ground Forces Commander. Though no explanation was given for this change, it is likely due to Babakar,s direct advisory role to the MinDef as the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. ¶2. (U) Despite the slow start, the JMOCC has established a good foundation and appears to have successfully imprinted on the Iraqis the JMOCC and joint subcommittee (JSC) procedure and process. The test will come with the third meeting of the JMOCC, to be held during the first week of March, during which the JMOCC for the first time is scheduled to deal with substantive issues. End Summary. ¶3. (U) The second meeting of the Joint Military Operations Coordinating Committee (JMOCC) convened at the Camp Blackhawk Conference Center, International Zone, on January 19. The meeting was co-chaired by General Raymond Odierno, Commanding General of MNF-I, and Iraqi Minister of Defense Abd al-Qader al-Mufriji, assisted by U.S. SA Secretariat Director Major General (MG) Timothy McHale, Iraqi SA Secretariat Director MG Mohammed Askari, PolMil Counselor Michael Corbin, and PM Senior Advisor Ambassador Jackson McDonald. The meeting was attended by key leaders and deputies representing the sub-committees under the JMOCC as well as the staffs of the respective secretariats. ¶4. (C) Following brief opening remarks by General Odierno and Iraqi MinDef Abd al-Qader, just as
with the inaugural JMOCC meeting on January 8, the Iraqis spent about 40 minutes engaging in protracted internal political discussions, chiefly over the role of the National Security Advisor,s office (NSA) as chair of the joint subcommittee for Provincial Security. MinDef al-Qader argued that if the NSA wishes to be the lead GOI rep to that subcommittee, then for protocol reasons NSA Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie should co-chair, that is, the NSA should send a co-chair of commensurate rank with the U.S. Overruling NSA representative Dr. Hamza Sharif Hasan,s objections, the MinDef announced Hasan,s replacement as co-chair of the joint subcommittee for Provincial Security (PS) to be Air Force General Nasier Abadi, Vice Chief of Staff, claiming he was not usurping the Prime Minister,s orders on responsibilities. (Note: Dr. Rubaie was out-of-country during this JMOCC meeting; it will be informative whether MinDef,s replacement of Dr. Hamza holds firm when Rubaie returns. End Note.) MinDef also announced that General Babakir, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and co-chair of the Military Operations, Training, and QForces and co-chair of the Military Operations, Training, and Logistic Support (MOTLS) JSC, will be replaced for future meetings by LTG Ali, Iraq Ground Forces Commander. Though no explanation was given for this change, it is likely due to Babakir,s direct advisory role to the MinDef as the COS of the Armed Forces. ¶5. (U) The remainder of the meeting proceeded according to form. The agreed minutes of the inaugural JMOCC meeting were ratified. All four JSCs had held organizational meetings, and the co-chairs presented their reports. ¶6. (U) LTG Lloyd Austin, co-chair of the Military Operations, Training, and Logistic Support (MOTLS) JSC, with his co-chair General Babakir, noted the MOTLS JSC,s mandate is to provide the operating framework for issue resolution and shaping of US/GOI combined military objectives, policies and procedures that ensure achievement of the full spectrum of military operations. He noted that the JSC is not a forum for the discussion of each and every issue and would not interfere with normal chain of command, where most operational decisions are to be made. ¶7. (U) MG Guy Swan, the co-chair for the JSC on Green Zone Security, in collaboration with his Iraqi co-chair, General Faruq al-A,araji, Director of the Prime Minister's military staff, the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC),noted that a joint operational plan is in place with the Baghdad BAGHDAD 00000188 002 OF 002 Brigade and that integrated joint command centers had been established. Badging, entry/exit control, and the Iraqi,s requirement for existing specialized equipment are issues to be reviewed over the next several months. On March 31, the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) training process will be assessed, and training will either be extended or the certification process will begin. ¶8. (U) BG Kurt Stein, the U.S. co-chair for the Vehicles, Vessels, and Aircraft Movement (VVAM) JSC, in cooperation with LTG Abdullah, informed that the implementation of Article 9 will occur in three phases: short, medium and long-term. Iraqi ground forces are working well with U.S. Forces and a good relationship exists. The Navy and sea movement is new and the transition will be longer; likewise, air space transition will take longer and the GOI will need U.S. assistance. ¶9. (C) RDML David Buss, the U.S. co-chair of the JSC for Provincial Security (PS),noted that the PS JSC replaces the former Joint Committee for the Transfer of Security Responsibility (JCTSR). Citing the JCTSR,s work over the past several years and the return of thirteen provinces to Iraqi Provincial Iraqi control prior to December 31, 2008, RDML Buss stated that the JSC would continue to assess and make recommendations regarding the remaining five provinces, but he also noted the PS JSC has yet to determine its objectives and goals. (Note: This JSC is not called for in the SA. There is concern from the U.S. side that the PS JSC holds firm to making assessments and not infringes on matters that belong to military operations; multiple committees dealing with the same or similar issues must be avoided. End Note.) ¶10. (C) Comment. As with the first JMOCC meeting, the MinDef and the Iraqi participants were less than fully prepared and engaged in what should have been internal discussion for much of the meeting. The JMOCC process nevertheless appears to be working. Despite the still unsettled matter regarding the Iraqi co-chairs of both the VVAM and PS JSCs, all of the JSCs managed to hold their initial meetings and report back to the JC. Most importantly, Iraqi buy-in to the process appears to be occurring; there is general consensus as to the role of the JMOCC as a supervisory/review committee over the JSCs and that most issues should be resolved at the lowest level, either in the JSCs or through bilateral discussions. Now that the JMOCC and its JSCs have moved beyond the introductory phase, the test will come when the JMOCC and JSCs tackle real issues. End Comment. CROCKER

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