PROMINENT SHIA CLERIC IN WASIT CRITICIZES SADRIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001832 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: PROMINENT SHIA CLERIC IN WASIT CRITICIZES SADRIST LOCAL GOVERNMENT Classified By: Classified by PRT Team Leader Kevin Blackstone for Reaso ns 1.4 (b and d). This is a PRT Wasit reporting cable. ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: On June 27, Provincial Reconstruction Team Wasit officers met Said al-Khateib, a prominent Shi'a cleric and one of two personal representatives of Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in Wasit province. They discussed local governance issues, national elections in January 2010 and security concerns after the June 30 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities. Al-Khateib criticized Sadrist-dominated municipal governments across Wasit for funneling services and investment away from areas of Sistani supporters. He agreed to PRToff's request to use his influence in Numaniyah to educate Iraqi citizens about the June 30 pullback and the fact that Iraqis would still see U.S. forces in urban areas on a variety of missions. This was the first time al-Khateib agreed to meet PRT representatives, and he emphasized that the meeting did not change Ayatollah Sistani's "quietist" policy of not cooperating or speaking directly with the U.S. and Coalition Forces (CF). Nonetheless, al-Khateib said that Sistani had approved the meeting. It appears that tensions between Sadrist-controlled municipal governments in Wasit and Sistani's supporters have led al-Khateib to seek outside help to improve services and encourage institutional reform in Wasit. End Summary and Comment. ¶2. (C) PRT Wasit officers traveled to Numaniyah, the second-largest town in Wasit, on June 27 and met with Said al-Khateib, one of the most prominent Shia clerics in Wasit and one of two personal representatives of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in the province. This was the first time a PRT representative had met with al-Khateib, and only the second time since 2003 that he has agreed to see American officials. Al-Khateib welcomed engagement with the PRT on reconstruction and capacity-building issues. He deplored the lack of transparency, corruption and favoritism in provincial councils across Wasit, and complained that while he supported democracy and representative government, Iraq's current leaders, at both the national and provincial level, were more interested in political intrigues and personal gain than governing the country and looking after the interests of their constituents. Al-Khateib urged the U.S. to use its influence to promote an "open list" ballot system in the January 2010 elections. The cleric said that "this one simple thing" would go a long way toward increasing transparency in Iraqi government and politics. ¶3. (SBU) Al-Khateib said Numaniyah's municipal authorities, dominated by Sadrists and led by an ex-Sadrist mayor, systematically excluded Sistani neighborhoods from public works projects and essential services, and put up obstacles to NGO investment. He cited various examples such as new school construction, healthcare infrastructure construction, and road paving/trash collection. Mercy Corps, a U.S.-funded NGO, had met previously with al-Khateib and discussed possible projects in Numaniyah's Sistani neighborhood; however city officials subsequently blocked further action and channeled investment toward Sadrist areas. The cleric said that he had just donated a substantial sum of money for construction of a new hospital for the Sistani districts. Al-Khateib said that he understood the PRT had to work through the existing, elected municipal government regarding reconstruction assistance, but urged PRToffs to engage with community organizations as well to ensure that all districts Qcommunity organizations as well to ensure that all districts received assistance and were not inadvertently excluded. ¶4. (C) Al-Khateib expressed concern over recent attacks in Baghdad and elsewhere and questioned whether Iraqi Security Forces were fully prepared to assume primary responsibility in urban areas after June 30. He told PRToffs that he would be pleased to see American forces remain in the cities for a longer period if it increased safety and security. He agreed to PRToff's request to use his influence in Numaniyah to educate Iraqi citizens about the June 30 pullback and the fact that Iraqis would still see U.S. forces in urban areas on a variety of missions-including escorting PRT personnel to meetings and projects. Al-Khateib said certain elements were willfully misinterpreting the agreement to foment anger toward coalition and Iraqi forces, and that others were simply poorly educated and uninformed about what the date meant since politicians had unfortunately co-opted it for their own purposes. ¶5. (SBU) Bio Note: Al-Khateib's oldest son was murdered by Jaish al-Mahdi elements in 2005 in an internet caf in Numaniyah. Many local Sistani supporters wanted to form a militia and carry out revenge attacks in reprisal for the killing, but al-Khateib, speaking at his mosque, disavowed BAGHDAD 00001832 002 OF 002 vengeance and forbade his supporters to engage in violence, stating that it would not bring back his son and only lead to more senseless bloodshed. This stance earned the cleric increased respect from many Iraqis in Wasit, but also alienated some followers inclined to meet violence with violence. HILL