Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD1817
2009-07-07 10:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
PM ADVISOR RIKABI UPBEAT ON VP BIDEN VISIT
VZCZCXYZ0014 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGB #1817/01 1881019 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 071019Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3819 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001817
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS: IZ
SUBJECT: PM ADVISOR RIKABI UPBEAT ON VP BIDEN VISIT
Classified By: Special Advisor Brett McGurk for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001817
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS: IZ
SUBJECT: PM ADVISOR RIKABI UPBEAT ON VP BIDEN VISIT
Classified By: Special Advisor Brett McGurk for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Prime Minister Maliki was pleased with Vice President
Biden,s visit overall and welcomes U.S. support behind the
scenes on reconciliation matters )- in particular with
Arab-Kurd disputes, PM Advisor Sadiq Rikabi told Special
Advisor McGurk July 6. Rikabi also discussed his plan for
advancing the reconciliation process, and why public rhetoric
sometimes conflicts with internal actions and deliberations.
Public pressure, however, will decrease the space for the
Prime Minister and other leaders to move toward compromise.
Rikabi also asked to discuss a proposed schedule and agenda
for Maliki,s upcoming visit to Washington. End Summary.
--------------
FOUR SPECIFIC REACTIONS: ALL POSITIVE
--------------
2. (C) Rikabi said the Prime Minister was extremely pleased
with the visit and was &especially encouraged8 by four
specific points the Vice President made in his meeting and
public remarks. First, it is essential that we move swiftly
to activate the Strategic Framework Agreement. Rikabi
explained that with the success of the Security Agreement and
the June 30 withdrawal the Prime Minister is now emphasizing
the need for a longer-term relationship beyond the presence
of U.S. forces. He was pleased that the Vice President noted
the SFA in his remarks and hopes the Maliki visit to
Washington can build on the good atmosphere. Rikabi added
the PM and his team are committed to working closely with
Secretary Clinton and her staff on an agenda for the
discussing the SFA.
3. (C) Second, the commitment of the new administration to
the &letter and spirit8 of both agreements is vital and
will help all Iraqi leaders move forward with a long-term
relationship. He said there is still skepticism over U.S.
intentions, commitment, and follow through. But the success
of June 30 and the statements along the lines of those made
by the Vice President are beginning to dispel those doubts.
Third, the Chapter VII issue is critical to Iraq overcoming
the legacy of Saddam Hussein and the Vice President
mentioning the issue in his points had a positive impact.
The Prime Minister wants to work very closely with us to
finally remove Iraq from Chapter VII oversight particularly
on the Kuwait issue, Rikabi said. Finally, the Prime
Minister welcomed the approach the Vice President outlined on
national reconciliation: the United States in support,
helping where requested, and sharing the same objectives;
defusing Arab-Kurd tensions; supporting the UNAMI process;
ensuring SOI integration; and cooling the overall atmosphere
in the run-up to national elections.
--------------
EXPLAINING SPOKESMAN,S COMMENTS
--------------
4. (C) In explaining some of the apparent statements made by
Spokesman Ali al-Debbagh -- that reconciliation is an
&internal affair8 and U.S. mediation is not welcome --
Rikabi said Debbagh would be issuing a statement to clarify
his remarks. (Debbagh did in fact issue an official
statement July 5.) Rikabi explained that the Prime Minister
is politically vulnerable on the most difficult
reconciliation issues, including in particular the issue of
de-Ba,athification reform. In the Iraqi mind, Rikabi said,
when Americans speak of the need for &reconciliation,8 it
evokes the idea that Americans want to bring back the Ba,ath
Party in a reconstituted form. He noted that few Shi,a
leaders ever used the word before 2006 and even now it needs
to be carefully explained and understood so as to avoid
Qto be carefully explained and understood so as to avoid
causing mistrust between the Iraqi people (especially the
Shi,a) and the American side. He further claimed that
Ba,ath leaders in Syria and elsewhere are claiming the
United States has a new policy towards Iraq: moving away from
democracy and concentrating on stability, which they read as
a signal the Americans are open to supporting the party
coming back to power. He said Maliki supports the principles
of de-Ba,athification reform but could never support the
return of the Ba,ath as an entity in any form. He said the
Prime Minister sought assurance that we shared this vision.
McGurk assured Rikabi that the U.S. shares the same goals.
Rumors of the U.S. wishing to bring the Ba,ath Party back in
some reconstituted form are baseless. Rikabi said it would
help if we could make this point publicly.
5. (C) On overall media coverage of the visit, Rikabi was
concerned by the narrative that U.S. commitment to Iraq was
&conditional8 on various political steps being taken. He
said the Prime Minister will have less political space and
maneuvering room if the perception is painted that he is
acting at the behest of U.S. pressure -- or to activate
agreements that are already in place and binding on both
sides. At the same time, the Prime Minister wants to assure
the U.S. side (and hopes he did so with the Vice President)
that he shares our same vision and is working on
reconciliation issues, with the emphasis being the Government
Reform Document passed by the parliament -- together with the
SA and SFA -- in November 2008. The Prime Minister, Rikabi
said, has &got the message8 and he knows there is work to
do, but he lamented that the obstacles right now are placed
primarily by Massud Barzani. Rikabi confirmed again that the
Prime Minister is ready to head to the KRG to meet with
Barzani as soon as an invitation is extended. He reaffirmed
the Prime Minister,s request for assistance with Barzani on
the issue of delaying the proposed constitutional referendum
in the KRG.
--------------
PM VISIT TO WASHINGTON IS THE NEXT STEP
--------------
6. (C) For the visit to Washington, the Prime Minister said
he hopes to emphasize the SFA and the benefits to the United
States of a strong bilateral relationship. Rikabi reported
Maliki was pleased Secretary Clinton was available for the
HCC. He would like to lay a wreath at Arlington Cemetery to
pay tribute to &shared sacrifice8 -- and emphasize how
activating the vision outlined in the SFA could honor the
sacrifices both our countries have made. In addition, he
offered a proposed schedule of events based on the dates and
parameters we provided earlier in the week.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C) The visit and internal messages appear to have been
received by the Prime Minister. Public statements rejecting
U.S. interference or pressure are nothing new (recall Maliki
saying prominently in October 2006: &I am not America,s man
in Iraq8). Maliki, like all Iraqi leaders, believes he must
assert strength and independence in order to ultimately make
compromises and move the process. What is important is the
internal conversations and a shared agenda which we can then
quietly push forward. While some of the media coverage
suggesting U.S. pressure or &threats8 has been unfortunate
(and inaccurate),we have advanced the goal of setting a
shared agenda on reconciliation issues --Arab-Kurd tensions,
DIBs, SOI integration.
HILL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS: IZ
SUBJECT: PM ADVISOR RIKABI UPBEAT ON VP BIDEN VISIT
Classified By: Special Advisor Brett McGurk for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Prime Minister Maliki was pleased with Vice President
Biden,s visit overall and welcomes U.S. support behind the
scenes on reconciliation matters )- in particular with
Arab-Kurd disputes, PM Advisor Sadiq Rikabi told Special
Advisor McGurk July 6. Rikabi also discussed his plan for
advancing the reconciliation process, and why public rhetoric
sometimes conflicts with internal actions and deliberations.
Public pressure, however, will decrease the space for the
Prime Minister and other leaders to move toward compromise.
Rikabi also asked to discuss a proposed schedule and agenda
for Maliki,s upcoming visit to Washington. End Summary.
--------------
FOUR SPECIFIC REACTIONS: ALL POSITIVE
--------------
2. (C) Rikabi said the Prime Minister was extremely pleased
with the visit and was &especially encouraged8 by four
specific points the Vice President made in his meeting and
public remarks. First, it is essential that we move swiftly
to activate the Strategic Framework Agreement. Rikabi
explained that with the success of the Security Agreement and
the June 30 withdrawal the Prime Minister is now emphasizing
the need for a longer-term relationship beyond the presence
of U.S. forces. He was pleased that the Vice President noted
the SFA in his remarks and hopes the Maliki visit to
Washington can build on the good atmosphere. Rikabi added
the PM and his team are committed to working closely with
Secretary Clinton and her staff on an agenda for the
discussing the SFA.
3. (C) Second, the commitment of the new administration to
the &letter and spirit8 of both agreements is vital and
will help all Iraqi leaders move forward with a long-term
relationship. He said there is still skepticism over U.S.
intentions, commitment, and follow through. But the success
of June 30 and the statements along the lines of those made
by the Vice President are beginning to dispel those doubts.
Third, the Chapter VII issue is critical to Iraq overcoming
the legacy of Saddam Hussein and the Vice President
mentioning the issue in his points had a positive impact.
The Prime Minister wants to work very closely with us to
finally remove Iraq from Chapter VII oversight particularly
on the Kuwait issue, Rikabi said. Finally, the Prime
Minister welcomed the approach the Vice President outlined on
national reconciliation: the United States in support,
helping where requested, and sharing the same objectives;
defusing Arab-Kurd tensions; supporting the UNAMI process;
ensuring SOI integration; and cooling the overall atmosphere
in the run-up to national elections.
--------------
EXPLAINING SPOKESMAN,S COMMENTS
--------------
4. (C) In explaining some of the apparent statements made by
Spokesman Ali al-Debbagh -- that reconciliation is an
&internal affair8 and U.S. mediation is not welcome --
Rikabi said Debbagh would be issuing a statement to clarify
his remarks. (Debbagh did in fact issue an official
statement July 5.) Rikabi explained that the Prime Minister
is politically vulnerable on the most difficult
reconciliation issues, including in particular the issue of
de-Ba,athification reform. In the Iraqi mind, Rikabi said,
when Americans speak of the need for &reconciliation,8 it
evokes the idea that Americans want to bring back the Ba,ath
Party in a reconstituted form. He noted that few Shi,a
leaders ever used the word before 2006 and even now it needs
to be carefully explained and understood so as to avoid
Qto be carefully explained and understood so as to avoid
causing mistrust between the Iraqi people (especially the
Shi,a) and the American side. He further claimed that
Ba,ath leaders in Syria and elsewhere are claiming the
United States has a new policy towards Iraq: moving away from
democracy and concentrating on stability, which they read as
a signal the Americans are open to supporting the party
coming back to power. He said Maliki supports the principles
of de-Ba,athification reform but could never support the
return of the Ba,ath as an entity in any form. He said the
Prime Minister sought assurance that we shared this vision.
McGurk assured Rikabi that the U.S. shares the same goals.
Rumors of the U.S. wishing to bring the Ba,ath Party back in
some reconstituted form are baseless. Rikabi said it would
help if we could make this point publicly.
5. (C) On overall media coverage of the visit, Rikabi was
concerned by the narrative that U.S. commitment to Iraq was
&conditional8 on various political steps being taken. He
said the Prime Minister will have less political space and
maneuvering room if the perception is painted that he is
acting at the behest of U.S. pressure -- or to activate
agreements that are already in place and binding on both
sides. At the same time, the Prime Minister wants to assure
the U.S. side (and hopes he did so with the Vice President)
that he shares our same vision and is working on
reconciliation issues, with the emphasis being the Government
Reform Document passed by the parliament -- together with the
SA and SFA -- in November 2008. The Prime Minister, Rikabi
said, has &got the message8 and he knows there is work to
do, but he lamented that the obstacles right now are placed
primarily by Massud Barzani. Rikabi confirmed again that the
Prime Minister is ready to head to the KRG to meet with
Barzani as soon as an invitation is extended. He reaffirmed
the Prime Minister,s request for assistance with Barzani on
the issue of delaying the proposed constitutional referendum
in the KRG.
--------------
PM VISIT TO WASHINGTON IS THE NEXT STEP
--------------
6. (C) For the visit to Washington, the Prime Minister said
he hopes to emphasize the SFA and the benefits to the United
States of a strong bilateral relationship. Rikabi reported
Maliki was pleased Secretary Clinton was available for the
HCC. He would like to lay a wreath at Arlington Cemetery to
pay tribute to &shared sacrifice8 -- and emphasize how
activating the vision outlined in the SFA could honor the
sacrifices both our countries have made. In addition, he
offered a proposed schedule of events based on the dates and
parameters we provided earlier in the week.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C) The visit and internal messages appear to have been
received by the Prime Minister. Public statements rejecting
U.S. interference or pressure are nothing new (recall Maliki
saying prominently in October 2006: &I am not America,s man
in Iraq8). Maliki, like all Iraqi leaders, believes he must
assert strength and independence in order to ultimately make
compromises and move the process. What is important is the
internal conversations and a shared agenda which we can then
quietly push forward. While some of the media coverage
suggesting U.S. pressure or &threats8 has been unfortunate
(and inaccurate),we have advanced the goal of setting a
shared agenda on reconciliation issues --Arab-Kurd tensions,
DIBs, SOI integration.
HILL