DEMINING DEADLOCK STARTING TO GIVE WAY?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001798 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/I/POLMIL, NEA/I DEPT ALSO FOR PM/WRA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2019 TAGS: IZ KHDP PARM PGOV PREL PTER UNDP SUBJECT: DEMINING DEADLOCK STARTING TO GIVE WAY? REF: BAGHDAD 1700 BAGHDAD 00001798 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Acting Political-Military Affairs Counselor W. S. Reid f or reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Iraqi ministries nudged closer July 1 to signing an interagency agreement (MOU) that would allow humanitarian demining to continue in Iraq. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) ordered the cessation of demining activities in December 2008 citing security concerns, but subsequent bureaucratic turf battles have turned the temporary freeze into a protracted, de facto ban. The UN mounted pressure on the GOI to lift the de facto ban during May and June, while the Embassy engaged all sides to craft a workable solution. The UN's push culminated July 1 when UNAMI Acting Special Representative of the Secretary General (A/SRSG) Andrew Gilmour "strongly urged" the MOD to allow demining to restart before a 50-person audience of government officials, international funders, and news media. Deputy Minister of Environment (MOEnv) Dr. Kamal Latif told the same gathering that the need was urgent and that MOEnv stood ready for action. GOI internal players say they now see two likely outcomes: either a flawed MOU giving MOD excessive power or a reaffirmed deadlock that will increase international scrutiny and require the PM's attention. This debate could lead us to a policy decision in the near future. End summary. An Imperfect Solution is Likely -------------- ¶2. (C) The impasse exists because the draft MOU that would unlock the de facto ban also gives MOD the right of first refusal over demining operations and could therefore impede international support that is humanitarian in nature. Senior MOD Advisor Major General Mohan al Furayji has said he will insist on a MOU that gives the MOD vast authority over demining, telling emboffs June 26 that the Iraqi military was solely responsible for, and very capable of, demining Iraq. Other actors see a way forward: Deputy Minister of the Environment Latif privately confirmed July 1 that the MOD had been intransigent and dismissive of civilian involvement during internal negotiations, but MOEnv was likely to sign a flawed MOU if need be. UNDP representative Kent Paulusson advised against conceding to MOD demands but ultimately concluded that immediate progress was needed to salvage humanitarian demining in Iraq. Latif and Paulusson agreed to a strategy that, if the flawed MOU is signed, then Iraqi NGOs, MOEnv, and UNDP would start cooperative, visible operations to demonstrate their technical ability, and subsequently seek to improve the legal arrangements. How Pressure Built Up -------------- ¶3. (SBU) During the first half of 2009, Iraqi ministries jockeyed to shape future demining operations. Emboffs reminded GOI officials repeatedly during this negotiation period that failure to reach an agreement was hampering U.S.-funded humanitarian programs and imperiling their future. The Weapons Removal and Abatement Office (PM/WRA) supports demining with grants to NGOs and contracts to companies that total USD20 million per year. During April and May, emboffs also engaged the UNDP and our grantees to devise ways to build official and public support for demining programs. Consultations intensified during a multi-agency UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT) visit from May 15 - 19. Emboffs joined the UNMAT May 17 for a meeting with GOI's Drug and Qjoined the UNMAT May 17 for a meeting with GOI's Drug and Demining Coordinating Committee chaired by Ali Abd al Amir al Yassery, a senior advisor to the PM. The UNMAT and NGO representatives made it clear they would increase the public and institutional pressure on GOI, while we emphasized that U.S.-funded demining programs needed to operate normally -- and soon -- or funds risked being re-programmed elsewhere. From Impasse to MOD Power Play -------------- ¶4. (C) After the UNMAT visit, al Yassery told emboffs May 27 that the Prime Minister's Office had called for the MOD, MOEnv, and Ministry of Interior (MOI) to negotiate an agreement that would re-establish a mine action authority and a demining policy council, both under the MOEnv. Al Yassery promised a MOU within weeks. However, MOD modified the proposed resolution to give itself extensive oversight, authority to vet all demining companies, and veto power over all demining projects and organizations. Paulusson told emboff June 23 of his special objection to clause 2(a) calling for MOD's "participation on boards of directors" of BAGHDAD 00001798 002 OF 002 private companies (to include NGOs),which he said would deter demining in general and contravene international norms, laws, and corporate bylaws in specific. This dispute has left the MOEnv and MOD mired in stalemate, though with a flawed MOU ready to be inked if MOEnv concedes. Scrutiny Increases, MOD Sees No Benefit in Compromise -------------- -------------- ¶5. (U) International news reports on the demining deadlock appeared June 2 and quoted UNDP's criticism that GOI's de facto ban had failed to prevent human suffering or improve Iraq's economic and agricultural prospects. The articles singled out MOD for blame and cited claims that corrupt officials were trying to "get a cut from international aid budgets." A July 2 AP Wire story on A/SRSG's comments increased attention to the de facto ban. In June engagements with GOI officials, emboffs cited not only international concerns and prospects of lost funding, but also media scrutiny. ¶6. (C) Senior MOD Advisor MG Mohan has not budged. MG Mohan welcomed emboffs on June 26 to discuss stalled demining operations and asserted that the Iraqi military should perform or otherwise control all demining operations and that international organizations doing humanitarian demining were seeking to benefit themselves. MG Mohan claimed that the military knows where all explosive remnants of war (ERW) are located and has the know-how and capacity to remove them. MG Mohan stated that he was not asking for money and did not need help. (Comment: In the same breath, however, MG Mohan said that the U.S. should "give equipment and training to us," instead of to the NGOs. End comment.) MG Mohan claimed to have information on terrorists infiltrating some NGOs and criticized the NGO that PM/WRA helped create, and has since supported, the Iraqi Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO),but provided no evidence to substantiate these claims. ¶7. (C) Comment: The Embassy now is considering how to diversify the deployment of PM/WRA resources as we simultaneously develop an approach to encourage GOI to lift the de facto ban on humanitarian demining. MG Mohan's suspicions about our grantee IMCO, whether genuine or personally motivated, will not go away. PM/WRA will likely have to shift resources among our Iraqi grantees and develop new projects, such as in the KRG where NGO demining is welcome. MG Mohan's significant influence as chief advisor to MinDef has made the ban on humanitarian demining durable. Even if MG Mohan drops his objections to international involvement, a more difficult problem to overcome may be broader skepticism within GOI of NGOs in general (reftel). MOD resistance may need to be met with sustained efforts to explain humanitarian demining, as we also consider the effectiveness of engagement at higher levels. If the MOD-backed MOU is signed and UNDP and local NGOs accept half a loaf by working within its framework, we face the dilemma of a U.S. policy not to abide by "prevailing local practice" by pulling back programs or to join international funders in seeming to support a policy that could ingrain GOI bias against NGOs and limit our longer term demining assistance options. End comment. HILL