S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000172

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS IZ IR
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN TUZ

Classified By: PRT Team Leader Richard Bell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

(U) This is a PRT Salah ad Din reporting cable.


1. (S) Summary: Iranian influence in the Salah ad Din (SaD)
district of Tuz Khormatu derives from the district's high
proportion of Shi'a Turcoman residents, its relative
proximity to Iran and its position as a north-south and
east-west crossroads. Coalition Forces (CF) believe the
district to be a transit sector for Iranian weapons and a
rest-and-refit area for extremists. Shi'a political parties
are active in Tuz, including Sadrists, ISCI, and the Prime
Minister's Da'wa party; ISCI in particular is seen by Kurds
and Sunni Arabs as a conduit for Iranian influence. Concern
about Iran shared by Kurds and Sunni Arabs in Tuz could form
the basis of some cross-ethnic political cooperation. End
summary.

Tuz Demographics
--------------


2. (C) Tuz Khormatu is a mixed district in SaD province, to
the east of the Hamrin "mountain" range, bounded to the
north by Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah and to the southeast by
Diyala; the latter two provinces border Iran. The best
estimates put the Kurdish population at roughly one quarter
of the district, with the balance evenly divided between
Turcomans and Sunni Arabs. Although the exact proportion is
unclear, Shia Turcomans outnumber their Sunni counterparts..
The district sits astride the road between Baghdad and
Kirkuk, and it also serves as a transit point for east-west
traffic, including weapons, commercial goods, and individuals
from Iran. Tuz is not so much an area where attacks take
place, as a district where extremists go to rest and refit,
and through which they transport weapons. However, some
attacks do occur there, mostly against Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) and civilian Iraqi officials.

Iranian Weapons Trafficking
--------------


3. (S) CF intelligence reporting indicates that Tuz is a
transit corridor for weapons from Iran coming in through
Diyala, and then through Tuz to other areas. This
trafficking is generally connected to fuel smuggling. One
RKG (a sophisticated

anti-tank grenade) probably of Iranian
origin was found in a recent cache, and there was an attack
last fall on a US convoy that also involved a RKG. Last
spring CF lost a soldier to an Explosively Formed Projectile
(EFP) which is also believed to have come from Iran. CF's
No. 1 target in Tuz is a purported Special Groups leader, but
he does not seem to spend very much time in Tuz -- reports
are that he spends most of his time in Iraq in Baghdad or
Karbala.

Shi'a Politics in Tuz
--------------


4. (S) ISCI is viewed by many Kurds and Sunni Arabs as a
primary conduit for Iranian influence in the Tuz area. The
most prominent component of ISCI in Tuz is the Badr
Organization -- the heir to the former paramilitary wing of
ISCI, the Badr Brigades. Qahtan Taher Qadir (strictly
protect), the KDP Assayish chief in Tuz, has alleged that two
Iraqi Police officers, Capt. Falah Hassan Mustafa and Col.
Ahmed Ali Hassan, are examples of unqualified individuals who
returned from exile in Iran and received lucrative government
positions solely due to their connections to ISCI and Iran.


5. (S) Sadrist presence in Tuz continues but limited detail
is available about specific linkages with Iran. Fawzi
Akram Samin Tarzi, a Sadrist COR member, while listed in the
embassy roster as representing Suleimaniyya governorate, is
originally from Tuz and is seen by locals as a Tuz resident.
He has also been linked in some CF reporting to Special
Groups activities. However, two police chiefs in the
QGroups activities. However, two police chiefs in the
district have reported to the PRT representative in Tuz that
Mr. Fawzi receives special treatment from the Ministry of
Interior (MoI) in the form of extra Iraqi Police drawn from
Tuz to protect him in Baghdad. While the Sadrists seem to
have only limited appeal among Turcoman Shi'a in Tuz, the Tuz
PRT representative has seen Sadrist paraphernalia including
posters for the ostensibly peaceful Sadrist social
organization, the Mumahidoon.


6. (C) As in Shi'a areas throughout Iraq, PM Maliki appears
to be making significant inroads with the electorate. KDP
sources told the PRT that the Prime Minister's Rule of Law
list is likely to be the top Shi'a recipient of votes in
the area and third overall. Signs featuring Rule of Law
candidates are commonly seen in Tuz city while ISCI and
Sadrist posters are rare, at best. The rise of Maliki can be

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seen as a sign of popular dissatisfaction with Iran, since
Shi'a voters generally give the PM credit for taking a
relatively independent stance toward Tehran.

Kurds and Iranians
--------------


7. (C) Many of the PRT's Kurdish and Sunni Arab contacts in
Tuz have complained about Iranian influence, and the
local PRT representative has received reports that two
district council members have close Iranian connections. Not
all of these complaints are directed toward the Shi'a: one of
the council members mentioned is a Shi'a Turcoman affiliated
with ISCI/Badr but the other is a Kurd currently with the
PUK. KDP leaders in Tuz sounded like downright
Iraqi nationalists when they complained to the PRT about
Iranian influence locally and within the national government.
Sunni Arabs in Tuz have expressed the usual suspicions
regarding Iranian and Shi'a domination of Iraqi politics to
both CF and the local PRT representative.

Comment
--------------


8. (S/NF) Iran's actual influence in Tuz is limited by
widespread suspicions of Iranians from all elements of
society,
including the Shi'a. Nevertheless, strong fears of Iranian
domination provide a rare point of agreement across ethnic
lines, particularly between Kurds and Sunni Arabs. A UNAMI
source confided to the PRT that senior Kurdish leaders have
already accepted that Tuz will almost certainly not become
part of Kirkuk Province (or the KRG). While local Kurds have
not yet acquiesced to this, the anti-Iranian sentiment they
share with the Sunni Arabs may provide a basis of political
cooperation if they remain in predominantly Sunni Arab SaD
province. End comment.
CROCKER