VP HASHIMI ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001707 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS IZ SUBJECT: VP HASHIMI ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ELECTIONS Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 22 meeting, Vice President Hashimi told the Charge he was concerned that upcoming withdrawals of U.S. combat forces from urban centers would lead to a deterioration of security, possibly mandating a return of U.S. forces in some areas. The Vice President expressed support for the idea of transferring all detainees held by the GOI to MOJ custody, but stopped short of offering to raise the idea directly with PM Maliki. In a moment of particular candor, Hashimi admitted he was ashamed of Iraq's human rights record and said "we need help" to improve it. Hashimi was equivocal on preparations for the 2010 elections, and predicted sectarian voting blocs, reminiscent of 2005, could reemerge. On developments in Iran, Hashimi expressed sympathy for the demonstrators, but expected the Iranian government to crush them. Hashimi, just back from Turkey, claimed credit for a Turkish decision to triple the amount of Euphrates river water flowing downstream. End summary. -------------- Troop Withdrawals -------------- ¶2. (C) The Charge told the Vice President the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from urban centers was proceeding on schedule. So far, the total number of U.S. occupied combat bases and security posts in the cities had dropped from 397 to 330, and would reach zero by the end of June. Hashimi sought confirmation that U.S. troops would be on stand-by in bases near the cities, on hand to assist Iraqi security forces if needed. The Charge affirmed that they would, but underlined that any such help would have to be formally requested by the GOI. Hashimi predicted that security conditions would deteriorate. ¶3. (C) Citing recent terrorist attacks - in Battha, Dhi Qar province, in Taza, near Kirkuk, and, just that day, in Abu Ghraib, West Baghdad, the Vice President expected that events would prompt a GOI request for U.S. troops to remain, at least in certain areas. The Charge asked VP Hashimi whether Iraqis would be surprised, after 30 June, by the sight of U.S. military training and support elements who will continue to be visible on the streets of Iraq's city's after 30 June. Hashimi thought the Iraqi public, focused mainly on the withdrawals, might indeed be surprised by this sight. The VP also asked whether private security contractors would still be visible, and the Charge affirmed that they would, as they protect Embassy diplomats, as well as other international institutions. -------------- Human Rights - Addressing Detainee Problems -------------- ¶4. (C) The Charge told the Vice President the Embassy was concerned about the status of thousands of detainees in Iraqi government custody. There seems to be a particular problem with detainees in Ministry of Defense custody, who are not receiving legal due process and are often held in inhumane conditions, the Charge added. The Embassy would like to see all detainees brought under Ministry of Justice supervision - would the Vice President support such an idea? "I fully agree, but will the Prime Minister?" Hashimi responded. ¶5. (C) Human rights and detainee matters are becoming a more prominent issue, he added, saying he intended to write to Vice President Abdel Mahdi about the idea. The Vice President suggested it would be useful if Minister of Human Rights Wijdan Salim broached the idea directly with Prime Minister Maliki, and also thought the UN might play a QMinister Maliki, and also thought the UN might play a constructive role. (Comment: Apparently reflecting Hashimi's very cool relations with Maliki, the VP notably did not say he would himself broach the idea with the PM. End comment.) The Charge welcomed Hashimi's suggestions and said the Embassy would follow up on them. ¶6. (C) In his most candid remarks of the meeting, Hashimi said he was ashamed of Iraq's human rights record (and noted recent UN human rights reports on Iraqi detainees),saying it was a national problem rather than a sectarian problem. He has seen Shi'a officials mistreat Sunnis, but has also seen Shi'a mistreat Shi'a and (in Anbar for example) seen Sunnis mistreat Sunnis. "We need help," to come to grips with Iraq's poor human rights record, Hashimi underlined. -------------- Elections Outlook -------------- ¶7. (C) The Charge asked Hashimi if he had any information on the status of the 2010 election law whose passage is becoming important. Hashimi said he was unaware of any parliamentary activity on the law, though he was sure they would get to it "at some point." The Charge emphasized that the U.S. thought it important that work start soon, so that the elections can take place on time in mid-January, and added that the U.S. believed an open list ballot would be preferable - enhancing the transparency of the process and accountability of the candidates to the electorate. Most important, he underlined, is the holding of elections by the end of January. ¶8. (C) The Charge also asked Hashimi how he saw, looking forward, Iraqi political blocs coalescing in advance of the elections. The Vice President said he expected that if the United Iraqi Alliance (which grouped Maliki's Da'wa together with ISCI and Shi'a independents) was reconstituted (after ISCI and Da'wa's falling-out in 2008),Sunni and Kurdish coalitions would follow suit - resulting a repeat of the sectarian competition that marked the 2005 national elections. ¶9. (C) Hashimi thought that Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq's most influential, yet reclusive, Shi'a leader, preferred to see cross-sectarian cooperation among political blocs. The Charge suggested that the Sunnis might consider sending an emissary, perhaps Sunni Waqf President Sheikh Ahmed Abdal Ghaffour al-Samara'ie, to visit Sistani and explore common ground, but Hashimi was dismissive, noting Sheikh Ahmed has already launched his own political movement (and, for good measure, is claiming he has American support, which we discounted). -------------- Iran -------------- ¶10. (C) Asked about developments in Tehran, Hashimi said he felt sympathy for the demonstrators, but expected that they would be crushed by a government crackdown "unless the West intervenes." He added that President Obama "has not been clear" on where the U.S. stands on the crisis in Iran, and, given the advance of technology, couldn't accept that there was a dearth of information about what is really happening there. The Charge responded that the U.S. has been clear - we want to see a fair and transparent process in Iran: in a sense who wins is less important than the credibility of how they win. -------------- Turkey/River Water -------------- ¶11. (C) Vice President Hashimi, who had recently returned from Turkey, boasted that he had convinced the Turks to increase the downstream flow of Euphrates water from 300 cubic meters/second to 700. Though satisfied for the interim, Hashimi believed that the UN should become involved in regulating what is, ultimately, an international legal issue, not merely a bilateral or multilateral concern. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Having stepped down last month as Secretary-General of the IIP, Hashimi seemed even more detached (though at the same time more cheerful) than usual. Despite his high profile position, our sense is that Hashimi has spent more time complaining (especially to the U.S.) about problems and perceived injustices than in harnessing the power of his office to do anything about him. We doubt he will stay on as Vice President when the new government is formed following the 2010 elections. As his interest seems to diminish, Ayed Samarraie, the Parliament Speaker, will also take on a more important role representing Sunni Arab concerns in the government. End comment. FORD