KRG PARLIAMENT PASSES CONSTITUTION CERTAIN TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001702 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2024 TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET PHUM IZ SUBJECT: KRG PARLIAMENT PASSES CONSTITUTION CERTAIN TO RAISE ARAB-KURD TENSIONS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP) has unexpectedly passed a constitution for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),and approved its going to a referendum on July 25. The draft contains a number of provisions that may conflict with the Iraqi constitution. Politically, the draft (which has been published on web-sites) will ratchet up Arab-Kurd tensions. For example, it calls the KRG "a republic" and defines several disputed areas as being part of the KRG. The draft also allows President Barzani to serve up to an additional two terms of office. We are pressing KRG authorities to delay holding a referendum on the new constitution. END SUMMARY. -------------- The constitution lurches to life -------------- ¶2. (C) On June 22, after several months in which the draft KRG constitution languished in the IKP Special Committee tasked to write it, the Committee issued a final draft, distributed it to media and posted it on the Internet. On June 23, IKP members agreed to hold a yes-no vote on the Constitution. President Talabani's Political Advisor Jalal al-Mashta told PolOff on June 24 that, with just one month until the IKP elections, there is strong political will for PUK-KDP to deliver something tangible to its people - a constitution. On June 24, of the 110 living members of the IKP, 96 voted to approve the Constitution; one voted no. Seven IKP members who have aligned themselves with Nawshirwan Mustafa's "Change" list boycotted the session and did not vote. -------------- Contradictions and Provocations -------------- ¶3. (C) Several provisions of the draft constitution may conflict with the Iraqi constitution and worsen Arab-Kurd tensions. The most politically charged of these provisions pertain to security, hydrocarbons, and disputed internal borders. A few examples are: - Geographic Definition of Kurdistan: The draft defines the KRG as including, in addition to its three undisputed provinces, Kirkuk and districts of Aqrah, Shaikhan, Sinjar, Talkayf, Qaraqush, and the townships of Zumar, Ba'sheeqa, and Aski Kalak from Nineveh Province, districts of Khanaqeen and Mandali from Diyala province "with its administrative border before 1968." (The draft specifies, however, that the borders of the region will be determined by the Article 140 process.) Most of these areas are disputed. UNAMI's mediation of KRG-Government of Iraq (GOI) negotiations on these territories has just begun. - Powers to Direct Security Forces: The draft empowers the KRG authorities to send the Peshmerga or Kurdish Regional security forces on a mission outside of the Region, with the approval of the Parliament of Kurdistan. This could be interpreted as vesting the IKP with the power to deploy security forces south of the Green Line without explicitly providing for coordination with the Iraqi federal government. Such coordination is key, as the Iraqi Constitution gives the Iraqi Prime Minister (PM) the power to order Kurdish forces to withdraw at least from areas south of the green line. - The draft allows the Kurdistan authorities to "allow federal armed forces (Iraqi Army--IA) to enter Kurdistan territory when necessary, after obtaining the approval of the Parliament of Kurdistan ...". The GOI constitution provides QParliament of Kurdistan ...". The GOI constitution provides for the exclusive power of the federal government over matters of national security. The PM has the constitutional authority to deploy the IA anywhere in Iraq, so long as the deployment comports with the GOI constitution. Neither provincial nor regional governments can unilaterally limit the PM's authority as Commander of the Armed Forces. - Hydrocarbons: The draft empowers the KRG authorities to manage exploration, production, management, development, sales, marketing and export activities. This could be interpreted to mean that the KRG will export and sell its own oil and gas. This appears to be a step backward and will create problems with ongoing negotiations on the draft Hydrocarbons Framework Law of 2007. -------------- Possible Internal Political Implications -------------- ¶4. (C) Some provisions of the newly approved KRG Constitution seem intended to address internal KDP/PUK political issues and current President Barzani's tenure as president. For example, the draft states that "(the President) may be reelected for a second time from the day of entry into force of this Constitution." This provision appears to permit President Barzani to serve what amounts to three terms as President; he has already served one, from 2005-2009. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) Although the constitution appears to have returned suddenly to life largely for internal KRG political reasons, it may do great damage to relations between the KRG and the rest of Iraq. The draft refers to the KRG as a "republic," which will surely be interpreted by Iraqi nationalists as an expression of separatism. The inclusion, by definition, of many of the disputed areas into the KRG will be viewed as preempting the UNAMI Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) process. The stipulation that the borders will still be determined by the Article 140 process is unlikely to mollify non-Kurds. Other provisions that conflict with the national constitution likely will raise the temperature of Arab-Kurd relations. Although there has been no official reaction yet to the draft outside the KRG, the fact that the provocative draft constitution has been posted on the Internet and distributed to media makes a sharp reaction only a matter of time. In their shortsightedness, Kurdish leaders fail to see how their provocative constitution may ultimately undermine the very provisions of federalism in the Iraqi constitution that they have fought to maintain and implement ) including the Article 140 provisions that they believe are so essential to their region's future. -------------- State of Play -------------- ¶6. (C) Given the potential for the draft constitution to cause acute damage to Arab-Kurd relations, the Embassy has been working to prevent it from being put to a referendum. On June 24, Charge told Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh, who was campaigning in Sulaymania, that the Constitution appeared likely to cause problems with the Baghdad government. He urged Saleh to move the KRG to postpone the referendum until at least January so that the Baghdad and Erbil governments could have time to review the texts quietly and avoid open disputes. Saleh discounted the likelihood of inconsistencies with the federal constitution. He pointed to the citation of the Article 140 process defining the Kurdish Region borders, for example. He added that were the Baghdad government to signal its disagreement with the proposed Kurdish constitution, public support in Kurdistan for the document would increase. (Comment. Meanwhile, KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani is avoiding out phone calls knowing what our message is. End Comment) On June 24, KRG Minister of External Relations Falah Mustafa promised PolOff that he would bring the points of contention to KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani's attention, but feared it was too late to address them. President Talabani's Advisor Aram Yarwessi argued, on June 23, that the "sticky parts" of the constitution can always be amended later and what was most important was to have a product for the election campaign. In a discussion with RRTOff, Adnan Mufti, IKP speaker, brushed off any potential contradictions between the KRG and GOI Constitutions, encouraging us to "read it (the Constitution) QConstitutions, encouraging us to "read it (the Constitution) carefully, you'll see that it is fine." ¶7. (C) On June 25, Prime Minister Maliki's advisor Sadiq Rikabi told Charge that he had seen the text. He wondered why the central government should continue with discussions about disputed internal boundaries when the Kurdish constitution appears to assign all the disputed areas to the KRG. There were other problematic issues in the text, Rikabi said, but the Baghdad government was not making its dissatisfaction publicly known. Charge agreed that there were important issues that had to be discussed between Baghdad and Erbil. He urged Rikabi to use his influence to keep the disagreements out of the media and to focus instead on quiet discussions with the Kurdish leadership. ¶8. (C) Technically, Iraq's High Electoral Commission (IHEC) requires a minimum of 60 days to hold a referendum. Even though IHEC has not received any official letter from IKP to hold a referendum on July 25, RRTOffs believe that IHEC will conduct the referendum, which would involve printing an extra ballot and providing an additional ballot box at polling stations. UNAMI A/SRSG Gilmour told EmbOffs on June 24 that UNAMI had warned IHEC that it would be impossible to conduct a referendum on such short notice. UNAMI acknowledged, however, that IHEC was not obliged to follow UNAMI's advice (although it has in the past). UNAMI sources have heard that KRG officials are working quickly to remove any potential logistical or technical obstacles that might hinder IHEC's supporting the referendum on July 25. FORD