DIWANIYAH ELECTION UPDATE: PREPARATIONS ON TRACK,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000165 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR IZ SUBJECT: DIWANIYAH ELECTION UPDATE: PREPARATIONS ON TRACK, CAMPAIGNING INTENSE Classified By: PRT Team Leader Michael Klecheski for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). This is a PRT Diwaniyah reporting cable. ¶1. (C) Summary: Diwaniyah provincial election authorities are doing well with preparations for the upcoming election, despite playing catch-up on a few details. Based on an informal PRT poll and other data, much of the public seems comfortable with details of the voting process and intends to vote. Posters for many parties and candidates are evident in Diwaniyah city, casting doubt on accusations that the Governor's forces and his ISCI party are ensuring that only their own posters may be hung. A prominent sheikh complained that ISCI is engaged in widespread bribery but hastened to add that he and other sheikhs were working to counter ISCI's effort; our interlocutor was among several contacts who felt Da'wa had a decent shot at victory. End Summary. IHEC Preparations Advancing -------------- ¶2. (C) Diwaniyah Governorate Electoral Office (GEO) chief Hasan Kadhem Al-Waa'li, who has made himself available to us with some regularity in the run-up to the election, met with us again on January 19 for an update on preparations. His office continues to receive the official voter information sheets but has yet to receive the voter lists, which are expected to arrive in Iraq from the UK soon and then to be delivered by truck from Basra, under ISF escort. Ballots are expected to arrive in Basra on or about January 25, and will be delivered directly to the GEO warehouse in Diwaniyah, where they are to be kept under guard. They are to be distributed to the province's twenty-one GEO field offices (formerly voter registration offices) on January 27-29 under ISF and IHEC escort, and then to be delivered to the province's 243 polling centers. Plans are in place for IHEC staff to begin setting up for the voting on the eve of election day; staffers will spend the night at the polling centers to have everything ready when the polls open. ¶3. (C) GEO chief Hasan, while insisting that most of the preparations are in place, expressed concern about the availability of electricity in many voting centers, particularly in rural areas. Noting that IHEC had offered only flashlights to conduct the vote count if electricity were cut off to the centers, he said he needed small generators to ensure that the lights are on when the counting takes place. Bio Note on Chief Hasan -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite funding shortfalls and staffing issues in his office, Hasan is always ready to engage as time permits, is a capable manager, and functions independently without inappropriate influence from provincial or national officials. Though we suspect that he personally favors religious parties, at no time has he displayed such a preference in the execution of his official duties as GEO. His ability to cultivate and maintain relationships with key provincial officials, including Diwaniyah's governor (ISCI) and MG Uthman, commander of the Eighth Division of the Iraqi Army (headquartered just outside the provincial capital of Diwaniyah),have enabled him to at times unite opposing factions in order to meet the needs of his office. Voter Education -------------- ¶5. (C) Seeking to get a better handle on the public's interest in voting and knowledge of the voting procedures, the PRT asked our locally employed staff to informally poll Diwaniyah city residents. Although the sampling size was small (52 respondents),it included people representing a range of professional and economic backgrounds. The Qrange of professional and economic backgrounds. The respondents generally indicated that they were comfortable with voting procedures: 71 percent said they understood those procedures, and almost as many reported knowing in what polling station to vote. Nonetheless, only 17 percent said they had received voter education -- although this does not preclude that they learned about the electoral process in the media -- and less than half reported having seen a sample ballot. ¶6. (C) In a conversation two weeks ago, Hasan had told us that GEO had conducted some half a dozen voter education seminars, with about 150 attendees at each. Each seminar, while focusing on all the key elements of the voting process, was also targeted to address concerns of those in a particular area. Indeed, a sheikh from the town of Hamzah BAGHDAD 00000165 002 OF 002 told us that he had attended a seminar targeted for tribal leaders in his area; those present had been urged to pass on what they had learned to their community. In our most recent conversation, Hasan said that the GEO's voter education seminars are now being aired twice daily on local television and radio stations. Accusations of ISCI Manipulation -------------- ¶7. (C) Over recent weeks, several PRT contacts who are not sympathetic to Governor Khudari and his Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) party have complained to us that the party has used the power of incumbency to unfairly stack the deck, most notably by getting the police to look the other way while ISCI loyalists tear down rival parties, campaign posters and put up ISCI posters in their place. One contact asserted that the police had stashes of ISCI posters at checkpoints, to be put up at key locations. In an earlier meeting with us, GEO head Hasan had reported hearing similar accusations, but he added that few people came forward to file the formal complaints necessary for GEO to investigate. Hasan had repeatedly insisted that his office was fully independent and would lead vigorous investigations, although at least one contact critical of ISCI argued to us that GEO was under the Governor's thumb. ¶8. (C) While we cannot judge the veracity of these charges, we saw, in our recent trips through Diwaniyah city, numerous posters for parties and candidates representing a wide spectrum of parties. Whereas our earlier informal soundings of the public had indicated widespread disinterest in the election, the current polling found 67 percent of respondents indicating they planned to vote. ¶9. (C) One prominent sheikh in the province expressed to us his concern at ISCI's aggressive campaigning, including in areas of his influence. He noted that ISCI had been bribing voters and was giving every sign that it would continue doing so. The sheikh noted that he would counter ISCI's efforts, including by ferrying pro-Da'wa voters to the polls on election day, and implied that he would be offering his own bribes where necessary. He posited that despite ISCI's strong effort, Da'wa had a good shot at garnering the most votes in the election. ¶10. (C) Perhaps further evidence of ISCI's covert campaign practices, a trusted NGO representative who is active in non-partisan voter education efforts and in independent observation at polling sites contacted the PRT claiming to have witnessed one of the sons of ISCI's Abdul Aziz al-Hakim offering cash bribes equivalent to 20 USD to citizens for their support of ISCI-affiliated candidates in the tribal stronghold of Hamzah. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Things look positive for the election in Diwaniyah. IHEC has generally done a good job of preparing for election day, although it has had to play a bit of catch-up on a few issues and may not be as proactive about planning for contingencies as it should be. The public appears to expect a peaceful election, which should boost turnout, and seems comfortable with the complexities of the electoral process. Concerns linger, however, that ISCI could use its dominance in the current provincial government to manipulate the outcome to its own advantage. CROCKER