SPEAKER SAMARRAIE SAYS THAT HE CONCURS REFERENDUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001496

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: SPEAKER SAMARRAIE SAYS THAT HE CONCURS REFERENDUM
IS NOT NECESSARY

Classified By: DCM Robert Ford for reason 1.4 (b).


1. (C) Summary: Ayad al-Samarraie, Speaker of the Council of
Representatives (CoR),told the Ambassador and Commanding
General June 4 that a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement (SA) was unnecessary, but doubted the CoR could
pass a law nullifying the referendum requirement because of
elections issues. Samarraie suggested that Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki take action within the Council of Ministers
(CoM) to address the issue. Failing that, he suggested a
statement from the Presidency Council (PC) or from President
Jalal Talabani that the referendum should be cancelled or
postponed, and said he would raise this possibility with the
PM.


2. (C) Samarraie also said that the Article 23 Committee
was unable to provide a unified report on Kirkuk. He
suggested the U.S. pressure the Kurds to permit holding
Kirkuk elections with national elections using a quota
system, but agreed Kirkuk should not delay the national
election law. Samarraie also suggested an end to the Kurdish
boycott of the Ninewa provincial council by offering higher
governorate positions in exchange for Kurdish recognition of
the March 2003 boundaries, followed by negotiations about
Pesh presence below the green line. The Speaker expressed
concerns that the recent arrests of Diyala provincial council
members were based on old actions and were destabilizing
security. He also said the hydrocarbons law was in the CoR
and would be on the agenda soon and that an ad hoc committee
had begun review of an election law. End Summary.

Referendum -- Address the issue in the CoR?. . .
-------------- ---


3. (C) Discussion of the referendum on the Security Agreement
opened with Samarraie's agreement that the referendum was
neither necessary nor desirable. The Ambassador stressed that
the U.S. would live up to its obligations on the SA because
it was the basis for a longer-term relationship. Samarraie
said he had received a draft referendum law the previous day,
but had sent it back to committee with questions about the
threshold for an acceptable turnout. He noted that the
referendum could vote down the SA with a very small
percentage of voters, unless there were some minimum
threshold for voter turnout. He also said he was meeting
with the PM later in the evening to discuss the issue. The
Ambassador suggested that another law nullifying the
referendum requirement could be a solution. (Note: the
referendum requirement was included in the SA ratification
law passed by Parliament in late 2009. End Note.) The
Speaker's response was non-committal, saying he didn't know
if such an action was possible in the CoR, because of
upcoming elections. He also suggested a law that delayed
consideration of whether a referendum was necessary for
another six months -- after which it would be clear the U.S.
was living up to its commitments.

. . . Or in the CoM?
--------------


4. (C) In rejecting the CoR as the locus of nullification,
Samarraie asked the critical question of who would initiate
the process, and noted that 90 percent of Iraqi laws were
generated from the CoM. (Note: The November referendum
provision, however, was generated entirely with the CoR and
entirely by Vice President Hashimi and the Iraqi Islamic
Party, ultimately becoming the price by which the Sunnis
supported the Security Agreement. End Note.) He averred that
unless the GOI took a position, any nullifying law was
unlikely. He also said he must consult with the GOI, but that
the government would have to participate in this process by
Qthe government would have to participate in this process by
submitting a draft law. Samarraie said the referendum was a
critical issue that might be better addressed by the Council
of Ministers, which could take action on behalf of the PM.
Samarraie also stressed that the U.S. would have to help
shape the "kind of referendum it wanted." The Ambassador
stressed that it would not help the situation for the Embassy
to be seen lobbying the CoR against the referendum.

. . . Or in the PC?
--------------


5. (C) As a possible solution, the CG inquired about the role
of the Presidency Council (PC),and if it was possible for
the PC to announce that the referendum was unnecessary. The
Speaker noted that the issue was a political and electoral
issue, but said everyone wanted to be practical. He
suggested that Talibani might be practical, being less
concerned about the election. Samarraie said he would raise
the possibility of a PC-initiated action to quash the
referendum with the PM, but also noted that he did not expect
a clear answer from Maliki.

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UK SoFA
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador urged Samarraie to facilitate approval
of the UK Security Agreement, noting that the COM had
approved it. Samarraie said he had assured the British
Ambassador of his cooperation, but also said he was awaiting
the law. When informed that the CoM had approved the long
version with the training and naval elements, and that it had
been passed to the CoR, he appeared surprised. (Note: Draft
laws from the CoM are conveyed directly to the Speaker via
the Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs. End Note.)
The CG stressed that it was an institutional training
agreement with a small UK presence of approximately 350
troops and a naval contingent. Samarraie was sanguine, and
said that he expected it would pass, but that the Sadrists
would campaign against it.

Kirkuk
--------------


7. (C) The Speaker raised the issue of Kirkuk and the Article
23 Committee, noting that, even after a two-month extension,
the Committee had told him that a unified report was not
possible. He said that he had discussed the issue with SRSG
Staffan de Mistura and his deputy, Andrew Gilmour. Samarraie
opined that it would be best to have an election in Kirkuk
based on quotas as a temporary solution for the next four
years to balance Kirkuk's representation in the CoR.
Samarraie also stressed that this approach would require U.S.
pressure on the Kurds to accept quotas. He noted that giving
additional time to the Committee to work on a unified report
would delay a Kirkuk elections law, and time was short.


8. (C) The Ambassador asked if it was possible to extend
the rules from the last Kirkuk election, but Samarraie was
uncertain that this would be acceptable to all groups. He
offered instead to delay -- perhaps by two weeks -- any
statements about the Committee's results until he, the Legal
Committee and the Provinces Committee had reviewed the
different reports, and the US had time to obtain Kurdish
buy-in for quotas. Samarraie agreed that the Kirkuk issue
must be kept separate from debate on the national elections
law.

Mosul
--------------


9. (C) Samarraie recommended a two-step approach to
addressing the situation in Mosul, where Kurdish elected
officials are boycotting the provincial government. The
first step is to convince the Kurds to return to the
Provincial Council with leadership positions in exchange for
Kurdish acknowledgement of the March 2003 administrative
boundaries. This, said Samarraie, would be the basis for
discussions of the second step, negotiations between the GOI
and the Kurds on Kurdish military presence in the disputed
areas and subsequent application of the Article 140 process.
Samarraie said that he had met with Rowsh Shaways a couple of
weeks prior, and that Shaways had not rejected his idea.
Samarraie also said that the new IIP head, Osama Tikriti, was
meeting with KRG President Masoud Barzani on June 5 to
discuss this and other issues. He stressed that this
approach would require a unified message supporting the plan
from the U.S., the UN and the UK.

Diyala
--------------


10. (C) Samarraie expressed strong concerns about the
situation in Diyala. He said that the recent arrests of
Provincial Council members there were based on old reports,
prior to 2006. (Note: There was a general "amnesty" worked
out between GOI and Coalition Forces for insurgent
activities, except murder and terrorism, prior to 2006. End
Note.) Samarraie said the arrests were disturbing a fragile
security situation. Both the Ambassador and the CG assured
Samarraie they were following the situation closely.
QSamarraie they were following the situation closely.
Samarraie seemed calmed by these assurances.

CoR Agenda Items
--------------


11. (C) Samarraie said that the hydrocarbons law had arrived
in the CoR from the cabinet and would appear on the agenda in
the next two weeks. He also said that, while the parliament
could begin work, it could not complete it until the cabinet
sent the appendix too. He told the Ambassador that the
session would break between the end of July and September 1
and confirmed that the elections law was under review by an
ad hoc bloc leaders committee. He also said that he had

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discussed with UNAMI some concerns (lost votes, the
assignment of remainder votes, etc.) resulting from the
provincial elections and that the CoR was seeking UNAMI
technical assistance on these issues.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) With regard to the referendum, it should be noted
that Samarraie is saying what many other Iraqis are saying:
e. g. someone else - the PM, the cabinet, the Presidency
Council, should solve the problem or make it go away. There
appears to be unwillingness either to take the first stand,
or to take any public stand, against the referendum because
it is an election year. Samarraie, we learned from a USAID
contractor working at the election commission, went out of
his way to lobby this contractor to help the commission
conduct the referendum. Thus we are not so sure Samarraie
really opposes holding the referendum. We are working very
quietly, behind closed doors with top leaders, to generate
Iraqi action to turn this around and sidetrack the referendum
idea.
FORD