PRT SALAH AD DIN: PC CHAIRMAN EMERGING AS KEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001478 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PINS PINR ENRG IZ SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: PC CHAIRMAN EMERGING AS KEY PROVINCIAL POWERBOKER REF: A. BAGHDAD 1412 ¶B. BAGHDAD 80 ¶C. 08 BAGHDAD 3893 Classified By: PRT Leader Rick Bell for reasons 1.4 (d). This is a PRT Salah ad Din (SAD) reporting cable. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Ahmed Abdullah Abid Khalaf (aka Abu Mazin) is emerging as an influential leader and skillful politician in the SAD provincial government. In his first few weeks as chairman, Abu Mazin has asserted his authority with officials from all levels of government. He summoned the directors general of two important national utilities to appear before the PC and demanded more responsive service for SaD residents. He has invigorated the new PC by demanding 100 percent attendance at weekly meetings -- a major change from the previous Chairman, who held infrequent meetings that few attended. He asserted authority over sub-provincial officials by sending official notice that district officials will now act under PC "supervision." Although his moves have rankled some in the province, others welcome a more dynamic PC. END SUMMARY. ASSERTING HIMSELF IN ALL DIRECTIONS, PUSHING UP... -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Since taking his seat as PC chairman, Ahmed Abdullah Abid Khalaf ("Abu Mazin") has asserted himself as the dominant source of power in SaD. He has shown a willingness to challenge Government of Iraq (GOI) authority where it brushes up against SaD interests. One of his first actions as the new PC Chairman was to summon Dr. Ali Obeidi, the Director General of the Bayji Oil Refinery (BOR),to appear before the PC and answer questions. GOI officials could easily see a provincial official's call for the DG of Iraq's largest oil refinery ) a national, not provincial, asset - to report to the PC as exceeding his authority. Dr. Obeidi specifically asked the commander of the US Army Brigade Combat Team in SaD (3/25 IBCT) to attend the PC meeting, to deter PC members from applying improper pressure. Abu Mazin was courteous to Dr. Obeidi and praised him for taking action to improve the BOR, but urged him to create more jobs for residents of SaD, and criticized prior management of the BOR by the Ministry of Oil. ¶3. (C) In a May 24 meeting with the PRT and BCT, Abu Mazin showed more evidence of his willingness to assert himself with national authorities. While being careful to affirm respect for Iraq's law and Constitution, he voiced strong resentment toward the continued National Police (NP) presence in Samarra. Despite his frustration, Abu Mazin professed hope that a constructive solution could be found. Later, he demonstrated his intention to act as SaD's key interlocutor with outside officials by traveling to Samarra to participate in GEN Odierno's visit to the city. PUSHING HIS PEERS... -------------- ¶4. (C) Abu Mazin has shown an equal willingness to deal forcefully with fellow provincial-level officials. Since taking office, he has publicly demanded 100 percent attendance from PC members at weekly PC meetings, saying he will hold absent members accountable. This is a real change from the previous Chairman, who held less-frequent meetings that were usually ill-attended. Abu Mazin has also dealt strongly with challengers and rivals. In a May 13 meeting, he persuaded the PC to fire Qahtan Hamada al-Juburi, the Governor's Assistant for Technical Affairs. Qahtan had acted as a powerful taskmaster over all of SaD's project planning and implementation. (NOTE: In the previous provincial government, Abu Mazin was a PC member and previous Governor Qgovernment, Abu Mazin was a PC member and previous Governor Hamad Shekti's Assistant for Security Affairs. He and Qahtan clashed over control of contracting and project planning. Both men privately accused each other of corruption. The PRT worked closely with Qahtan in implementing several projects related to essential services. END NOTE). ¶5. (C) In the jockeying for positions in the new provincial government, Abu Mazin also outmaneuvered outgoing Governor Hamad, his former boss. The two ran on the same list (the Iraqi National List, under the auspices of Ayad Allawi). Abu Mazin initially pledged his support to reelect Hamad as Governor, but later reneged. ¶6. (C) Abu Mazin also shut out another rival, former Deputy Governor Abdullah Hussein Jebara, whom he had tried to have disqualified from the provincial elections on de-Ba'athification grounds (refs B and C). Abu Mazin was the top vote-getter in the January elections, and Abdullah, running on a different list, was fourth. The post-election alliance-building that resulted in Abu Mazin becoming PC Chairman was largely about freezing out Abdullah, who had been the most powerful figure in the province as Deputy Governor. Abu Mazin and his allies succeeded in preventing Abdullah from chairing any of the new PC committees, though he is a member of three important ones (security, development, investment). PUSHING DOWN... -------------- ¶7. (C) Abu Mazin has shown an equally strong hand to sub-provincial officials. On May 31, district officials in Tuz told the PRT they had received a letter from him that the PC will "supervise" the Tuz district council and the Qa'immaqam ("mayor"). The Qa'immaqam complained that this was overreaching by Abu Mazin, as the Qa'immaqam should report to the Governor, not the PC. ¶8. (C) Abu Mazin's attention to districts is prompting mixed reactions: along with concerns of interference, there is an appreciation of the greater willingness of the provincial government to engage in addressing public issues. The council of his home district Bayji reacted favorably when two PC members joined its weekly meeting on June 2. Similarly, on June 3 the Tuz district council was pleased that three PC members joined its meeting and began to address issues in the district. Not only was it good to see PC leaders directly engage district leaders, and for the chairman of an important PC committee (services) to visit a district of which he is not a resident (Tuz),but on the same day Tuz also saw the arrival of two electrical transformers, which the locals credited to the efforts of PC members from Tuz. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Abu Mazin (DOB approx. 1968) is a prominent figure from the Bayji area and a member of the Juburi Tribe, the largest in the province. His political skill has become more evident following the elections. He has shown that he is tough, well-connected, and unapologetic about taking on all challengers to his authority. It remains to be seen if he will completely eclipse former Deputy Governor Abdullah Hussein Jebara, who had previously been thought the strongest politician in SAD. ¶10. (C) Abu Mazin told PRT Off that he has a close relationship with former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, whom Abu Mazin says put him in touch with US intelligence before the 2003 invasion. Abu Mazin claims also to have been given secret military training in Texas, and then inserted into Iraq to prepare for the invasion, which led to his capture and torture at the hands of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. As evidence, Abu Mazin keeps an old Time magazine in his office with a story from 2003 titled "The Secret Collaborators" about a person (who he says was himself) named only as "al-Jaburi," accompanied by pictures of torture injuries that person suffered. END COMMENT. HILL