CABINET APPROVES UK AGREEMENT; EXPECTED TO BE

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001462 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ UK SUBJECT: CABINET APPROVES UK AGREEMENT; EXPECTED TO BE APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister Counselor Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: On June 2, the Council of Ministers (COM) approved an agreement allowing for the continued presence of UK forces - specifically 100 trainers and five naval ships and their crews, in Iraq. The agreement comes after weeks of failed negotiations and attempts to secure an extension to the UK's current memorandum of understanding (MOU),according to which UK forces must cease all operations by May 31 and depart Iraq by July 31. The agreement must now be approved by the Council of Representatives (COR),which is expected to resume session on June 8. The COR approval process will take at a minimum seven to nine days. Since the agreement provides only for training and naval operations, we do not judge that there will be significant opposition in the COR. The UK has begun making preparations for the departure of their remaining forces, to include imbedded UK officers within Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). The UK will likely seek to bolster its support for the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM -I) to augment proposed naval training operations. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) The UK has been frustrated over the last weeks by its failed efforts to secure a long-term agreement with the Government of Iraq (GOI) for the continued presence of British Forces to conduct training and naval operations. The COM rejected the UK's initial attempt at an exchange of letters, noting that any such an agreement must go to the COR for ratification. The UK then drafted a text for consideration by the COM, which was supported by Dr. Fadel, the Prime Minister's chief legal advisor. The COM, despite Dr. Fadel's support, rejected the draft and formed a committee which proposed significant changes to the agreement. The committee's proposal accorded lesser jurisdictional immunities to the UK than its current MOU, which was unacceptable to HMG. UK Special Envoy Simon McDonald arrived in Baghdad on June 1 to assist with negotiations. After meeting with various GOI officials, on June 2 the UK submitted to the COM a new proposal, which was approved without revision. ¶3. (S/NF) The proposed agreement, which is valid for one year from the date it enters into force, stipulates the British presence "shall not exceed in any way one hundred members of UK Forces and the associated civilian component and five naval ships and their respective crews." It authorizes the provision of "tactical maritime support for the Iraqi Forces to protect Iraqi oil platforms and Iraqi territorial waters, in co-ordination with Iraqi Forces and United States Forces," as well as "training naval forces and marines." Additionally, the UK will be accorded immunities from legal process equivalent to their current MOU, which it is satisfied with. ¶4. (S/NF) Per the current MOU, UK forces were required to cease operations in Iraq by May 31 but are authorized to remain until July 31. UK forces have ceased all combat operations and are making preparations to leave Iraq by July 31, including embedded staff officers within MNF-I. ¶5. (S/NF) The new agreement must now go to the COR for approval. The COR, which is currently in recess, is expected to resume session on June 8. Sources in the COR indicate that because the agreement limits UK forces to uncontroversial training and naval operations, there should Quncontroversial training and naval operations, there should be little opposition from COR members. Both UK and US missions will seek support in the COR for the agreement. ¶6. (S/NF) Comment: This agreement provides the UK an honorable and dignified way to wind down its mission here - with the possibility of a much longer-term relationship in naval cooperation and training. This is a good thing for Iraq, the US and the UK. The last minute sudden death nature of these negotiations was a fault of both the UK and the Iraqi sides (a combustible combination of "take it or leave it" negotiating styles). We engaged heavily with both to find a mutually agreeable formula - and ultimately succeeded. The next step is the COR and we will continue to quietly support the UK in securing passage. We do not believe the agreement will elicit strong opposition in the COR. As difficult as this process has been, we believe the fact that the PM eventually came on board bodes well for ongoing efforts to nail down an agreement on NTM-I (to which Maliki is more favorably disposed). End Comment. HILL