AMBASSADOR AND CG MEET TURKISH SPECIAL ENVOY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001389 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ TU SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND CG MEET TURKISH SPECIAL ENVOY REF: BAGHDAD 1222 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Turkish Special Envoy to Iraq Murat Ozcelik will be the next Turkish Ambassador to Iraq, Ozcelik told Ambassador Hill and General Odierno May 23. The main points he intended to raise in an anticipated meeting with PM Maliki were his May 17 meeting with KRG President Masoud Barzani and the arrangements for a planned June 10 visit of FM Davutoglu to Iraq. He explained the circumstances of the May 1 Muqtada al-Sadr visit to Turkey. Ozcelik discussed the importance of the time preceding Iraqi national elections and raised questions about Maliki's suitability to continue as PM, claiming he is too sectarian. He also cited growing concern that Sunnis and Kurds may bring votes of no confidence against particular ministers as a way of portraying Maliki as an ineffective leader to the populace. ¶2. (C) (Summary continued) On hydrocarbons, Ozcelik said DNO, a private Norwegian oil company, received KRG permission to connect the Taqtaq field to the Iraq-Turkey pipeline, but did not have permission to run oil through it. In response to a question from CG Odierno, Ozcelik admitted that Turkey has supported the al Hudba Gathering party in Ninewa but downplayed the continuing nature of the support as merely keeping political channels open with all parties. He blamed both Kurds and Sunnis for exaggerating their differences and engaging in unnecessarily provocative rhetoric. On water issues, Ozcelik said recent "stupid mistakes" in Turkey resulted in reduced water flow to Syria and, therefore, to Iraq but this would be rectified soon with a significant increase in water flow to the Euphrates. End summary. ¶3. (C) On May 23, Turkish Special Envoy to Iraq Murat Ozcelik met with the Ambassador; Commanding General, Multi-National Force Iraq Raymond Odierno; POLAD to CG Odierno Emma Sky; Minister Counselor for Political Military Affairs Michael Corbin; and Senior Advisor on the North Peter Vrooman. At the outset, Ozcelik revealed that he had recently been informed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu that he would be named the next Turkish Ambassador to Iraq - pending agrment. Ozcelik commented that his predecessor waited more than 40 days before receiving agrment, but he would press ;Foreign Minister Zebari for a more speedy resolution of his nomination. ¶4. (C) Ozcelik said he expected to meet with Maliki and would brief the PM on his May 17 meeting with KRG President Barzani. He said he would also discuss the planned June 10 visit of Davutoglu to Iraq, during which he is expected to go to Basra to officially open the new Turkish Consulate there. -------------- MUQTADA IN TURKEY: HOW'D THAT HAPPEN? -------------- ¶5. (C) Asked by the Ambassador how the recent visit of Muqtada al-Sadr (MAS) to Turkey came about, Ozcelik said approximately ten days before the visit, he received a call from the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) spokesman Salah al-Obeidi who said the Sadrist trend wanted to hold a meeting in Istanbul with 70 or 80 party members from throughout Europe. The aim of the meeting was to discuss the policies of the group and to come up with "a new vision." There was no mention of MAS. After conferring with the FM, Ozcelik informed Obeidi that the GOT would permit the meeting. The Qinformed Obeidi that the GOT would permit the meeting. The GOT, he said, thought it wise "to keep an open channel" with MAS and his people. Then, shortly before the meeting, Obeidi called again, asking if MAS could attend the meeting. Ozcelik said the GOT had also checked that the USG had no objection. He said the GOT was not concerned about Maliki's reaction. "We thought as long as the Americans were ok with it, we could handle the rest. Maliki is always suspicious anyway." He added that the GOT policy of meeting with "everybody" was well known and Maliki should not be troubled by the engagement. ¶6. (C) Ozcelik said during al-Sadr's meetings in Turkey (with the President and the PM),his first question to both was whether they "really believed the Americans were going to leave Iraq." Ozcelik described MAS as being opposed to federalism, but said he did not speak out against the SOFA. He said Gul and Erdogan told MAS they had spoken to President BAGHDAD 00001389 002 OF 003 Obama and were assured that the USG intended to withdraw from Iraq. Ozcelik said GOT officials thought the Government of Iran must have prodded MAS into taking the trip to Turkey - probably to seek some degree of reconciliation between Sunnis and Shi'a. Ozcelik said MAS accused the U.S. of fanning violence in Iraq (allegedly as a means of justifying continued presence in Iraqi cities),but MAS said he is willing to cooperate on anything Turkey proposed. Ozcelik said, "We definitely have a channel open to Muqtada." ¶7. (C) Ozcelik said different Sunni groups are approaching the GOT to bring non-sectarian parties together. He said it is vital for Iraq to have a coalition of non-sectarian Shi'a and Sunni parties and said Salih Mutlaq, Ayad Allawi and others are trying to bring certain groups together. He added that the United Iraqi Front could be trying to coalesce and it would have power whether the Sadrists were a part of it or not. Therefore, he said, Iran appears to be comfortable with the possibility of the Sadrists marrying up with Sunni political parties - as another means of extending Iranian/Shi'a influence over Iraqi politics. Ozcelik said if MAS could be persuaded to join the Sunnis, he might even become the Prime Minister. -------------- WORRIES ABOUT MALIKI -------------- ¶8. (C) Ozcelik said the GOT is growing tired of hearing so many complaints about Maliki. "If everyone is complaining about the same guy, there must be something wrong with the guy," he said. Ozcelik predicted that Sunnis and Kurds in the Council of Representatives (COR) might try for a vote of no confidence on Maliki. The Ambassador noted that other parties are unlikely to pursue that route absent a viable alternative; Vrooman added that parties in the COR seem to be looking to target particular ministers for votes of no confidence on claims of corruption in order to make Maliki appear as an ineffective leader. Ozcelik complained that Maliki is trying to govern by committees made up, essentially, of Dawa party members as opposed to elected members of parliament. ¶9. (C) In response to comments by the Ambassador regarding the Prime Minister's political ambition and strategic vision, Ozcelik said if Maliki was a nationalist (instead of overly sectarian) and if he would stand up against Iran, then the GOT would support Maliki. The growing problem of Arab Kurd tensions and a poor record on delivering services still persists. "If we support Maliki, and he comes to power again after the elections and only takes care of Dawa or Shi'a, what will happen? Power should be decentralized a little," he said. Ozcelik said that President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan both warned him early on: Maliki is a survivor, and he is cruel. "He may be the easy solution in the short term," Ozcelik posited, "but is he the best answer for the long term?" The Ambassador cautioned that while Iraqi politicians are already in campaign mode, it is too early to tell who will emerge as the next prime minister of Iraq. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador related how the PM had noted how much he "cherished" Iraqi-Turkish relations. Ozcelik said when he met Maliki, he would offer his continued support and invite him to Turkey after the visit of Davutoglu to Iraq in June. Ozcelik said if Maliki were able to show that he is open to reconciliation, things might improve - but he had thus far Qreconciliation, things might improve - but he had thus far refused to show any willingness. According to Ozcelik, none of Iraq's neighbors are pleased with Maliki either - with the possible exception of Iran. -------------- -------------- PROBLEMS WITH SHAHRISTANI AND OIL DEALS IN THE KRG -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Ozcelik singled out Minister for Oil, Hussein Shahristani, for particular criticism. Hearing the Ambassador's assessment that agreement on a hydrocarbons law is unlikely at this juncture, Ozcelik asked what would be different after elections if Maliki were again PM and Shahristani were still in office. He said that DNO, a Norwegian company, received permission from the Ministry of Oil's State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) only to connect to the oil pipeline, but not the concomitant approval for running oil through the line. Ozcelik explained that the GOT and Turkish oil companies are growing impatient with the situation in the KRG - fearing they are losing out on valuable, available opportunities in northern Iraq. The President of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) BAGHDAD 00001389 003 OF 003 (presumably Mehmet Uysal) recently told him he would "forget about the south," and pursue a deal with Masoud in the north for all the oil and gas, saying "that would be enough for us." Ozcelik said he strongly counseled patience as such a strategy would cause enormous problems. (Comment: In its impatience, TPAO is ignoring the likelihood that any direct deals with the KRG will end up in the same impasse that has complicated DNO's efforts to get returns on its investment. We should continue to discourage Turkish desires to conclude oil and gas contracts with the KRG, just as we do with U.S. firms, on the grounds that such agreements will merely exacerbate and complicate Erbil-Baghdad relations. End comment.) -------------- SUPPORT FOR AL-HUDBA -------------- ¶12. (C) CG Odierno asked Ozcelik whether the Turkish Consulate in Mosul provided support to the al-Hudba Gathering political party of Athiel al-Nujafi in Ninewa. Ozcelik conceded that the GOT had "helped out Osama before the elections." (Note: Osama Nujafi is a COR member and brother to al-Hudba leader Athiel. End note.) He said the GOT help was always aimed at doing something positive - never at the expense of others. Ozcelik said he told Osama Nujafi during the May 8 conflict in Ninewa (ref A) that the rhetoric on both sides was too extreme. "Neither Masoud nor these guys (al-Hudba) want to fight. They both know their limits," he said. "While the presence of the Peshmerga makes some people uneasy, there has been exaggeration on both sides." Ozcelik said the value-added from the GOT in Iraq is its influence over individuals who have respect for his government and for him personally. "If the U.S. and Turkey work the same message, it can be very good," he said. -------------- -------------- TURKEY PREPARED TO INCREASE WATER FLOW ON THE EUPHRATES -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question as to whether Iraq's water shortages had been discussed with Turkey, Ozcelik said "our guys made some stupid mistakes" on water but that this would be resolved now. The Ambassador stressed the importance of Turkey addressing this significant, public Iraqi concern. (Note: While it is unclear how Turkey will directly help with getting water to Iraq, at the conclusion of the meeting, Turkish DCM Sencer Yondem explained to PolMilOff that part of the issue was that the GOT knew Turkish water flow into Syria was as low as 200 to 300 cubic centimeters per second (c/c/s). He said the GOT not only intended to "correct" the flow to 500 c/c/s, but they will also 'probably compensate' Syria for past shortages. Not to do so, he said, would subject Turkey to international opprobrium. Yondem said water would then flow through Syria to Iraq. End note.) HILL