DPM ESSAWI TELLS CODEL LEAHY PM MALIKI IS "A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001380 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IZ SUBJECT: DPM ESSAWI TELLS CODEL LEAHY PM MALIKI IS "A DICTATOR IN DEMOCRACY'S CLOTHING" Classified By: Amb. Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is using the democratic process and liberal rhetoric to conceal a move to dictatorship Deputy Prime Minister Rafe Essawi told Senators Patrick Leahy (VT),Mark Warner (VA) and Sheldon Whitehouse (RI),and Ambassador Hill on May 23. Essawi outlined the familiar list of Sunni complaints: lack of Sons of Iraq (SOI) integration into security forces, lack of implementation of de-Ba'athification legislation, and failure to reconcile former military officers in Syria and Jordan. He also claimed that the recent arrests in Diyala of a Provincial Council member and two other individuals were the PM's retribution for the Council of Representative's interrogations on ministerial corruption, citing a threat from Maliki to Speaker Ayad al-Samarraie during a meeting Essawi had hosted. On elections, Essawi voiced a preference for open lists, but expected that the election would use closed lists with multiple districts. He said that liberal-secular groups were splintered, but that he was hosting a meeting to try to form a liberal secular coalition. Dictator in Democracy's Clothing -------------- ¶2. (C) Essawi's pessimistic outlook reflected what he identified as two major concerns: the emergence of a new dictator (Maliki) manipulating the processes of democracy and Maliki's new rhetoric of non-sectarian consensus building that concealed a sectarian agenda. He cited as indicators the increased use of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) against potential political opponents, and political statements by clerics in the press. Essawi stressed his desire for the emergence of a liberal secular model of government, but noted that Iraq had been unsuccessful in developing the necessary institutions over the past four years. Sunni Targeting - Diyala -------------- ¶3. (C) When Senator Warner asked about Diyala, Essawi responded with a list of Sunni grievances including de-Ba'athification, former military officers and the Sons of Iraq (SOI). Essawi described two ways of looking at the SOI: nationalists or Ba'athist/AQI tools. Essawi said that Maliki's advisors believed SOI were the latter, leading them to resist integrating SOI into Iraqi society. The advisors would agree in principle but not implement the programs, and Essawi cited the SOI's slow integration into Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Essawi also claimed that within the Council of Ministers (COM),the Ministers of Education and Municipalities refused to employ SOI. Essawi claimed that the ministers were part of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) in Parliament, and that Maliki would not press them to accept SOI. (Note: Essawi was probably referring to the PM's various political bargains in his continuing efforts to reconstitute the UIA. End Note.) Essawi noted a similar lack of implementation on de-Ba'athification programs, via the Accountability and Justice Law. Essawi also claimed that former military officers in Syria who were registering to return to Iraq were told by Iraq's Ambassador in Syria not to return. ¶4. (C) Essawi also cited Diyala an example of bad behavior by Maliki's government. Essawi said he had hosted both Speaker Ayad al-Samarraie and the PM to discuss political reform. According to Essawi, the PM opposed the interrogation of ministers as part of Samarraie's anti-corruption agenda. When Samarraie insisted on the interrogations, Essawi claimed that Maliki threatened to go after some MPs and political leaders. QMaliki threatened to go after some MPs and political leaders. The arrests in Diyala happened shortly after, Essawi stated, calling this an indicator of dictatorship. When the Ambassador inquired if Essawi had discussed this with the PM, Essawi said the PM was defending the corruption, because the exposure reflects badly on him. Essawi also noted that many political leaders were concerned by the various unconstitutional bodies under the personal direction of the PM. (Note: These bodies are a reference to the Office of the Commander in Chief, the Baghdad Brigade, and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau. These were de-funded in the FY2009 Budget Law, but continue to operate. End Note.) Elections -------------- ¶5. (C) Essawi said he thought that elections would use closed lists and multiple districts. When asked by the Ambassador, Essawi said he preferred open lists, which would increase participation of smaller parties. He also said the GOI should submit a new law, because the 2005 law had a single district which could create issues with allocating BAGHDAD 00001380 002 OF 002 compensatory seats. He also noted that there was new intimidation against smaller political entities to discourage their participation. Essawi said that the liberal secular groups were splintered, but that he was meeting with political leaders such as Ayad Allawi, Saleh al-Mutlaq, and Jawad al-Bulani to discuss a liberal secular coalition. When Senator Warner inquired about the chances of success for this coalition, Essawi noted wryly that each individual wants to be the leader of his own group; compromise would be difficult. At Senator Whitehouse's query about the post-election power transition, Essawi predicted there could be problems because Maliki was used to controlling everything. Essawi welcomed Senatory Leahy's idea of international election observers, but said he doubted their effectiveness, because their presence would not be widespread enough to prevent political shenanigans with ballot boxes. He also said that refugee voting would be technically difficult, according to IHEC. ¶6. (U) CODEL Leahy has not had an opportunity to clear on this cable. HILL